S. Hrg. 103-900 UNITID STATES DUALUSE EXPORTS TO IRAQ AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE HEALTH OF TOE PERSIAN GULF WAR VEIIRANS Y 4. B 22/3: S, HRG. 103-900 . United States Daul-Use Exports to I Hr xx^riRING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS SECOND SESSION ON UNITED STATES CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE-RELATED DUAL-USE EXPORTS TO IRAQ AND THEIR POSSIBLE IMPACT ON THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR MAY 25, 1994 Printed for the use of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs ^AV,^ ^*'^7^*\ is\ifj. ^ ■^"&iiL ^'^^^^ S. Hrg. 103-900 UNITED STATES DUALUSE EXPORTS TO IRAQ AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE HEALTH OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR VETERANS HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS SECOND SESSION ON UNITED STATES CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE -RELATED DUAL-USE EXPORTS TO IRAQ AND THEIR POSSIBLE IMPACT ON THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR MAY 25, 1994 FVinted for the use of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 86-558 CC WASHINGTON : 1994 For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402 ISBN 0-16-047069-2 COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS DONALD W. RIEGLE, JR., Michigan, Chairman ALFONSE M. D'AMATO, New York PHIL GRAMM, Texas CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri CONNIE MACK, Florida LAUCH FAIRCLOTH, North Carolina ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah WILLIAM V. ROTH, JR., Delaware PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut JIM SASSER, Tennessee RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusette RICHARD H. BRYAN, Nevada BARBARA BOXER, California BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL, Colorado CAROL MOSELEY-BRAUN, Illinois PATTY MURRAY, Washington Steven B. Harris, Sta/f Director and Chief Counsel Howard A. Menell, Republican Sta/f Director James J. TUITE, III, Professional Staff & Special Assistant to the Chairman for National Security Issues and Dual-Use Export Policies Robin EddingTON, Senior Fellow, Women's Executive Leadership Program Edward M. Malan, Editor (II) CONTENTS WEDNESDAY, MAY 25, 1994 Page Opening statement of Chairman Riegle 1 Opening statements, comments, or prepared statements of: Senator D'Amato 6 Prepared statement 87 Senator Boxer 7 Senator Faircloth 9 Senator Bond 11 Prepared statement 88 Senator Bennett 12 Senator Kerry 58 Senator Moseley-Braun 90 Senator Campbell 90 WITNESSES Edwin Dom, Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC; accompanied by: Dr. Theodore M. Prociv, Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Weapons, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC; and Dr. John Kriese, Chief Officer for Ground Forces, Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC 14 Prepared statement 91 Response to written questions of: Senator Riegle 104 Senator D'Amato 121 AFTERNOON SESSION Dr. Mitchell Wallerstein, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Counterproliferation Policy, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC 60 Dr. Gordon C. Oehler, Director, Nonproliferation Center, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC 67 Prepared statement 93 Additional Material Supplied for the Record Letters concerning Persian Gulf War Health Issues 98 Department of Veterans' Affairs Gulf War Syndrome Registry 102 U.S. Army Medical Materiel Agency — Medical Customer Shopping Guide for Saudi Arabia 196 May 25, 1994 Committee Report 225 October 7, 1994 Committee Report 434 (III) UNITED STATES DUAL-USE EXPORTS TO IRAQ AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE HEALTH OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR VETERANS WEDNESDAY, MAY 25, 1994 U.S. Senate, Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Washington, DC. The Committee met at 10:10 a.m., in room SD-106 of the Dirk- sen Senate Office Building, Senator Donald W. Riegle, Jr. (Chair- man of the Committee) presiding. OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN DONALD W. RIEGLE, JR. The Chairman. The Committee will come to order. Let me welcome all those in attendance this morning. This is a very important hearing and we'll take whatever time we need today to pursue all of the issues that Members want to raise. Of course, we have a follow-on hearing later in the afternoon. I'm going to give an opening statement that summarizes what brings us to this hearing this morning. Then I'm going to call on Senator D'Amato and other Members in the order in which they've arrived. I also want to acknowledge the presence in the room of some of our Gulf War veterans who are suffering from the Gulf War Syn- drome. I appreciate very much both their service to this country and their attendance this morning. Back in 1992, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, which is the Committee which has Senate oversight for the Export Administration Act, held an inquiry into the United States export policy to Iraq prior to the Persian Gulf War. During that hearing it was learned that U.N. inspectors had identified many United States-manufactured items that had been exported from the United States to Iraq under licenses issued by the Department of Commerce, and that these items were used to further Iraq's chemi- cal and nuclear weapons development and missile delivery system development programs. The Committee has worked to ensure since that time that this will not happen again and the Export Administration Act legisla- tion we reported out yesterday by a 19 to nothing bipartisan vote is an illustration of that. Nearly a year ago, several Persian Gulf War veterans from Michigan contacted my office to complain that the Department of Veterans' Affairs was not adequately treating the myriad of medi- (1) cal symptoms that they were suffering from. These veterans were suffering from what has come to be known as Gulf War Syndrome. Many of them were being treated symptomatically, with no long- lasting, positive effects on their health. Others were being referred for psychiatric evaluation because personnel in the Department of Veterans' Affairs were at a loss to explain their physical symptoms. We'll come back to that later today. Then, in July 1993, the Czechoslovakian Minister of Defense an- nounced that Czechoslovak chemical decontamination units had de- tected the chemical warfare agent Sarin in areas of northern Saudi Arabia during the early phases of the Gulf War. They had attrib- uted the detections to fallout from coalition bombing of Iraqi chemi- cal warfare agent production facilities. In September 1993, I released a staff report on this issue and, in turn, issued an amendment to the fiscal year 1994 National De- fense Authorization Act, that provided preliminary funding for medical research of the illness and an investigation of reported ex- posures and sicknesses of our Gulf War veterans. When I released that report, the estimates of the number of vet- erans suffering from these unexplained illnesses varied from hun- dreds, according to the Department of Defense, to thousands, ac- cording to the Department of Veterans' Affairs. It is now believed that tens of thousands of U.S. Gulf War veterans are suffering from the symptoms associated with the Gulf War Syndrome. Mean- while, hundreds, and possibly thousands, of servicemen and women still on active duty are reluctant to come forward for fear of losing their jobs and, in turn, losing their medical care and coverage. These Gulf War veterans are reporting muscle and joint pain, memory loss, intestinal and heart problems, fatigue, nasal conges- tion, urinary urgency, diarrhea, twitching, rashes, sores, and a number of other symptoms. They began experiencing these mul- tiple symptoms during and after, often many months after, their tour of'^duty in the Gulf. I might say that, in virtually every case, these veterans were in excellent physical condition when they went over to the Gulf In fact, under the voluntary Army arrangements, you have to be in exceptionally good condition today just to qualify for service in the Armed Forces, and that was particularly true for many who were asked to serve in the Gulf War. So we're talking about people with exceptionally strong health profiles before their service in the Gulf. The Department of Defense, when first approached regarding this issue by the Committee staff, contended that there was no evi- dence that U.S. forces were exposed to chemical warfare agents. However, on September 7, 1993, a Defense Department medical of- ficial told my staff that the issue of chemical and biological warfare agent exposure had not been explored because it was the position of "military intelligence" that such exposures never occurred. Then, during a November 10, 1993, press briefing at the Penta- gon, the Department of Defense acknowledged that the Czech gov- ernment did detect chemical agents in the Southwest Asia theater of operations. After analyzing the results of the Czech report, the Department of Defense concluded that the detections were unre- lated to the "mysterious health problems that had victimized some of our veterans." The Ranking Member of this Committee, Senator D'Amato, and I have released today a report detailing an inquiry into this issue that provides important new information based upon Government documentation and other official reports. The report establishes, first of all, that, contrary to the Depart- ment of Defense assertions, there is clear evidence that the chemi- cal agents detected by the Czechs and others were at sufficient lev- els to harm U.S. troops. Second, it establishes that the chemical agent detectors used by U.S. forces during the Gulf War were not sufficiently sensitive to detect sustained low levels of chemical agent and to monitor per- sonnel for contamination. U.S. Army Material Safety Data Sheets, called MSDS, indicate that chronic exposure to levels of over 1/ 10,000th milligram per cubic meter of Sarin is hazardous and re- quires the use of protective equipment. The minimum amount of chemical agent required to activate the automatic chemical agent detection alarm that was commonly used during the war was 1,000 times greater than this amount. In other words, the levels for the alarms used in the war were set at a rate 1,000 times greater than the actual level that we know from other military records to be damaging and hazardous to people if they are exposed to them over a period of time. Third, the report provides detailed weather and information from unclassified satellite imagery which confirms that during much of the war, the smoke plumes from the coalition bombings were mov- ing directly over U.S. troop positions. Fourth, it explains that the United States did not have effective biological agent detectors deployed with the capability to confirm whether or not troops were being exposed to biological agents. During a November 1993, unclassified briefing for Members of the United States Senate, in response to direct questioning, a DoD official said that the Department of Defense was withholding clas- sified information on the exposure of U.S. forces to biological mate- rials. Then in a Department of Defense-sponsored Conference on Counterproliferation held at Los Alamos National Laboratory on May 6 and 7, 1994, this same official admitted that biological agent detection is a priority development for the Department of Defense since there currently is no biological agent detection system fielded with any U.S. forces anywhere in the world. Fifth, it provides evidence that the United States shipped biologi- cal materials to Iraq which contributed to the Iraqi biological war- fare program. The report also draws upon direct eyewitness accounts from full interviews of more than 600 Gulf War veterans who were directly interviewed by Committee staff. A representative cross-section of 30 of these individuals is presented in full detail in the report, but it is very illustrative of the entire body of interviews that we have now taken, and we are continuing to take interviews and we will continue to do so. The information provided by the veterans indicated that expo- sure to chemical and possibly biological agents was widespread — widespread! Detections were confirmed by chemical specialists de- ployed in Saudi Arabia, in Kuwait, and in Iraq. Despite the fact that during the air war, the chemical alarms continued to sound frequently, and despite the fact that the Czech, the French, and some United States commanders were confirming they were sounding because of trace amounts of nerve agents in the air, from the coalition bombings of Iraqi chemical facilities, storage depots and bunkers. United States troops were often told that there was no danger. Some reported to the Committee that they turned the alarms off because they sounded so often during the air war. After the war, in addition to tens of thousands of other chemical munitions, U.N. inspectors — now listen carefully to this — U.N. in- spectors found and destroyed 28 SCUD chemical warheads contain- ing the chemical nerve agent Sarin. According to a Department of Defense official, these warheads had been obtained from the former Soviet Union. The report also cites an increasing number of cases of spouses and children who re- port the same symptoms as the veterans, indicating a strong possi- bility of the transmissibility of the syndrome. This is an extremely worrisome issue that now confronts those families in the country. The emerging pattern of information in this area in terms of family problems of spouses and children requires immediate additional in- vestigative effort. And I don't want to hear the Defense Depart- ment or anybody else in the Executive Branch of Government say that we don't have the money to do this job. We waste money on a million other things. [Applause.] It's time we got to the bottom of this problem. The report also recommends the immediate declassification and release of all classified or special access information relating to Iraqi chemical and biological warfare programs and information re- lated to the detection or discovery of chemical, chemical precursor, or biological warfare-related materials. It's time to put it all out into the light of day. It demands that a thorough and detailed epidemiological study be conducted on all Gulf War veterans — on all of them — to deter- mine the origins and causes of the illnesses and the report of trans- mission of the syndromes to family members. It calls for the estab- lishment of a comprehensive medical testing regime for all sympto- matic Gulf War veterans and their family members. We have not had a situation like this before and it's not enough to use a Catch-22 part of the Government military establishment to say that if a family member is now sick because of an exposure, that we don't have any procedure to provide health care for them. I think we have to establish a procedure to provide health care for them. That's part of our responsibility. That's what America is sup- posed to be all about — about honor and decency with respect to our service men and women, and certainly to their families that are now showing these same symptoms and these same medical prob- lems. The report also calls for the positive presumption of service con- nection for the purposes of receiving necessary medical treatment and determining disability compensation and vocational rehabilita- tion eligibility. We can't have a situation in this country where we have veterans that have served 10, 20, or 30 years, who went over to the Persian Gulf in excellent health and who have come home and who are sick, like some in this room today, and have the military establish- ment, in effect, walk away from them. And not only not provide the kind of adequate medical treatment and coverage, but to leave them in a situation that when they're out of the service, and if they don't have a service-connected disability adequate to support them- selves, they can't possibly go out and get private health insurance. The insurance companies don't want them, or if they do, they charge a premium that those veterans can't afford to pay. We're not going to have this in America. The Executive Branch had better wake up, from the Secretary of Defense up and down the line. It's time we give a positive presumption of service connec- tion for the purposes of receiving necessary medical treatment and determining disability compensation and vocational rehabilitation eligibility. It's the minimum we can do. Finally, it calls for Government-financed health care for the spouses and children determined to have contacted a service-con- nected illness from a Gulf War veteran. If the Department of Defense intended to conceal these exposures during the Gulf War to avoid the physical and mental disruption their use would have had on our tactical planning and deployment at the time, then there might be some way of understanding, at least in a battle situation, why that might be their thinking. But now that the war is over, hoping to avoid responsibility for the cas- ualties of this conflict is an entirely different matter. Over the last 8 months, our office has been contacted by over 1,000 Gulf War veterans directly. In addition to veterans from the United States, we've also been contacted by sick veterans of the Canadian, British, and Australian armed services who served in the Persian Gulf and who also suffer from this disabling syndrome. This is not a mental problem with the veterans. It may be a mental problem over at the Defense Department. It is not a mental problem with the veterans. [Applause.] The veterans of the Gulf War have asked us for nothing more than the assistance that they have earned. I think any refusal to come to their full assistance and to that of their family members who also have these problems now, would cause any thinking per- son to just question the integrity of the operation that's calling the signals with respect to getting to the bottom of this issue. I want to just say one other thing before yielding to Senator D'Amato, and I appreciate very much his leadership and concern on this issue. I've served here now for 28 years, through seven Presidents. I've seen our Government lie to us before in other war situations. I saw how long it took for our Grovernment to understand we had a prob- lem with Agent Orange. We had sick veterans all across this coun- try trying to cope with the problems, and their family members try- ing to cope with the problems, but nobody could figure it out in the military establishment. We're not going to have that repeated in this situation. If I find anybody that comes before our Committee and who, under oath, gives false testimony, incomplete testimony, misleading testimony, or disingenuous testimony designed to create a false pic- ture, we're going to pursue that individual with every single piece of authority that we have to see to it that they don't serve in this Government and that whatever the truth is, that the truth come out. We're not going to tolerate that kind of situation. It has nothing to do with party. I've been in both parties in my service in the Congress and I've served under Presidents of both parties and Secretaries of Defense under both parties. It has noth- ing to do with that. It has to do with what the truth is, and about honor and integrity, and our military structure, and our respon- sibility to our veterans and their families. I care a lot more about what happens to the veterans than I do about our former Secretaries of Defense. In fact, at the end of the day, they're a lot more important because they're the ones that go out and get the job done, especially when the dirty work has to be done. [Applause.] So I'm tired of all of the circuitous, incomplete, and mental lapses that I'm getting out of the military establishment. I want to say it as bluntly as I can because we're not going to settle for that, and if anybody thinks so they're sadly mistaken. I urge everybody to read this report today. If we have to have a hearing where we bring the veterans in one by one and have 100, 200, 300, or 400 and do it day after day after day to get the atten- tion of the people at the top of this Government, then I'm prepared to do it. This is not going to be an issue that gets swept under the rug. We've seen that happen before. It's not going to happen now, not with anything that falls under the jurisdiction of this Committee. Senator D'Amato. [Applause.] OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ALFONSE M. D'AMATO Senator D'Amato. Mr. Chairman, let me begin today by express- ing my appreciation for your commitment to addressing the serious issues that are raised, whether the exposure to chemical and bio- logical agents during the Gulf War with Iraq are causes of what has come to be known as the Gulf War Syndrome. Whether or not the exposure to immunization from the possible effects of these chemicals may have played a role in bringing about a situation in which no one can deny, cannot be explained away by simply saying that these are problems that come as a result of a state of mind that one has, as opposed to very real illnesses that may have been caused by any one of these factors. The report is very illuminating. Pages 134 and 135 take us to the issue of the question of the effectiveness of the drugs and the long- term impact that were administered to the veterans in an attempt to immunize them against possible biological attacks. These drugs have not received the full approval of the FDA. How many and how often were these drugs used? Which of them were experimental in nature? What have we done in ascertaining the impact of the ad- ministration of these drugs on our veterans? Have we made or begun to make the kinds of studies that can lead us to the informa- tion and facts necessary? I've raised this with the Assistant Secretary just a few moments ago. This has been the subject of some hearings that have been held, not open to the public, touching on some sensitive, very sen- sitive areas. The Congress is very much concerned and the Chairman is very, very right. When the Defense Department is issuing orders to peo- ple that they should not testify or should not appear publicly in uniform to make known their plight, I believe they're overreaching. And I think it smells, then, of the kind of situation which we should all be contemptuous of. We want the facts. I don't know the facts. But I know one thing — it's not good enough to simply try to dismiss the thousands of veterans and their complaints from themselves and their families by saying, it's a mental state of mind. It is improper to attempt to turn this around and make people who are truly ill, where they had no ill- nesses before, and try to blame this, in effect, on that person, by making them feel that he or she somehow has a mental problem, and that it's not real. And that's exactly what is taking place. If we treat people with disdain — and that is what is happening — there will come the kinds of reactions that we've seen. I don't think we should loan ourselves to that. I don't believe that most people are doing that deliberately. But I think that is the manner in which it is being perceived. I believe that the Administration, the Defense Department, must show a greater degree of sensitivity and has to devote more of its resources and energies to getting the facts. It can't wait another 2 or 3 years. It's something that we are entitled to and it's something that we should be letting those who are experiencing these prob- lems know what we're doing. You can have the best intentions and the best programs in the world in terms of trying to get the facts. But if you're not letting the veterans know, if you're not letting the Congress know, if you're saying, well, we're working diligently, why, then, it loses its impact. I think that it is absolutely imperative that we get these things out on the table. It's not going to be swept away, as the Chairman has indicated. Let me conclude by saying that I think we owe the Chairman a great debt of gratitude for his persistence in pushing forward and really trying to get the facts and the information that those who are afflicted are entitled to and that the American people and pub- lic are entitled to. Thank you. [Applause.] The Chairman. Thank you very much. Senator D'Amato. Senator Boxer. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BARBARA BOXER Senator BoxER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. You really have been the voice for our Gulf War veterans, not only inside the U.S. Senate, but in the country. 8 I've been here a short time. And soon after I came, you began to talk about Persian Gulf War Syndrome. You never gave up pushing for the answers and you never let this become a matter of statistics. You've always put a human face on it. Some of those faces are out here today, thanks to you and your work. I believe, whether from within or without the Senate, this is something you're not going to let die. When people say one person can't make a difference, they never met Don Riegle. I sincerely mean it, and I certainly want to be your partner in this endeavor. The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Boxer. Mr. Chairman, hundreds, if not thousands, of California veterans are now suffering from Gulf War Syndrome. Many of them have come into my office. They've told me of lives disrupted and families destroyed. Every one of them has been a heartbreaking story. The symptoms of this terrible disease are now well known: Head- aches, muscle and joint pain, loss of memory, shortness of breath, skin rashes, diarrhea, and an inability to function. Mr. Chairman, I had the honor of discussing the Gulf War Syn- drome with a woman who has it. I'm not going to put her name out there because I feel that I need to protect her. She's a 26-year- old active-duty Army mechanic. She worked out on the line repair- ing planes in the Gulf War. She was sent to Saudi Arabia in 1990 and returned in May 1991. She started to experience terrible symptoms in late 1990. I have her medical report. You can tell from the symptoms, which go on and on, that she was completely debilitated. She experienced daily fevers of 102 degrees every afternoon, dry mouth, bilateral subcoastal stabbing pains of pressure which would last for hours, as long as 1 week, palpitations, chest pain, oral ulcerations, blisters on the lips, numbness in the hands, fatigue, severe headaches, and it goes on and on. Prior to being shipped to the Persian Gulf, she was a 100-per- cent, all-American, healthy young woman, with no history of any problems at all. She wrote to me: On May 1, 1991, I returned from Desert Storm. I did not know that the war would start again 3 years later. This time it is not with a foreign nation, but with my own Government. I do not want compensation. I only want my health back. Please help the sick veterans of the Gulf War. When we send people to face death, we owe them something when they come back. As a matter of fact, we owe them everything when they come back. And I believe that if there is in fact a cover- up going on, whether it's meant to be something to help our coun- try, not to get us down and depressed, for whatever reason, there is no excuse. We need to get to the bottom of this and, Mr. Chairman, as you point out, we will. It took us a long time to find out about radiation exposure in the 1940's and the 1950's, but we found out about it, and the pain of learning about the cover-up only adds to the agony of the original sin. We've also learned about the Agent Orange experience. I remem- ber struggling in the House of Representatives for years to get rec- ognition that Agent Orange exposure should have been an auto- matic disability. Don't you think it's time we made the same kind of conclusion here? We don't have one person or ten people. We have many, many thousands. They all have the same symptoms. I have a statement submitted to us by Dean Ludholm, Jr., a Gulf War veteran, who joined the California national guard and very proudly volunteered for service in the Gulf War. I just want to close by reading his last paragraph: Nine months after first accessing VA medical care, I'm still being told to be pa- tient. This bothers me. But it doesn't compare to the anger I feel when other veter- ans and their families tell me their stories of dealing with the VA and the DoD. They tell me that these Governmental agencies just don't care, as long as they get their research funding. They tell me *)f waiting many months for medical appoint- ments. They tell me of quick medical screenings that do not look for evidence of ill- ness. They tell me of the financial hardships this illness has caused their families. For the last 3 years, we've been more than patient with the powers that be. You have the ability to help us veterans and our families. And then he closes and says: These are tough times. We want nothing more than to be self-sufficient. You can't know the pain of asking for food stamps and handouts from the communities we live in, ana then being told, we're looking to take advantage of the system. Let there be no peace until we have justice. These are very strong, emotional, and important words. Mr. Chairman, the soldier to whom I referred earlier is now at a pri- vate clinic, courtesy of a very generous man. They're trying to get to the bottom of this. I hope today we will have the wherewithal to get the truth out on the table because it is our responsibility, not some private clinic, to find out what this problem is. Mr. Chairman, I thank you again for your leadership. The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Boxer. I appre- ciate what you've said and I appreciate your leadership on this and also citing those stories of those individuals from California. Senator Faircloth. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LAUGH FAIRCLOTH Senator Faircloth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you for holding this hearing. It's necessary and it's going to serve an excellent purpose. In the wake of the Gulf War, it is time we looked back to see what was done wrong and what was done right. We can't change what was done, but we will be accountable for what we do now. My statement also gets to another cover-up of that conflict, not as touching as the sick veterans, but well worth a review. The Commerce Department has a lot of questions to answer about its role leading up to the Gulf War. It is also time that we in the Banking Committee revisit a current Commerce Department nominee — Lauri Fitz-Pegado, who played a crucial role in shaping public opinion toward U.S. involvement, and she did it by person- ally orchestrating perjured testimony before Congress. Mr. Chairman, in 1990, after the Iraqi invasion of their country, the Kuwaiti government in exile formed Citizens for a Free Ku- wait. They hired the lobbying firm of Hill and Knowlton to influ- ence public opinion in this country toward entering the conflict. Lauri Fitz-Pegado was in charge of the effort. Her strategy was to use alleged witnesses to atrocities, to tell stories of human rights violations in occupied Kuwait. Using their 10 testimony, she orchestrated what has come to be known as the Baby Incubator Fraud. She first coached a 15-year-old Kuwaiti girl, identified only at the time as Naira, to testify before Congress that she had seen Iraqi soldiers remove Kuwaiti babies from hospital respirators. Naira claimed to be a refugee who had been working as a volunteer in a Kuwaiti hospital throughout the first few weeks of the Iraqi occupation. She said that she had seen them take babies out of the incubators, take the incubators, and leave the babies "on the cold floor to die." Naira's emotional testimony riveted human rights organizations, the news mediums, and the Nation. That incident was cited by six Members of the U.S. Senate as reasons to go to war with Iraq. However, it was later discovered that the girl was in fact the daughter of the Kuwaiti ambassador to the United States. It turns out that Lauri Fitz-Pegado had concealed Naira's real identity. Since then, reputable human rights organizations and journalists have concluded that the baby incubator story was an outright fab- rication. Every study commissioned by the Kuwaiti government could not produce a shred of evidence that the ambassador's daugh- ter had been back in occupied Kuwait to do volunteer work in a hospital. It was a total fabrication. Lauri Fitz-Pegado then put on a repeat performance in front of the U.S. Security Council on November 27, 1990. In the testimony before Congress, they claimed they couldn't fully identify who the witness was because thev wanted to protect her family that sup- posedly was still trapped, in Kuwait. But, in fact, they were here on Embassy Row. In front of the United Nations, Lauri Fitz-Pegado abandoned that pretense and instead employed witnesses who testified using false names and occupations. The most important of these phony witnesses was a man who called himself Dr. Ebrahim. With Lauri Fitz-Pegado there in New York, he claimed to have personally bur- ied 40 babies pulled from incubators by the Iraqis. Dr. Ebrahim told the Security Council that he was a surgeon. But after the war, when the scam was exposed as a total fraud, he admitted to being a dentist and had never buried any babies or seen any. More lies. The Fitz-Pegado scam continues. Mr. Chairman, as a supporter of our country s involvement in the Gulf War, I am offended that Lauri Fitz-Pegado believes that those kinds of illegal and unethical activities were necessary to get this country to face the threat of Saddam Hussein. None of these facts and allegations were dis- closed to either you, Mr. Chairman, or other Members of the Bank- ing Committee when her nomination was voted on here. If confirmed, Lauri Fitz-Pegado would have control over a global network of 200 trade offices in 70 countries. My opposition is based not on party or ideology. It is based on the fact that there are few people in America who have less business being in charge of our Nation's trade secrets than Lauri Fitz-Pegado. Lauri Fitz-Pegado's nomination should be returned to the Bank- ing Committee for further review. If it is not, then facts that are far more embarrassing to Ms. Fitz-Pegado and to others in Govern- ment will be revealed in other speeches and in long, protracted de- bate on the Senate floor. 11 Mr. Chairman, the Banking Committee was hoodwinked by a professional scam artist. Lauri Fitz-Pegado should be asked to dis- close her entire past and then be prepared to defend what I believe is a totally indefensible past. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator D'Amato. Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. Senator D'Amato. Senator D'Amato. Mr. Chairman, I would urge the Chairman to consider the Senator from North Carolina, Senator Faircloth's re- quest. I know that he does not make this request in anything other than the spirit of honesty and fair play and not in partisanship. I know he feels deeply about this matter. He has conferred with me about it, Mr. Chairman, and I know the Senator and his staff will make available to you and your staff an outline of those matters that he has withheld and has not gone forward on, and that you might then reconsider this request. I'd urge you to consider that. I think in fairness to everyone, that might be the best course of action, to ask that this be sent back to the Committee for further consideration. I join in the request. I did not oppose the nominee, but I am very much concerned at this point in time before we go further. The Chairman. Let me take this request and the suggestion under advisement. Senator Faircloth and I have not discussed this previously, and so this is an issue that we do need to discuss per- sonally beyond what's been said here now. I will plan to do that with you. Then we'll see where we go from there. Senator Faircloth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. Thank you. I want to note that Senator Night- horse Campbell was here and may be able to return. He had an- other situation. He's been a very important voice on this issue in the Veterans' Affairs Committee as well, and feels very strongly about this issue. In any event, he's next in the order and I will recognize him at any point at which he returns. Senator Bond. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CHRISTOPHER S. BOND Senator Bond. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for calling this important hearing to investigate the causes of the Persian Gulf War Syndrome because many U.S. veterans and their families are currently suffering. I think we owe it to our veterans to do everything we can to de- termine the causes of the Gulf War Syndrome, to develop and re- search cures for these veterans who are affected, and to do what- ever we can to better prepare and protect our service personnel from illnesses associated with this syndrome in any future con- flicts. Mr. Chairman, I have a lengthy statement. I am just going to highlight a couple of items on it because. No. 1, I have another commitment at 11 a.m., and. No. 2, I think it might be well if we could get to our witnesses before noon. The Chairman. Yes, indeed. 12 Senator Bond. So I will just summarize to sav that we have thousands of American servicemen and women who are suffering from symptoms and undiagnosable disorders. It is consistent with exposure to biological or chemical toxins. I think, collectively, the facts make it at least possible that these Gulf War veterans were exposed to chemical and/or biological tox- ins, and I support Public Law 103-210, which provides additional authority for the Secretary of Veterans' Affairs to provide priority health care to the veterans of the Persian Gulf War who have been exposed to these toxic substances, environmental hazards, or what- ever caused this syndrome. I think we have a duty, not only to these veterans, but to others, to investigate fully whether or not chemicals or biologicals were used on the troops and what caused the problems that they are now encountering. I do have some real concerns. First, I find it disturbing that the Department of Defense has not been as forthcoming on this issue as I feel they must. It's been almost 2V2 years since the Gulf War and it does not appear to have been a Defense Department priority to get to the bottom of the causes of Gulf War Syndrome. It may or may not be a result of chemical or biological warfare. But the odds of this syndrome affecting future units in combat is grave enough to warrant full and speedy investigation. Second, it would appear that a thorough re-evaluation of our de- fenses against biological and chemical warfare is in order. Finally, I am concerned about the possibility that these adverse effects on the veterans could have come from the administration of the nerve agent pretreatment drugs and inoculations distributed to our Armed Forces. A research specialist has commented that the drug was unproven. And I really think we have to do more re- search on the side effects of this drug and the advisability of ad- ministering it to our troops. No. 1, could it have caused some of the problems? No. 2, was it effective? What are its risks? I think these open up a tremendous number of questions that should be ad- dressed. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have my full statement made a part of the record. The Chairman. Without objection, the full statement will be made a part of the record. I appreciate your summary comments very much. Senator Bennett. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROBERT F. BENNETT Senator Bennett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief, as I, too, want to hear from the witnesses. But I want to underline several themes that have been made here. First, with respect to the responsibility of the Government not to lie to its citizens. I come from a State where we have a group of people called the Downwinders, people who lived in the 1950's downwind from the atmospheric tests of nuclear weapons that took place in Nevada. The Downwinders were told that they should go out and look at the clouds as they went by because it would be a great experience that they could describe to their children. Then they were told that the 13 cancer rates that occurred in southern Utah as a result of people who were exposed to that radiation and fallout were somehow just coincidental. The Government clearly lied to its citizens in that cir- cumstance. So it goes back, as you say, through a lot of Presidents and a lot of Administrations and a lot of parties. One of my heroes, Dwight Eisenhower, was President when that was being done. In the name of national security, we lied to our citizens. We exposed them to health risks and then we tried to cover up after the fact. More to the point, recently, I toured the military installation at Dougway, Utah. Some people may not know about Dougway, Utah. It is the prime storage facility for nerve gas and other chemical and biological weapons in the United States, and for many years Dougway was the place where the testing of the efficacy of these weapons went on. Dougway is now entirely defensive, appropriately. We do not do any production or testing of potential American weapons in this re- gard, but we do a great deal of testing of ways to prevent and de- fend ourselves against attacks from other countries. The military is cutting back on its activities in Dougway, saying that these defensive kinds of tests are not needed anymore. I'm not here to debate the military budget on that issue. But I think as we raise these questions, we should very carefully revisit the decision to cut back on America's capability to develop defenses against this kind of thing. Having been so recently at the site where this capa- bility is going on, I think it — well, it comes very firmly to my own approach to this to say, maybe we're too hasty in cutting back some of that defensive activity. But, ultimately, the thing that will bring the greatest anger as far as the Junior Senator from Utah is concerned is the issue that the Chairman has raised, in another context, the Senator from North Carolina has raised, and that is the issue of lying to Con- gress. I think it's indefensible to consider that any member of any Administration, in an attempt to cover up an agency position — and by agency, I include Cabinet-level officers — would come before the Congress and attempt to mislead the Congress. I associate myself entirely with the Chairman's promise — and I think it is a promise, not a threat — to pursue any witness who at- tempts to mislead the Congress in an effort to protect the reputa- tion of his or her agency. I think that applies to the issues raised, as I say, by the Senator from North Carolina. But it certainly ap- plies to the issues here. If, as a result of activity on the part of our enemies in the Gulf War, we are sustaining belated casualties, we need to know about it, and we need to know as quickly and as openly and as completely as we can about it. And there is no better constitutional vehicle to find out this truth than the Congress of the United States. I hope those who represent the Executive Branch understand their constitutional responsibility, taken at the time they raised their hands and took an oath to uphold and defend the Constitu- tion, that that includes being honest and open and straightforward with the Congress and its constitutionally elected officers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 14 The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Bennett. I appre- ciate your comments very much. Let me indicate our first panel of witnesses today includes Edwin Dom, who is the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. He is accompanied by Dr. Theodore Prociv — am I pro- nouncing that correctly? Dr. Prociv. It's "pro-siv," Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. Prociv — the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Weapons; and by Dr. John Kriese, who is the Chief Officer for Ground Forces at the Defense Intelligence Agency. I want to welcome you all. Let me ask you to please stand and raise your right hand. Do you swear or affirm that the testimony you're about to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? Mr. DORN. I do. Dr. Prociv. I do. Dr. Kriese. I do. The Chairman. Very good. Thank you. We have your prepared statement, Mr. Dorn, and I'd like you to take whatever time you need to set forth your understanding of this situation and the statement that you want to make to us this morning. OPENING STATEMENT OF EDWDsT DORN, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL AND READINESS, U.S. DE- PARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC; ACCOMPANIED BY: DR. THEODORE M. PROCIV, DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR CHEMICAL AND BIO- LOGICAL WEAPONS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASH- INGTON, DC; AND DR. JOHN KRIESE, CHIEF OFFICER FOR GROUND FORCES, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, WASH- INGTON, DC Mr. Dorn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Com- mittee. Mr. Chairman, in your opening statement, you used three key words — honor, integrity, responsibility. Those are words that I take very seriously and I hope, in that mshion, to work with you — in fact, to work with other Members of this body — to ensure that we do the right thing in this instance. I'm pleased to provide information to support the Committee's re- view of how materials contributing to Iraq's chemical and biological warfare program were exported to Iraq from the United States. These are significant issues as you consider measures to strength the Export Administration Act. Secretary Perry has asked me to be the focal point within the Defense Department for issues related to service in the Persian Gulf during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. I'm here today in that capacity. Senator, you and other Members of this Committee have made very clear your concern about the health problems that some of our Persian Gulf veterans have developed. -We, in the Department of Defense, share that concern. 15 In recent weeks, we've testified before the Armed Services Com- mittees and the Veterans' Affairs Committees of both Houses. I'll be pleased to share with you the same information we shared with them. Indeed, before we move on to discuss matters related to the Ex- port Administration Act, I'd like to offer a few points about our ef- forts on behalf of Persian Gulf veterans. May I begin, Senator, with a memorandum to Persian Gulf veterans, recently co-signed by Sec- retary Perry and by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. With your indulgence, Senator, I would like to read this into the record: As you may know, there have been reports that some Persian Gulf veterans are experiencing health problems that may be related to their service in the Gulf. We want to assure each of you that your health and well-being are top priorities for the Department of Defense. There are many hazards of war, ranging from intense combat to environmental exposures. Anyone who has health problems resulting from those hazards is entitled to health care. If you And keep in mind, Mr. Chairman, this is being sent to Persian Gulf War veterans: If you are experiencing problems, please come in for medical evaluation. Active- duty personnel and their eligible family members should report to any military hos- pital and ask to be included in the Department's Persian Gulf War Health Surveil- lance System. You will receive a full medical evaluation and any medical care that you need. Reserve personnel may contact either a military hospital or their nearest Veterans' AfTairs medical center and ask to be included in the DoD Surveillance System or the VA's Persian Gulf Health Registry. You will receive a full medical examination. Depending on the results of the eval- uation and eligibility status, reserve personnel will receive medical care either from military facilities or from VA facilities. This memo goes on, Mr. Chairman. There have been reports in the press of the possibility that some of you were ex- posed to chemical or biological weapons agents. There is no information, classified or unclassified, that indicates that chemical or biological weapons were used in the Persian Gulf. There also have been reports that some veterans believe there are re- strictions on what they can say about potential exposures. Please be assured that you should not feel constrained in any way from discussing these issues. We are indebted to each one of you for your service to your country during the Persian Gulf War and throughout your military careers. We also want to be sure that you receive any medical care you need. Thank you for your service. Signed, John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and William J. Perry, Secretary of Defense. Mr. Chairman, we take the position that the veterans who are sick should receive the best care we can provide. Three years ago, we trusted these men and women to make life and death decisions in the heat of battle. Today, we should trust them if they say they're sick. We're committed to treating the symptoms, to fashion- ing appropriate compensation for those who are disabled, and to identifying the causes of their illnesses. An interagency coordinating board ensures that the Defense De- partment's treatment and research programs complement related efforts by the Department of Veterans' Aifairs and the Department of Health and Human Services, I should note here, Mr. Chairman, that Congress aided our abil- ity to respond last fall by authorizing the Veterans' Administration 16 to provide priority care to Persian Gulf veterans for conditions that might be related to their Gulf service. We're especially concerned about those Desert Shield/Desert Storm veterans who since the war have developed symptoms whose causes we cannot identify. These veterans represent a small por- tion of the nearly 700,000 U.S. military personnel who served in the Persian Gulf region during the conflict and, indeed, they rep- resent a small portion of those who have been treated for illnesses or injuries suffered during the war. DoD and VA doctors have treated thousands of Persian Gulf vet- erans for readily identifiable illnesses and injuries. We know of a few thousand people, however, for whom a clear diagnosis contin- ues to elude physicians, and this is the group that we consider to be experiencing the Persian Gulf Syndrome or the mystery illness. We're working very hard on this. There are lots of theories about causes. We've heard from people who are convinced that we'll find the answer if we only focus solely on parasitic diseases, or focus solely on the effects of Kuwaiti oil smoke, or on industrial pollut- ants, or on the effects of inoculations, or solely on stress, or on mul- tiple chemical sensitivity. What we are trying to do is maintain a program that explores all the possibilities. In the course of our work, of course, some possibilities begin to appear less plausible than others. One theory involves Iraq's chem- ical and biological warfare capability. It's that theory which pro- vides a connection between the health problems of Persian Gulf War veterans and the Senate Banking Committee's review of the Export Administration Act. At the time of its invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, Iraq clearly represented a case in which past efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction had not been effective. Many American policymakers and military commanders were greatly concerned going into that war that Iraq would use chemical and/or biological weapons. They knew they had used chemical weapons in the past and we had evidence that they had acquired a biological warfare capability as well. Our concerns led us to take measures to protect our personnel against such weapons, through immunizations, through special training, equipment, and detection. The tension surrounding the possible use of chemical or biologi- cal weapons was evident to every American who watched on tele- vision as journalists scrambled to put on protective masks in re- sponse to the SCUD attack warning sirens in downtown Riyadh and other areas. There were many such alarms witnessed by Unit- ed States and other coalition military personnel and by the civilian populations of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Israel. Following the war, we confirmed through inspections conducted by the United Nations Special Commission that Iraq did have sig- nificant stocks of chemical agents and the weapons systems to de- liver them, as well as equipment and material suited for chemical agent production. All of these chemical agents and related equipment were found stored at locations a great distance from the Kuwait theater of op- erations. These materials have been undergoing destruction at a centralized location in Iraq under the supervision of the United Na- tions Special Commission since late 1992. 17 United States military personnel have been present on site in Iraq and involved in each of the teams overseeing these destruction operations. We've concluded that Iraq did not use chemical or bio- logical weapons during the war. This conclusion is based on analy- sis of large amounts of detailed data gathered in the theater and reviewed after the war. First, throughout the operation, there was only one instance of a soldier who was treated for chemical bums that were initially at- tributed to mustard agent. A subsequent test on the soldier and his clothing, however, did not definitely support that finding. We know of no other reports of any U.S. military, coalition military, or civil- ians in the region having symptoms caused by exposure to chemical or biological warfare agents. Mr. Chairman, the effects of chemical and biological weapons are acute and readily identifiable, and our personnel nad been trained to look for them. The effects of exposure on unprotected people are painful, debilitating, and often deadly. We did not see those effects in the Gulf. Second, our detectors were strategically located and, although many detectors alarmed, there were no confirmed detections of any chemical or biological agents at any time during the conflict. Third The Chairman. Let me just stop you there for a moment. Did we have in the field machinery or monitoring equipment to pick up biological agents? Mr. DORN. I will turn to my colleague. Dr. Kriese, to answer that. We can do it now or following the statement. The Chairman. Can you give me a yes or no now? I don't want to interrupt the rest of your presentation. Dr. Kriese. Let me just briefly say, sir, that there's a difference between detectors and timely detectors. We did not have real-time detectors present, but we did have detectors The Chairman. On biological weapons? Dr. Kriese. Yes, sir, that sampled the air and looked for traces of biological The Chairman. So to say that there was no confirmed detection of biological agents, when in fact we didn't have real-time devices there to measure that, is a little misleading, wouldn't you say? Dr. Kriese. Sir, I would offer that, as we're sampling air on a continuing basis, we would know about any BW agents shortly after they entered the area. The Chairman. Even without monitoring devices? Dr. Kreese. The monitoring devices take awhile to give an an- swer. The Chairman. Two years? Three years? Dr. Kriese. Dr. Prociv? The Chairman. Let me go ahead and let you finish, Mr. Dorn. We'll come back to that. Dr. Prociv. Let me just add, the collection and analysis devices, particularly the BIDS, the Biological Identification Systems, take generally in the range of 1 to 2 hours to complete their scheme. But once they do, they identify the species quite readily. We had no positives in that detection system. The Chairman. We'll come back to that. 18 Senator Bennett. Would the Chairman yield? The Chairman. Yes. Senator Bennett. I also don't want to interrupt, but I would hope, when you say, we have no such indication, you would address the reports of the Czech Mr. DORN. I certainly will. Senator Bennett. OK, Thank you. Mr. DoRN. I also want to emphasize the word, confirmed. As you know, there were lots of reports of detections. There is a protocol, however, a procedure which these gentlemen can describe in great- er detail, that we use to confirm whether an initial alarm or detec- tion is a valid one. If I may go on. Third, no chemical or biological weapons were found in the Ku- wait theater of operations. And by Kuwait theater of operations, I mean those portions of southern Iraq and Kuwait that constituted the battlefield. We did not find any chemical or biological muni- tions, live or spent, among the thousands of tons of munitions re- covered on the battlefield. The international community agrees with these conclusions. This is a complicated and contentious issue, however. To ensure that we've not overlooked or misinterpreted important information, we've asked an independent panel of experts, chaired by Nobel Laureate Joshua Lederberg, to review all the available evidence. We expect to receive the panel's report in June. We also remain eager to hear from Gulf War veterans who feel they can shed light on the sources of the undiagnosed illnesses. Mr. Chairman, may I say to Colonel Smith and to other veterans who served courageously in the Persian Gulf, the following: I un- derstand the fear and the frustration that many veterans are expe- riencing. They're sick and their doctors can't offer them definitive answers. To them, let me say, this Administration is committed to treating you fairly. You stood up for the Nation. The Nation is going to stand up for you. Now let me turn to the Defense Department's role in the export licensing process. First, it should be noted that DoD is not a licensing agency. That responsibility falls on the Department of Commerce for dual-use items. The Department of Defense, however, reviews and provides recommendations on export license applications when they're re- ferred to Defense, or to inter-agency groups in which Defense par- ticipates. Records on the ultimate disposition of dual-use biological, chemi- cal, nuclear, or missile technology-related licenses reside in the Commerce Department. DoD is a member of the inter-agency Subgroup on Nuclear Ex- port Controls, which was in operation throughout the 1980's. This group reviews export requests for nuclear-related dual-use tech- nology. In the missile area. Defense played a significant role in the es- tablishment of the missile technology control regime in 1987, and subsequently helped set up an interagency license review group in 1990. 19 In the chemical and biological area, Defense also plays an impor- tant role as part of an inter-agency team in reviewing export li- cense requests for items controlled by the Australia Group. The Department has taken, and will continue to take, its respon- sibility here very seriously. For example, DoD made an important contribution in halting export of the Argentine Condor Program that was aiding Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program. And we spearheaded the effort to prevent Iraq from acquiring a more capable missile than the SCUD. Defense also played a leading role in developing the President's Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative and most recently, the Comprehensive DoD Counterproliferation Initiative. The Depart- ment of Defense continues to consider proliferation as a significant military threat. The growing ability to produce and use chemical weapons is a great concern to DoD. We fully support any measures that will pre- vent or control this proliferation, which includes strengthening the Export Administration Act. It is important to remember that all exports made to Iraq in the 1980's were completely consistent with the laws in effect at that time, and Iraq was not considered a hostile country. Defense's role in reviewing exports was greatly expanded in 1991, and would be further expanded through measures you were considering in this Committee. I would now like to introduce other members of the panel, if I may. Dr. Theodore Prociv is the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Weapons. In that role, he oversees the Department's chemical and biological defense pro- gram, the Army program to destroy the U.S. stockpile of chemical weapons, and the implementation of bilateral and multilateral chemical weapons treaties, including the chemical weapons conven- tion, which is being considered currently by the Senate for ratifica- tion. Additionally, his office has assisted the Defense Science Board Task Force on Gulf War health effects, which is examining the issue of Gulf War health, and has assisted my staff with technical support in the area of chemical and biological warfare defense. My other associate is Dr. John Kriese, who is Chief Officer for Ground Forces at the Defense Intelligence Agency. He is respon- sible for production of intelligence on foreign ground forces and as- sociated weapons systems worldwide, and all aspects of foreign nu- clear and chemical programs. Dr. Prociv and Dr. Kriese are here with me this morning. Dr. Mitchell Wallerstein, who will testify this afternoon, is an expert in counterproliferation and export control for the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in International Security. Mr. Chairman, that concludes my opening statement. But before we turn to questions, I wonder if I might beg your indulgence so that Dr. Prociv and Dr. Kriese might say a few words. The Chairman. Yes, I want them to do so, but I want to know whether they can give an assurance here, based on their expertise and credentials, that there are no Desert Storm veterans that were exposed to chemical or biological agents during the war period that now account for their illnesses. 20 Mr. DoRN. Mr. Chairman, they will not provide you that assur- ance because we cannot provide that assurance at this point. The Chairman. All right. That puts you on the record and I'm glad to have you on the record stating the fact that you can't give that assurance. I want them to make a direct professional comment on that question before I go any further. Mr. DORN. May I clarify further? This is a very contentious area. It is very easy to confuse use of chemical agents with presence of chemical agents and exposure. I want to distinguish between Iraq's use of chemical or biological agents, a matter on which we are quite confident, and a second question, which is whether or not there may have been chemical agents present at a very low level within the theater of operations. And on that latter matter there continues to be some concern. The Chairman. Well, now, wait a minute. Now you're saying there's a reason for some concern. You're saying, as far as you know now, there was no offensive use of these weapons by the Iraqis that you've been able to establish. But you're drawing a very fine line to say that there may very well have been exposures to chemical agents during the war period. Mr. DoRN. As you alluded to in your opening statement, Mr. Chairman, there were reports by the Czechs of the detection of very low levels of chemical agents. Those reports were never con- firmed independently. Nevertheless, last October, I believe it was, representatives from the Defense Intelligence Agency began a re-review of that Czech detection. You know that Senator Shelby also spent 2 or 3 days in the Czech Republic talking with officials who had been involved in that, including the commander of the unit that had made those de- tections in Saudi Arabia. As a result, we have accepted those detec- tions as likely valid detections, even though we have not found the independent confirmatory evidence. The Chairman. We're going to come back to this and I want to keep our respective blood pressures down to a civil level here today. We have already had testimony here before the Senate from a chemical detection unit officer in the field running a FOX unit who detected chemical agents, and he wasn't a Czech soldier. He was a member of our military. Mr. DoRN. Yes. The Chairman. He actually has a print-out of that. He's not the only one, by the way, who's done that. You must be aware of that. Are you erasing that? Are you discarding that as not being Mr. Dorn. I'm not erasing it at all, Mr. Chairman. Perhaps Dr. Kriese The Chairman. Please, unless you're here to say that these first- person accounts that we've been given by people who are in the field designed to make these measurements are wrong or inac- curate, I think it is misleading for you to say that the only evidence we have is from the Czechs. That's not an accurate statement. Do you want to say again that it is an accurate statement, that we don't have any reports up through our own military chain of com- mand? 21 Mr. DoRN, We have reports through our military chain of com- mand. What I am saying is that we are deaHng with a protocol here. As you know, there were any number of reports or alarms of chemical agent detection during the conflict. There was a procedure for verifying those initial detections. Those secondary tests did not verify the initial detection. That is as close as I can come to the technology here. But there is simply a procedure by which one con- firms an initial suspicion. Those initial suspicions were not con- firmed in hundreds of instances. Senator Bennett. Mr. Chainnan. The Chairman. Yes, Senator Bennett. After Senator Bennett asks his question, with all due respect, I put a question to the two people that you've brought here today, and I want direct, specific, under-oath answers, not from you on this point, but from them. Then if you want to elaborate, Mr. Dorn, you're free to do so. Senator Bennett. Senator Bennett. Mr. Chairman, I simply want to inject this thought into this conversation. Implicit in your answer, Mr. Secretary, is the idea that there was something wrong with those initial reports. That is, there was something that could not be confirmed. Therefore, there was some malfunction. There was some panic on the part of the individual. There was something — whatever it's attributed to. In every case, as I understand your testimony, you're saying that the initial reports which are included in detail in this report filed by the Chairman and the Ranking Member, Mr. D'Amato, were wrong. Is there a possibility, sir, that there is something technically, technologically wrong with the confirmation process, that in fact the initial reports were accurate and that the confirmation process, either through lack of time so that there is a half-life or what- ever— I'm not a scientist, so I can't really help you very much in trying to find out what it is. Isn t there a possibility that the statement you have made is 100 percent accurate, but that the procedures used in the confirmation process may be faulty, so that, in fact, we end up with the cir- cumstance that the reports are correct and that the reports did, in- deed, find some kind of presence of either chemical or biological agents in the area and that the confirmation process is where we have seen this thing break down, rather than the assumption that the confirmation process is valid in every circumstance and there- fore, the reports must be disregarded. Can you comment on that? Mr. Dorn. It's a fascinating question. Senator Bennett, and since it deals with the technical capabilities of our equipment, I'd like to defer to Dr. Prociv to address it. Dr. Prociv. Let me try to take that. That's an excellent question. The way we detect chemical agents now, the initial detection of the alarm comes from an M8 detector. The M8 detector is an ion- ization detector that's not highly specific. It's sensitive to categories of compounds, so it's a good indication that we may have a problem in the area. The M8 detector generally will detect between 0.1 and 0.5 milli- gram minutes per cubic meter. We then follow up with an M256 kit. Now this is a hand-held kit that basically is a little chemical laboratory in your pocket. The M256 kit is very specific and very, 22 very sensitive. It goes three orders of magnitude better than the M8 alarm does. So even if materials have dissipated after the ini- tial alarm, you should be able to pick it up with the M256 kit. I've worked with that kit and I have a lot of confidence in that kit. Senator Bennett. Are you aware of the fact that, reported in this document, there are those who say that their M256 kits did indeed test positive? Dr. Prociv. I haven't seen this report and I am not aware of those. I'm sorry, sir. Senator Bennett. I'll see if I can find them. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I'll call them to your attention later on. I noticed them as I was reading through this report. The Chairman. Very good. No, this is a problem that we have. It's like two different worlds here, two different realities. You folks seem to find one reality and the more we dig into this, a broad number of us, both parties. House and Senate, the more we find a starkly different reality. It's extremely troubling. And when I finish with the questions that we're going to go through today, I think it's going to be even harder for people to understand the position of the Defense Department, that it can't find this prob- lem, can't see this problem, doesn't think the problem exists. Senator Bennett. Mr. Chairman, I have found it, with help from staff. I can very quickly respond. Dale Glover was a Staff Sergeant with Mr. DoRN. Senator, can you let us know the page? As you know, this report was just produced. We have not had an opportunity to review it. Senator Bennett. OK It's on page 79, Event 13. Dale Glover was a Staff Sergeant with the 1165th Military Police Company. He recalled being awakened at 3:30 a.m. The Battalion NBC NCO was announcing that they were under chemical attack. An M256 kit registered a positive reading for a chemical agent. They went to MOP? level 4 for 4 hours. Afterward, all of them had runny noses. So here is the case where the kit you have described registered positive, unless you have information that Mr. Glover is somehow mistaken about what happened. But this appears to me to be an eyewitness account contemporary with the event, reporting that the kit that you have described as being very, very accurate, pro- duced a result contrary to that which you just told the Committee occurred. Dr. Prociv. Let me take a second to review this, Senator. [Pause.] OK The commentary — ^by the way, I have Col. Merriman here. She was the NBC officer at the Gulf and worked with the staff there. So all of the NBC reports, NBC events, went through her. This is a document that she prepared for me. It says, Mr. Glover sent out an M43 detector, but not connected to the M42 alarm. When notified they were under attack, Mr. Glover went out to check the M43. The visual signal was blinking on one detector. Ac- cording to Mr. Glover, there were several possible causes for the detector alarm, like a sonic bomb that occurred shortly before the chemical alert. Pesticides or vehicle exhaust could have set it off. Mr. Glover and the Battalion NBC NCO conducted a 256 A-1 kit. Both received a positive pale red color on the nerve agent test 23 spot, but the accuracy of this reading is suspect. Both men were using a red lens in their flashlights. This is a defensive measure. Mr. Glover stated one test kit nerve agent spot was a deeper red than the other test kit. Correct colors for nerve agent tests are blue for safe and clear or peach for nerve. That's the explanation that we've been given. Senator Bennett. Can you go back — I don't mean to interfere. The Chairman. No, please do, Senator Bennett. This is very im- portant. Senator Bennett. Go back to page 66 on this document, Witness No. 04. I have not gone through this that carefully. I was just thumbing through it while we were going on. This kind of sprung out at me. Witness No. 04, Mr. Harold Jerome Edwards, the chemical NCO in charge of the Nuclear/Biological/Chemical Team for the Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24 Air Detachment at the King Abdul Aziz Naval Air Station was interviewed by the U.S. Senate staff on January 13, 1994. During that interview, Mr. Edwards said he conducted three M256 tests for chemical agents on the evening of this event. Mr. DoRN. Can we get a date, Senator? We have not looked at this, and so we're not quite certain what time period we're talking about here. Senator Bennett. I don't have that here. The Chairman. Apparently, January 19 or January 20. Senator Bennett. Two of the three tests he conducted were posi- tive for chemical blister agents. He said that the negative test was conducted in an area in between a number of rows of tents. He also said that he reported this information to his unit commander. Mr. Edwards said that a member of the unit, Tom Muse, blis- tered in the area under his watch during the event. The all-clear was given from a higher command. Mr. Edwards was called out to serve on a chemical decontamination team that day, and so on and so forth. But here is another report of an M256 test that was positive, in this case, two positive tests. We'll keep looking for some more. The Chairman. Let me just say for the record, every single one of these documents that are now being produced that are designed to rebut these things, which apparently, nobody knew about, but everybody's prepared to respond to, I want it made part of the record. And can I be assured that well have any and all of that information, Mr. Dom? Mr. Dorn. Yes, you certainly can. Senator. The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Dorn. We appreciate seeing your report so that we have an opportunity to respond to it. The Chairman. I'm reminded by staff, and it's important that we add this to the record. Prior to our release of this report, this infor- mation was delivered to the Defense Department. This is not new information. You didn't get this last night. Mr. Dorn. That may be right. That's probably 24 The Chairman. Well, find out if it's right. I'm saying to you it's right. So don't leave the inference that you've just had it for a few hours. Mr. DORN. No, clearly, we knew about this particular informa- tion. I'm referring to the broad report. The Chairman. Do you know how you knew about it? Because you got it from us. Mr. Dorn. That may be. And let me point out. Senator, I do not see this as an adversary process. As you and other Members of this Committee had pointed out, people occasionally will come to you with information that they do not share with us. They come to you because you are their Senator and they see you as accessible. We hope we can develop a sharing relationship. A member of your staff, Mr. Tuite, was kind enough to testify and provide infor- mation to our defense science board. That may be the source of some of this information. We also have gotten a great deal of useful information through our exchanges with the House and Senate Armed Services Committees and with the Veterans' Affairs Com- mittees. So this should be a constructive process. I can assure you that my job here is to find out what happened, to ensure that treatment is provided, and ultimately, to get at what's behind the illnesses that some Persian Gulf veterans are ex- periencing. I have seen no information which suggests that anyone with whom I've worked in the Defense Department, or in the Congress, has any other mission than to get to the truth. The Chairman. Well, you're certainly welcome to put that state- ment on the record. The fact of the matter is that it's taking a very long time to get to the truth here. What I would like to do now — Senator Bennett, did you want to pursue any further that one issue, because I want to go back to the outstanding question raised earlier and I want a direct answer from the two experts that are here. Senator Bennett. I simply want to summarize what I said ear- lier, which is the statement that there was no confirmation at all runs contrary to what the Czechs said. You've addressed that by saying, in your opinion, the Czech monitoring was insignificant. Mr. Dorn. No. I said the concentration of agent they detected at the incident that I recall, which was north of King Khalid Military City at Hafir Al Batin on January 19, was a very low concentration of agent. I did not say that the finding was insignificant in a judgmental sense. Senator Bennett. OK Mr. Dorn. We're talking about the level of agent that they re- ported detecting. Senator Bennett. Good. I'm glad to get that clarified. Mr. Dorn. OK. Senator Bennett. Then you said there was no confirmation. And my point is there appears to have been some confirmation, for which there may be explanations. But there have been confirma- tions reported to the Congress. The question I raise with you has to do with whether or not the confirmation procedure is viable, given the fact that we have what we have — that is, a number, a significant number of people suffer- 25 ing from something that they apparently picked up in the Gulf, at least there is that common thread, just as there were with the le- gionnaires who attended their convention, that took us a couple of years to figure out what it was. There is the possibility that I hope you're hanging onto that your confirmation procedures are flawed and that the existence of these people who have these problems is a prima facie case for the fact that they may be flawed. I don't think that we can just automati- cally say, well, the confirmation didn't find it. Therefore, there's nothing to worry about. Mr. DORN. Senator Bennett, this gives me an opportunity to talk about the process and to amplify, if I may, Mr. Chairman, this give and take. We have received large amounts of information and large num- bers of questions from Members of Congress, from veterans organi- zations, and from others. It is our task when we receive those to track them down, to identify the units and the people involved, to conduct interviews, where necessary. Ltc. Vicki Merriman, who was introduced earlier, has been in- volved in a great deal of that tracking down, and we are talking about, in some instances, hundreds of leads that have to be teased out. All of this information then gets resifted through the Lederberg panel or through other ways, so that we can come for- ward to you. In some instances, we cannot get a direct answer quickly. The Chairman. Yes. Well, let me just say at this point, and you'll find this interesting too, I think, Senator Bennett. In February, the Defense Science Advisory Board contacted the Banking Committee and asked for a list of witnesses who may have — of what may have been direct Iraqi attacks in the context of this discussion. We gave a list of at least one person from each event to the Department of Defense. These persons were then called by the Department of Defense. And I'm going to describe to you what happened. It's been reported back to us by a number of those interviewed by DoD that, rather than being asked substantive questions about the events and to locate other witnesses that might have been at the events, high-ranking military officers — and we can talk about who they are — said to these individuals that they were mistaken. They were told that the Iraqis did not have the ability to initiate these types of attacks, which we know to be false because we got the stockpiles after the war, if nothing else. And you should know that. Now, I don't know whether that comes as news to you or not, but I can arrange for you to talk to those people Mr. DoRN. I will do it. Senator. The Chairman. — Who, hopefully, will say to you what they said to us, that they got a phone call saying, tell us everything you know. Lay it all out. It was a scripted phone call where they were presented with an approach that said, it couldn't be a certain thing because that was off the table as a possibility. I think any time you're using people to do this kind of investiga- tive work that may have some stake in what was done previously, 26 as well as the decisionmaking chain leading up to these events can — I don't say does, but can — cause a problem. I've been very troubled by that. I think whoever is making the phone calls, whether it's Ltc. Merriman or anybody else, can't be calling with a scripted approach that tries to tailor the answer that presumably is being asked for from the person that they're calling. And we've had a problem in that area, just for your information. Mr. DORN. Mr. Chairman, if I can get particulars, I will be more than happy to follow up. The Chairman. You'll get them. You'll get them because, again, we're not going to let any assertions be made on the record here where we have contrary information. And I appreciate very much Senator Bennett raising the issue with respect to these testing kits. Now let me come back to my question to your two colleagues. Can you give us here today your professional certification that there were no exposures of Gulf War veterans to either chemical agents or biological agents out there in that war zone? Dr. Prociv. Since I've taken this position, Mr. Chairman, I have reviewed a lot of data and a lot of cases. My statement that I do not believe that any chemical agents were used by the Iraqis The Chairman. No, that's not what I said. I understand double- talk when I hear it. That's not what I asked you. [Laughter.] That's not what I asked you. And with all due respect, let me re- peat it again because I'd like an answer to my question, and then if you want to elaborate, you can. I realize everybody's designed here to veer off into the question as to whether there was an attack, a verifiable attack by the Iraqis to use these weapons. I did not pose that question. I asked you under oath for your professional opinion to give me a certification of your belief and confidence that no Gulf War veterans had any exposure to chemical agents or biological agents while they were in the war zone. Now can you give us that certification, regardless of the source? Dr. Prociv. Again, Mr. Chairman, I'm not a medical doctor. I don't understand a lot of the medical symptomology. What I do un- derstand is that when chemical agents are used, and I understand how they are dispersed, I understand how they're detected, in all of the evidence that I have seen that I can say in my own profes- sional certification, I can say that I do not believe that any chemi- cal agents entered the theater of operations and exposed any of our soldiers. That I can say. The Chairman. Well, I've got to make sure that I understand every single word in your sentence here. I want to make sure be- cause you're putting your professional reputation on the line, and you're doing it under oath. Meanwhile, I've got a lot of sick veter- ans all across the country, some in the room today, who heard the chemical alarms going off all the time, even though the chemical alarms were set at a much higher level than we know can cause a problem if there's extended exposure. You know that as well. But you're telling us, in your testimony today, that it is your best professional belief that we don't have a single veteran coming back from the Gulf War who had an exposure to chemical agents or bio- 27 logical agents in that war zone. And you're here today under oath with your professional reputation on the line. Dr. Prociv. Sir, again, I'm here to say that, knowing what I know and what I've reviewed, I do not understand how any of our veterans could have been exposed The Chairman. I didn't ask Dr. Prociv. I have to say it this way because I'm not a medical doctor, sir. The Chairman. Maybe we need a medical doctor to answer the question. Let me ask the same question of you. Dr. Kriese. Dr. Kriese. Sir, in the intelligence community, one of our, if you will, reminders is that absence of evidence is not evidence of ab- sence. So I cannot say absolutely, categorically, that there was no chemical or biological use and nobody was affected. I can tell you that, based on all the evidence I've seen, my judgment is that it was not used. But as a professional, I cannot tell you The Chairman. Now when you say, not used, you mean — by not used, you mean, what? That there was an offensive use of these weapons? Dr. Kriese. Yes, sir. The Chairman. You've not been able to validate in your own mind an incident or instances where they would have been used in an offensive way. Dr. Kriese. That's correct, sir. The Chairman. But you also make the point that you're not pre- pared to rule out the possibility that these agents got loose in some way and may in fact have had an effect on some people. You can't comment one way or the other on that. Dr. Kriese. I think it's impossible to prove a negative. I don't mean that lightly, sir. This is a very difficult issue, with low levels, many people involved. The Chairman. You see, it's difficult, when you have hundreds, and now thousands, of eyewitness accounts of people who are in the theater of operations and the chemical alarms go off. The chem- ical alarms sound. Now the chemical alarms were not just sitting out there waiting. We designed them. We sent them out there. We put them there be- cause we were worried that this might happen. That's why the chemical alarms were there in the first place. That's why all the gear was there in the first place. That's why we have job titles that some of you carry that talk about biological and chemical warfare, because this is a real issue and it's not somebody's invention. Saddam Hussein has done this in the past, killed his own people with these kinds of weapons. This isn't science fiction or fantasy. So we understood that there might very well be a problem. We put all the monitors out there and then the monitors kept sounding and people keep taking their MOP? gear on and off. There's no question in your mind about that having happened, is there? Dr. Kriese. No. The Chairman. OK. How many times, to your knowledge, would you say the chemical alarms went off throughout the whole theater of operation where they were placed to try to detect the chemicals? 28 Dr. Kriese. I think Dr. Prociv probably has a better estimate than I do. Dr. Prociv. I can't quote an exact number, but there are times when those alarms are deliberately set off. For instance, in the regiment, the NBC platoons are required to, in fact, test those alarms. What may have fallen apart is that they may not have no- tified the soldiers they were testing the alarms. So, as a minimum, twice a day, they would have tested. [Applause.] No, please. The Chairman. Let's have order. Dr. Prociv. I also will admit that they are prone to false alarms. They are prone The Chairman. But you can see all the possibilities. It's amazing to me how clear your mind is on all the reasons why the alarms could go off — how it could be an accident or mistake or faulty equipment. So now we have a new question — why are we buying faulty equipment? Why are we putting faulty alarms out there? In fact, I don't understand whv we're putting alarms out there that detect a level 1,000 times higher than what we know can cause a problem over a period of time. Dr. Prociv. I could quote some numbers there, also. The Chairman. Let me ask you this question. I'm going to ask you for the record. Again, I would urge you to measure your an- swer. Was the M8AI automatic chemical agent detection alarm which was deployed during the war sufficiently sensitive to detect harmful exposure levels of chemical nerve agents? Dr. Prociv. The MS — ^yes, sir. The Chairman. Are you saying, then, that there could be an ex- posure level harmful to somebody that could come in beneath the level that device was scheduled to measure? If there were chronic exposures that went on for a period of time below those levels, couldn't those cause medical problems in people? Dr. Prociv. I believe that there is data that shows that chronic levels at very low levels do cause problems. But I believe it's only with The Chairman. But the machines weren't designed to pick that up, were they? Dr. Prociv. It was only with mustard, is my understanding. The Chairman. Well, we'll get to that. But the machines were not designed to pick up low levels on a chronic level, were they? Dr. Prociv. No. The MS detection, the range of 0.1 to 0.5. You can get myosis, which are the initial symptoms, at 0.005. But the first time that you get a runny nose is at 0.5. That's the second symptom. And 0.5 is well within the detection range of the MS. The Chairman. We can go back and forth on this. The fact is Mr. DORN. Senator. The Chairman. Let me just finish. He and I are having a discus- sion. I'd be happy to call on you in a minute. I'm distressed about the fact that we've got a million reasons why we can't find the problem. We can't get to the root of this thing. We have all these sick veterans out there, wives and kids getting sick, and we just can't find out what's causing it. 29 Now, we're going to stay on this trail because I think it's quite clear what is causing part of it, and it falls into this zone. Not just the exposure to chemical items. I'm convinced that's part oi it. You're not convinced that's part of it. We have a difference of opin- ion on that issue. When you talk to the sick veterans who were in the theater of operation where the alarms were going off, the ones who are now sick are overwhelmingly convinced that there is a relationship. Now maybe you're smarter than they are and maybe they're smart- er than you are. The consequences for them are a lot higher than they are for you because you're not sitting here sick, with all due respect. [Applause.] Dr. Prociv. Sir, if I can just go on the record. I don't disagree that there are sick veterans. I was a veteran myself. I'm very sym- pathetic toward the veterans. I wouldn't be working for the Depart- ment of Defense — I just left a 20-year career in industry to work for the Department of Defense because I believe in this cause. The Chairman. Let me give you another example of how power- fully real it is in the lives of real people. Col. Smith over here who's sitting in the wheelchair spent 30 years in the military himself He was in excellent health when he went over to the Persian Gulf, actually had prior training as a vet- erinarian, so he knows something about what causes people to get sick and die, and animals to get sick and die. He's no longer in the service. I'm doing this from memory, but after a long struggle, he finally received a 20 percent, I think it is, service disability related to his problems, although he can hardly get up out of the wheelchair and walk. When he was invited to go on the Phil Donahue Show to talk about this problem, as a guy with a background in this area who is very, very sick, he was told by somebody in the military, it would be a good idea for him not to wear his uniform and all those rib- bons on his chest. I've got to tell you, I'm much more concerned right now with sick veterans than I am with veterans like yourself who I respect very much who are not sick. I think if you were sick, if you were sitting in his wheelchair, your feeling about this would be dramatically different. I think part of the problem here is that the people who ran the operation during the Gulf War are not sick because they were not the ones out into the area of exposure and who have not come back with these problems. And so, I think it's very hard sometimes for us to put ourselves in the other person's shoes. That's why it would be very healthy for some of these interviews to be conducted di- rectly. I'm going to ask, and we're going to bring the witnesses in here, if I have to bring in 500 witnesses and we have to do this hour by hour by hour, we're going to get the Defense Department to pay sufficient attention to this problem. I don't think that's happened yet, with all due respect. As Sen- ator Bennett points out, with the atomic exposure problem years ago, and as I mentioned with the Agent Orange exposure, I think there's an enormous institutional difficulty for a bureaucracy, whether it's the Defense Department or some other agency of the 30 Government, to ever come "to terms with perhaps some grievance decision errors about equipment, about exposure, about things that maybe weren't properly planned for that happened after the fact. We have some of that here, and we're going to have to deal with it because you have a problem here that's a lot bigger than you un- derstand right now. You have wives and children that are sick. I don't know how many of them you've talked to. I'm going to give you some names of spouses that are sick, whose reproductive situation has been knocked completely haywire since their husbands have come back from the Persian Gulf, and some women veterans who have come back and whose reproductive situation is completely haywire. They think, and I believe that they're right in thinking it, that they were exposed to agents out there that have caused this to hap- pen. They had a perfect health profile before they went. In fact, they couldn't have gone without a good health profile. You need to talk to them, not through intermediaries and the chain of command where everybody understands that if there's a line that we're going to follow here that there were no exposures and we're all going to hue to that point of view, it gets very easy to start to tailor v^at's being heard into that sort of channel. I've seen it too many times and I think it's happening here. I want you to talk to some of these people. I want you to sit down and get right up close to them because if there is a problem where this thing is moving through families, as we now have enough an- ecdotal evidence for me to believe that it is, you ought to get up close to it. You ought to look at it. You ought to look at the sick kids, not just Col. Smith and the others that are here right now who have given as much or more time in uniform as you have and who are now sick and are being tossed out the side door, quite frankly. That's what's happening because, in effect, there's a problem but we don't know what caused the problem. It couldn't be chemical. It couldn't be biological because we can't find any evidence of that. Therefore, we're not going to aim our treatment regime down that track because if it never happened, then that can't oe the cause of the problem. So let's look for other things. Let's look for mental problems. Let's look for this. Let's look for that. This is not a mental problem. It is a mental problem, I think, in the Defense Department. I think it's fair to say that because the defense establishment has decided that this problem has to be out- side certain boundaries. Yet, all of the evidence is accumulating, and we're going to go through it here today. We've gotten side- tracked here, which is a little bit regrettable because I want to nail down specific things here and we're going to do that. But I think what is happening here is that the Defense Depart- ment almost cannot allow itself to come to any conclusion that there could have been or was any significant amount of chemical or biological exposure. I can see a lot of reasons why that could be the conclusion that the Department would find itself backed into thinking that it had to reach. I would like an assurance — and I don't know if you can give it. Secretary Dom, or not — I'd like an assurance today, an iron-clad assurance that every active-duty military service person who 31 served in the Gulf who now is sick and who is afraid to come for- ward, as many are because they're afraid that they're going to get drummed out of the service. It's tough to find jobs on the outside, especially if you're sick, if you're leaving the military because you've got a health problem. And it's very tough to remain in the military if you've got a health problem, and especially if it's in this area that the Defense Department I don't think is very comfortable with. We've got to have an assurance, and I'd like it stated explicitly by the Secretary, that no active-duty person will be sent out of the military if they come forward and indicate that they have these problems and that they won't be off-loaded for some other reason that's a fake reason. And that, in fact, if they have to leave the service because they are so sick coming off the service in the Gulf War, that they will get service-connected disability and so they're not just going to go out and land on the scrap heap and find they can't get a job and they're uninsurable. I think we have to have that assurance, or you're never going to know how many people you have in the active-duty force that are sick. Can you give me that today or can you within the next few days give me a commitment that you'll get that from the Secretary? Mr. DORN. I certainly can. Senator. I can say that we want peo- ple to come forward. We recently fashioned a new program, as you may know, for encouraging people to come forward and for giving them a systematic treatment protocol so that we can ensure that we are searching for everything we possibly can search for and so that we can assure that they're being given the best treatment. We also are working on the appropriate disability compensation rules. There was an earlier mention by a Member of your Committee that the legislation needs to be changed so that we do not insist on proof of a service connection. That legislation has been proposed by Mr. Montgomery, the Chairman of the House Veterans' Affairs Committee. We have been given an opportunity to comment on it. But let me say further. Senator, if I can broaden this a little, we are trying not to close our eyes to things. This is one of the reasons we have asked the Lederberg group to look at the possible long- term effects of low levels of exposure to chemical agent. And this is why we have a range of research programs that look at a variety of possibilities from infectious agents to the possibility of environ- mental exposures. Senator Bennett. Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. I might just say that there already has been re- search done on that, as a matter of record, we've included it in our report. It's toward the end in an appendix, having to do with infor- mation developed by the U.S. Army Chemical Research Develop- ment Engineering Center, indicating the problems that do exist with prolonged low-level exposure. So Mr. Dorn. I believe Mr. Tuite shared that information with the Lederberg panel. He did not? OK. The Chairman. Presumably, they would know about this. Mr. Dorn. They'll find it. The Chairman. It's all the same operation. You see, if this is an issue that everybody really wants to understand, work that's al- 32 ready been done within the apparatus of the defense establishment ought to be the first thing that comes to the surface. I would think that if the Defense Secretary turned around and said to the next person in command, I want every scrap of informa- tion that we have, anything that we've done. I want to know every- thing that there is to know that's in our files, records, research on chemical and biological testing, information of any and all sorts. I would assume that within a matter of days, if not hours, people could ^0 like this and all the information ne asked for would sur- face. Or am I wrong in that assumption? Mr. DoRN. We thought so, too. And you may recall that last No- vember, in response to a request from another Senate Committee, we tried in the course of a week or two to produce definitive an- swers to questions such as those we are discussing today. We think we got pretty close, but it turned out that there was simply more information out there than we could reasonably digest in the course of a few days. This is one of the reasons the Lederberg group has spent several months looking at this matter. On that panel are people who have spent many years studying a variety of issues that may be related to these illnesses and to possible exposures to a variety of environ- mental or chemical or biological agents in the Gulf They are still hard at work producing their findings. But there is a lot of lit- erature here. The Chairman. I really don't want anybody else sent out into the field of battle where we're likely to run into chemical and biological weapons, where we know we've got a bad guy on the other side who has been developing these weapons, been using these weapons on his own people, and we say to our service men and women, look, suit up. We're going to send you in there. But we're not quite sure what we're likely to run into. We don't necessarily have the kind of gear we might like to have. We're not necessarily able to meas- ure effectively biological exposures, even though we know this guy's been working on that. But we'd like you, in the name of the Amer- ican Government and Uncle Sam, to get right on in there. Here we are facing a situation with the North Koreans. In my mind, the North Koreans may be as entirely capable of diabolical activities of any and all kinds as Saddam Hussein. I can see why, if you were concerned about biological and chemi- cal weapons activity on the part of the North Koreans, why there might be a reluctance to even want to talk about the issue, so you dicm't have a panic with our troops who are up on the front line who might be concerned that 3 years from now, if they're engaged in a fracas over there, they might end up like Col. Smith in a wheelchair. And so, I would hope that we would never get to the point where the thinking is, let's get the mission done and then we'll treat the walking wounded, maybe, later on down the line or we'll figure out what that problem is at a later time. I would hope that we would never get into a frame of mind where the objective in the immediate military sense puts the health and safety of our own forces in a secondary situation. Even though that's happened before in your lifetime and mine. It hap- pened in Vietnam, in my opinion, and I think the evidence bears 33 it out and the Vietnam veterans clearly feel that way. So you don't have to stretch your imagination to imagine scenarios like that be- cause we're living with the after-effects of that right now. Mr. DoRN. May I, Mr. Chairman, associate myself with some- thing Senator Bond said earlier? The Chairman. Then I want to call on Senator Bennett, who has been waiting patiently to get in here. Mr. DoRN. Our effort here is, first and foremost, of course, to treat the sick veterans. That we are trying to do. Second, to find out what the underlying causes are and to deal with those. The Chairman. But Mr. DoRN. Senator Bond said something else. He said we have to prepare for the future. The Chairman. Well, just one second. Just one second, Mr. Dom. I think the problem, and the reason you got a murmur out of the veterans who are here, is that so many of them feel that their prob- lem is in the chemical/biological exposure zone. And if the Depart- ment feels that that can't be the cause of their problem and there- fore, the research efforts are really directed down other channels in any serious way, they feel like they're likely to continue to stay sick and get sicker and die in the meantime because you're going down divergent tracks. Mr. Dorn. If that is the impression I left, please give me an op- portunity to clarify it. One of the reasons we focused in my opening statement on chem- ical and biological weapons is, it was our understanding that that was this Committee's concern, how those weapons got into the hands of the Iraqis and whether they were used. However, I want to make absolutely clear that we are exploring every possible or every plausible cause for these illnesses, including the possibility of exposure to some type of chemical agent, the pos- sibility of exposure to various environmental pollutants, the pos- sible long-term health effects of the Kuwaiti oil fires, infectious dis- eases such as leishmaniasis. There may be others. We are looking at a full range of possibilities. One of the frustrations for some of the people who are vitally concerned with this is that there are strong proponents of each of those theories. We spend a lot of time explaining why we are trying to develop a program that looks at all of the possibilities rather than honing in solely on multiple chemical sensitivity or the Ku- waiti oil fires. We are examining a full range of possibilities here. Now, how soon will the results come out? This is difficult. This is research. We are not confident how soon the results will The Chairman. How much are we spending at the present time? Do you know offhand? Mr. Dorn. I'll have to get back to you on that because I cannot give you a total. Keep in mind that this research is being done under a lot of auspices. DoD is sponsoring some of it. VA is spon- soring some of it. Some of it is being done through Health and Human Services, their Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. I will try to put together some numbers for you. The Chairman. Senator Bennett. Senator Bennett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 34 I'll spare the editorial comment that I was about to make. Let me go back to the issue. The Chairman asked a specific question to which he did not get an answer. I'm interested in the answer. The question was how many times did the alarms go off? The answer was, well, we don't really know, and so on. All right. I used to give that kind of an answer to a boss that was not sympathetic to that kind of an answer and he would al- ways say to me when I'd say, well, I can't give you an exact num- ber. He'd say, how many would you be surprised if it were more than? Can you give us a ballpark figure? How many would you be surprised if it were more than or less than, and give us kind of a bracket? Then as you investigate this, and you probably can't answer it here, and I would be surprised if you could, I would like an answer for the record, how many times was the gear replaced after the alarms went off. And to focus exactly on what I'm talking about, I'll direct you to page 65 of the report provided by the Chairman and the Ranking Member. There, by coincidence, seems to be two occasions here where the alarms went off and the gear was replaced. The first one, quoting a Mr. Fred Willoughby of Columbus, Geor- gia, who was with the Naval Mobile Construction Battalion. He has reported that on January 20, 1991, at about 3:00 to 4:00 a.m., he was hanging out outside his tent when he heard a long, loud explo- sion. Shortly thereafter, a siren sounded and he went inside the tent to get his gas mask. By the time he came out, people were yelling, MOPP 4, MOPP 4, not a drill. Immediately, his mouth, lips, and face became numb all over, a sensation he likened to no- vocaine at the dentist's office. He was in the bunker for about an hour or an hour and a half. When he came out of the bunker, he and others in his unit were told bv the officers and chiefs that what they had heard was just a sonic boom. The next day, the unit was told not to talk about it. Here's the operative sentence — but the unit's MOPP gear was collected and replaced the next morning. I want to know how many times that happened, where an alarm went off and subsequently to the alarm going off, someone had the MOPP gear collected and re- placed. Go down to the next one just below it. Roy Morrow of Phenix City, Alabama, assigned to the Air Detachment, King Abdul Aziz Stadium. On January 20, 1991, he heard two explosions between 3:00 and 3:30 a.m. He was awakened, went to the bunker. The unit went to MOPP 2 level for 25 to 30 minutes. The all-clear was then given. When he exited the bunker, Mr. Morrow noticed the Marines run- ning and screaming, MOPP level 4. The siren sounded again. He began to feel a burning sensation on his arms, legs, the back of his neck, his ears, and his face, his lips felt numb. His unit went to full MOPP level 4. Right before he went to the bunker the second time, Mr. Morrow saw a flash in the commercial port of Al-Jubayl. He had a radio in the bunker, so on and so forth. When they began to discuss it, down in the next paragraph, he's talking with the head of the decontamination team in his unit. And 35 when they began to discuss it, according to Mr. Morrow, the unit was told that the two explosions were a sonic boom and they were ordered not to talk about it any more. The next day, all of their chemical gear was collected and replaced with new equipment. I am sure in the logs of those units, the sounding of the alarms, the going to MOPP 4 level, and the collecting and replacing of the equipment is recorded. If there's one thing our military does well, it is multiply paper and record things that went on, and people keep logs. I would like to know how many times the alarms went off, and after the alarms going off, regardless of the explanation as to why, someone felt it necessary to collect and replace all of the MOPP equipment, because, certainly on its face, it would appear that somebody on the scene at the time was convinced that the gear was contaminated or would not have had it replaced. Finally, just as another footnote, as I browsed through this The Chairman. I'm wondering, do you have a response? [No response provided.] Senator Bennett. Do you have a response on that? I'm assuming that you don't have that statistic. But if you do, I'd be glad to The Chairman. There ought to be somebody here that knows. There are a lot of people here that are experts in this area. Who can get the closest to an answer? Dr. Prociv. I guess the difficulty of coming up with a number, and we will try. We will try to provide one for the record. The only time that a record is made of an alarm is if it's a verified alarm. An NBC 1 report is prepared and that's sent upstairs. The Chairman. Now what is a verified alarm? Dr. Prociv. An alarm goes off and the M256 kit is used to verify it. The Chairman. So when the alarm goes off, if there isn't that kind of a verification, you wouldn't count it, anyway. Dr. Prociv. No. The Chairman. Would you then kind of switch back to the other point, that maybe it was a faulty alarm or Dr. Prociv. I'm trying to be open-minded here. We probably wouldn't hear about it, but it may be that the com- pany would keep records, that Central Command would keep records. And so, we will try to get the number. Senator Bennett. I find it inconceivable that the alarm would go off and the unit would be on alert, and in their MOPP gear for hours, and then the gear would be collected and disposed of and there would be no record of the incident on the ground that it wasn't verified. That's incredible to me. Dr. Prociv. Let me try to explain that, also. Typically, the gear is not changed after an alarm. Senator Bennett. I understand that. Dr. Prociv. Typically, the gear is changed after a certain number of days of wear life. For instance, the British suit has a 5-day wear life. On the fifth day, everybody changes out of the suit and gets a new one. I'd have to look into each of these cases and see why those change-outs were made. I'm not sure I understand that, other than by coincidence, it may have hit that fifth day. 36 Senator Bennett. I can understand that it would be by coinci- dence. But the Chairman asked the question, how many times did the alarms go off, because the testimony here has said that every single time that the alarm went off, it was because of some nonchemical reason. It was a false alarm. It was in reaction to die- sel fuel in the air. It was testing. In every single instance, the testi- mony is the alarm was not an alarm of actual chemical presence. His question was, how many times did we have those nonchemical stimuli creating an alarm going off? I think that's an answer we ought to get an approximation for. The second question that I'm asking is, how many times was there a replacement of the gear following the alarm going off? If you say it only happened twice and in both cases, the 5 days were up, I'll accept that. But I want to know how many times it actually happened, whether or not we can put it down to coincidence of the 5 days being up, or if somebody on the ground came to the conclu- sion that there was in fact contamination there and the gear had to be replaced as a safety measure for his troops. I can see a con- scientious commander making that decision and having a record of it somewhere. I want to know if, indeed, that happened. Finally, just as I was browsing through here, I'd point out to you on page 77, there is another case of an M256 giving a positive read- ing. William Brady, Battalion Logistics NCO with the 217th Main- tenance Battalion. Deafening sound, a flash of light, everything shook. That does not sound like a sonic boom to me. He remembered the chemical litmus paper turning red and a positive reading from an M256 kit. His nose began to run. He smelled and tasted sulfur and he began coughing up blood a couple of days after the attack. Once again, you may have an explanation for the M256 working, but I come back to the earlier statement that there is never a veri- fied case. We do have a pattern here of alarms going off and now individ- ual reports of even the M256 being activated. I don't think there's a lot of credibility, unless you've got an answer for every one of these, for the statement that there was no presence of these things. To a layman, it just seems overwhelming that there's got to be a presumption of presence if these kinds of things kept happening. Dr. Prociv. Our conclusions are also based on not just the alarms. It's also the absence of the types of symptoms that we ex- pect to see from nerve agents. We talked to our allies. We have not seen the symptoms there. Typically, an attack will cause a lot of people to get exposed. So I will take these questions for the record, however, sir, and I will provide you the answers to those. Senator Bennett. Let me pursue what you just said because it fits with the line that I was on earlier. You say, typically, we can expect. Let's hold the possibility that these particular agents were not typical. Let's hold the possibility that, indeed, something happened out there that doesn't meet the typical norm. Back to my earlier question to the Secretary — isn't there a possibility that the confirmation pattern is flawed? You say, we can't get confirmation of it. Maybe we're dealing with something new here that we weren't previously thinking 37 about that can produce a different kind of reaction than we were expecting. With that thought in mind, go back and review every- thing we ve talked about. Our confirmation pattern doesn't confirm. I'm willing to accept that. I don't think you're sitting here lying to me on that issue. I'll accept that you've done the confirmation and the confirmation doesn't confirm. But how do I explain all of the people with Gulf War Syndrome. Just because it doesn't fit the tvpical pattern does not mean it didn't happen. Start thinking in those terms and maybe this whole thing will be a little different. I thank the Chair. The Chairman. I think, Senator Bennett, that that's an enor- mously constructive point you've just made. We know that Saddam Hussein was experimenting with mixing up these cocktails, these so-called chemical cocktails and maybe mixing biologicals in with the chemical cocktails. We don't know what he was finally doing. We just know at the end of the war, even though we bombed the daylights out of every storage place we knew about, and I think in the process threw a lot of this stuff up in the air, which then blew down over our troops, that even after all the bombing, the massive bombing, he still had a huge stockpile of this stuff. That's what the U.N. inspectors found. And we're still destroying it, still getting rid of it. It's not easy to get rid of One of the great ironies is that we helped put it together because we sent him the materials in the beginning to get him going, with these licenses that were approved by our own Government to send the biological specimens and so forth. But I think Senator Bennett is onto something. I think we may in fact be dealing with something here where, when he was threat- ening us with these kinds of doomsday weapons and other things, that ne may have been experimenting with weapons that were dif- ferent and outside the norm, and that we were not necessarily ready to deal with that. I tnink, quite frankly, it's a stunning statement. I know you may not think about it that way, when you say that when these alarms were going off all the time, it's probably because the alarms were faulty or that they were registering the wrong things. To the people out in the real world that go to work everyday and pay the bills for the defense establishment and everything else, that will have them marching on Washington, if they think that what we were doing is buying alarm systems to protect their sons and daughters that basically weren't any good. And so, yes, they kept going off all the time, but they were going off for the wrong reasons. That's like asking people to believe something that's just so un- believable, that to say it, makes a person sound like a fool, I think to a citizen. Senator Bennett. Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. Yes. Senator Bennett. Could I comment on that because you've trig- gered a thought here that I'd like to share with the Department of Defense. We're in a Catch-22. If we say, on the one hand, the alarms going off in every instance was due to malfunction or misreading or diesel oil, or whatever, and then we turn around and say, on the 38 other hand, we have absolutely no confirmation from anywhere that these agents were present. It's the second conclusion that's driving the first. If you say, just one alarm functioned properly, and what are the statistical chances that that's true, just one of these M256 readings was accurate, then we do have confirmation. You've got yourself into a logic box here. If you say they all failed, the M256 all came from people who didn't understand what they were doing. We've checked everyone of them. You then can validate, no, there's no confirmation. But the overwhelming inference on the part, again, of somebody looking at it from the outside who's not involved, is that it is the second conclusion that is driving the first and it becomes a self-ful- filling prophecy once you get there. You can't prove a negative, but just think about it for just a minute logically and use the phrase, fuzzy logic, that allows you to go with probabilities, even if you can't pin it down. Is it really log- ical to assume that every single one of those events was faulty? Mr. DORN. Senator, let me — perhaps Dr. Prociv can address an- other dilemma here which has to do with the way one designs the systems and the way one sets them so that one has the maximum possible warning. It is a system which, unfortunately, is likely to yield some false alarms. But perhaps we can discuss that technology because it does raise an interesting question about how much advanced warning we want in these circumstances and it may guide the way in which this technology is refined in the future. The Chairman. Well, before we get off into a long, technical dis- course that eats up more time, I want to stay on the point that he's just raised. If you can invent a better system, I'll all for it. Go and do it. If you want the money, I'll vote for the money to do it. I'm concerned about a lot of sick people right now because the last system didn't work right and we're having a very hard time, I still think, getting an honest understanding of what happened. I think Senator Bennett is exactly right, that it's the second con- clusion that in a sense is driving the first conclusion, that backs you into the notion that you've come in here with a truly unbeliev- able assertion that every single one of these alarms going off was faulty and didn't mean anything. I think that that's clearly not the case and I would hope at the end of the day, not iust today, but at the end of this, you wouldn't force yourself into believing something that is patently unbeliev- able. But there's a more serious and sinister part of it. And that is that that kind of logic also drives the effort to get to the bottom of the medical problems because if you're working off the premise that it can't be chemical exposure or biological weapons exposure, then you don't aim the bulk of your medical research effort with real urgency into that area of exposure. You look at other things. You can spend a long time looking at everything else that it might be. Meanwhile, you've got very sick people that in many instances, are getting sicker. In other words, their sickness isn't standing still. Their sickness in many cases is progressive. 39 The thing that alarms me the most right now is that by, in a sense, ruling out the notion that it could be chemical and biological exposure causing a lot of this difficulty, maybe in a mixture with the pretreatment pills and so forth, we are losing very valuable time and causing perhaps an immense amount of grief. If you've got a biological issue working in all of this, you may have even a bigger threat on your hands than we're accustomed to even thinking about. And so, that kind of logic or illogic, in this case, I think is what people can't accept who look at this. And to your question, how many times did the alarms go off, I can assert to you right now, based on just the first person accounts that we have nad, with discussions with people who have come for- ward, for whom we have names, places, times, and so forth, that there would be thousands of events of alarms going off. Would any of you dispute that? You would not dispute that. Dr. Prociv. We have no data. Senator Bennett. That goes back to my question — what would you be surprised if it were fewer than? Does 1,000 strike you as much too high? You say you have no data, but you obviously Dr. Prociv. I think tnat I would agree to per-alarm, perhaps 2 to 3 a day. I could see that happening. The CHAffiMAN. How many alarms were out there? Dr. Prociv. We had 14,000 alarms out there. The Chairman. So 14,000 alarms going off 3 times a day. Dr. Prociv. Big number. The Chairman. That's a pretty big number. Senator Bennett. Yes. Let me pursue another aspect of the thought that I'm laying down here, that just because it doesn't fit the norm doesn't mean that it didn't happen. As I understood, Mr. Secretary, your comments were that you found no evidence of the presence of these weapons, let alone the trace of the gases or agents, but no evidence of the presence of these weapons in the theater. Is that correct? Mr. DORN. That is correct. Senator Bennett. OK I beheve, from the first-person reports contained in this document, that most of the instances reported were not in the theater. They were behind the lines back in the maintenance area, subject to SCUD attacks that were later dis- missed as sonic booms and not, in fact, SCUD attacks in some cases, but not necessarily in the theater where the tank battle and those other things took place. Is that correct? Mr. DoRN. Those portions of southern Iraq and Kuwait that con- stituted the battlefield. So you are correct in the way we've defined the Kuwait theater of operations. However, I believe that state- ment is intended to cover, and I will verify it, but I believe that is intended to cover everything that we found on the battlefields, short of a certain parallel into Iraq. Now I will confirm that. Senator Bennett. You see where I'm going. Mr. DoRN. It obviously would be very important Senator Bennett. Yes. Mr. DoRN. — If this were cleverly worded to obscure that point. It is my sincere hope that it has not obscured that important point. 40 The Chairman. We have more than a hope, though. Senator Bennett. I don't accuse anybody of cleverly wording it to obscure it. But I have had enough dealings with some military minds, I won't say all, by any means, to suggest that it would never occur to them to go beyond the battlefield as to what the the- ater would be. We are dealing now, if we accept these first-person witnesses at face value, with people who are behind the lines, who are subjected to SCUD attacks launched from areas we know not where. That is prima facie obvious because if we knew where the SCUD's were, we would have destroyed them. We were out looking for them. That was the number-one priority of the war, as far as our relationship with the Israelis was concerned. These are attacks being launched from some area that we may very well have never reconnoitered that took place in an area out- side of the theater. So that the information that you gave us here, very conceivably, could be exactly correct and still have missed the point. Mr. DORN. I will double check the information. However, as you know, a number of these SCUD's landed in populated areas or were destroyed over populated areas. We know that when they were de- stroyed, they sometimes spewed forth rocket fiiel and lots of other debris. I have seen no information suggesting that the debris con- tained evidence of a chemical or a biological agent. I will double check that information for you, sir. Senator Bennett. I think it would be a useful exercise. The other comment I would make Mr. Dorn. Dr. Kriese has a comment on that. Dr. Kriese. May I comment, sir? Senator Bennett. Surely. Dr. Kriese. My understanding is that, after every SCUD attack, we checked for CW and none was found. That was of great concern to our forces. I think you brought up a very important point as you talk about delivery of agents. You referred to an incident on January 19, or perhaps January 20, this is event 3 on page 64. This area, we believe, was outside the range of any Iraqi delivery systems, except for SCUD's. And on January 20, there were four SCUD's that landed near Al-Jubayl, two of them about 35 miles away and two about 58 miles away. I think as we discuss chemical agents, and I don't want to give any appearance that I'm trying to rule something out or in circular logic, but, in my mind, one of the issues is the question of how those agents were inplaced, how they got there. As we look at the installations that were deep behind the lines, like Al-Jubayl, SCUD is the only way to get there. I'm not saying that they're not there because I don't know how else to explain them. But I think delivery is a very important issue that we've looked at as we've tried to make an assessment of the use of CW and BW weapons. We've also asked ourselves questions about if there are low levels of CW or BW, why do we never find high levels? Distribution of material is a very difficult problem. Usually, you start from a small canister and release it. Close to the canister, you have high levels 41 of CW or BW agents. Further away, you find low levels. So this is, again, a puzzle to us. And I don't want to say that I'm ruling any- thing out. Senator Bennett. Yes. Dr. Kreese. But as we try to understand how the Iraqis may have used CW or BW agents, these are things that we try to ad- dress. Senator Bennett. And I think it's appropriate that you try to ad- dress them. I think that that's a legitimate question. I go back to my earlier comment that maybe we're dealing with something here that does not fit our expectations because we're dealing with an individual who has pursued this weaponry far be- yond the levels that we have, I think, in our own arsenal. We've decided to pull back from this a long time ago and he has decided to go forward. Dr. Kreese. Yes, sir, and I would add that, certainly, one of the things that the intelligence community worries about a lot is the question of technological surprise. So, across the board, we look at unexpected developments in technologies that may be a threat to U.S. forces or the forces of our allies. This is something that we've looked for and, again, I can't say that it's not there because we haven't seen it, but we certainly pur- sue those leads whenever we have them. Senator Bennett. I have to leave. I just want to conclude with an experience totally unrelated in specifics, but I think quite in- structive in its overall message that I had in my formative years as a very young man. It had nothing to do with war, fortunately. But we were trying to sell tickets to a concert. The public relations firm hired to help us to do this sent their expert into the area where I was operating. He was appalled to find out that I was doing all kinds of things he didn't want me to do. This happened in the British Isles. He called his superior in London and he reported to his superior all of the things that I was doing that were contrary to the wishes of this internationally known PR firm. The conversation is still burned in my mind and the lesson that I learned is the one that I want to share with you. He said, "Yes, dear, I told him that." His superior was a woman, so he could use that terminology in the days before political cor- rectness. He said, "Yes, dear, we covered that. Yes, dear, we have handled that. Yes, we have done that. That's right. Yes, we've covered all those bases. Everything is fine. There's just one problem — no tick- ets have been sold." OK, we can get all of the explanations. We can get all of the ex- amination. There's just one problem — we have a batch of people for whom we cannot give any explanations in terms of their medical circumstance. Maybe the old pattern he was describing in that cir- cumstance and as you are describing in here, has got to be aban- doned and we've got to do something different. That's what I was trying to do when I was trying to sell tickets to the concert and offending people because I was doing things dif- 42 ferently than they thought they should be done by the classic pat- tern. My only defense for my actions was but no tickets are being sold doing it your way. My only comment here is no answers are being found as to where this body of people with serious medical prob- lems came from. And that's what keeps driving me and I know keeps driving the Chairman and will keep driving this issue until we either fill the hall, as I can say proudly we did on the occasion of the concert, by solving the problem, or come up with an expla- nation that is so scientifically iron-clad, that everybody can buy it. Saying that the explosions were all sonic booms and the alarms went off, all in malfunction or testing, and that all of the illness comes from some other source is simply not going to cut it in the reality of what we've got here, what we have to deal with. There is the reality of the people who have these problems and that re- ality is not going to go away. Mr. DoRN. Senator Bennett, I want to emphasize again that we are considering all the plausible possibilities, including the possibil- ity of exposure to some type of chemical or biological agent. Senator Bennett. I'm delighted to have you say that last sen- tence because I had not heard it before now and I may have missed it. But I'm glad to hear it before I have to leave and I congratulate you for making that clear commitment, to consider this as a real possibility, in spite of the fact that there are no confirmations, in spite of the fact, et cetera. That, I think, is a major commitment on behalf of the Defense Department. The Chairman. Thank you very much. Senator Bennett. I think logic, which is what Senator Bennett is trying to apply here, and properly so, is maybe the quickest way to an answer be- cause of the problems that we've been discussing this morning. I want to read into the record the chemical warfare agents which survived the Allied bombing — these are the chemical weapons that Saddam Hussein had squirrelled away and then they were picked up to be destroyed after the war by the inspectors that went in. Now listen to this. This is just what we got after all the bombing. We went in and, as a priority target, tried to knock out a lot of these weapons storage places and weapons production places. So, presumably, we got rid of most of it in the bombing runs. But this was what was left after all the bombing. Now just think about this and think about it logically — 13,000 155-millimeter shells loaded with mustard gas; 6,200 rockets load- ed with nerve agent; 800 nerve agent aerial bombs; 28 SCUD war- heads loaded with Sarin; 75 tons of nerve agent Sarin; 60 to 70 tons of the nerve agent Tabun; and 250 tons of mustard gas and stocks of thiodiglycol, a precursor chemical for mustard gas. Again, just think about this, we went in with these saturation bombing raids. We tried to hit their weapons production facilities and knock them out. Presumably, we did knock a lot of them out. A lot of what they had to start with presumably went up in smoke and, unfortunately, I think a lot of it drifted down over our people and that's part of why these alarms were going off. 43 According to the testimony here, if there were 14,000 going off 3 times a dav, there's an awful lot of something going on. But this is what was left after the war that we managed to find. Knowing Saddam Hussein, he may have more than this squirrelled away some other place we haven't even found. But leav- ing that aside, this is a tremendous stockpile of these kinds of weapons to have at the end of the war. Now you have to say to yourself, and especially when we're deal- ing with sick veterans and so forth, who feel that they were ex- posed to these items, is it conceivable that Saddam Hussein, with all of this stockpile — I mean, he didn't have these things by acci- dent, he built these with a very deliberate design to have all of these things — is it conceivable that in the course of the war, he or his field commanders, and I understand some of his front-line field commanders had authority to do certain things in the war, depend- ing upon how the war went. Is it conceivable that not a single one of these shells or weapons was ever fired? Is that conceivable? Maybe it's conceivable. I think it's very, very unlikely. That leaves apart the question of blowing these things up with our own bomb- ing raids and dispersing it in that fashion. And the fact that he had a history of doing it in the past. But what's even more powerful, I think, when you apply the logic, if you take the symptoms, the health symptoms that would come, and this runs counter to something that was said earlier by one of the witnesses, we spent a lot of time overlaying symptoms to exposure to what kind of items could create these kinds of symp- toms and what kinds of biological items and chemical weapons do we know that he had and was developing that could create, if a service person was exposed to them, a pattern of medical difficulty that would fit that kind of exposure. We find a very high correlation between the kinds of sickness and medical symptoms and exposure to chemical and/or biological weapons. In fact, we can't find anything else that correlates highly. This is the one thing that fits. And so, after a while, the pattern is so strong, that you look at it and you say, why is it that everybody else that's looking at this, including a lot of outside medical people who are trying to deal with sick veterans, can see these patterns and the Defense Depart- ment has this mental attitude that says, it couldn't be in this area and therefore, we don't really believe that's the problem because we can't verify it, so we're assuming the problem is somewhere outside those parameters. Now, granted, you've just said in response to Senator Bennett at the end of a long morning that you're locking at the chemical and biological issues as well. But your whole statement is built around a central supposition and belief that there was no chemical and bi- ological problem here. Mr. DoRN. No, sir. The Chairman. It is not? Mr. DoRN. You asked what I thought was the Committee's inter- est in the Export Administration Act and the possibly related ques- tion of whether or not Saddam Hussein used materials provided under the old Export Administration Act against us. And my state- ment was that we find no evidence that the weapons were used. 44 I've said several times during this hearing that we are consider- ing a wide range, all the possible explanations, including the possi- bility of some type of exposure to chemical agents. There are two issues here. One is what our adversary may have used. The other question is what may have been available or what may have been present in the theater for other reasons. The Chairman. Isn't there a third category? Isn't there a poten- tial, unintentional way in which it could be used if we went in and bombed these facilities and these got up into the air Mr. DoRN. That has been looked at. The Chairman. — ^At different levels of air currents and it came down over our troops. That would be a way in which he would not have made an offensive strike. We would clearly not have intended for that to happen. But isn't that another possibility? Mr. Dorn. That is clearly a possibility. May we speak briefly to that? The Chairman. Yes, please. We have an extensive aspect of that in our report, as I'm sure you know. Gro ahead. Dr. Kriese. I think one of the questions that comes up when you look at this as a potential cause for the illnesses is the question of where are the very sick people? The high concentrations that would have resulted locally from at- tacking facilities, I think possibly could have caused very serious injuries near the places that were bombed. The Chairman. You're talking now about the Iraqis themselves? Dr. Kriese. Yes, sir. The Chairman. Do you trust their data? Dr. Kriese. We saw no evidence as we were reviewing all the im- agery that we had available for bomb damage assessment of any local fatalities that we could attribute to release of chemicals or bi- ological agents. As we attacked facilities, sir, we went back and very carefully evaluated the amount of damage that we achieved with our attacks and have extensive imagery from gun cameras and other resources that we had in the area and we found no evidence of the deaths that you might anticipate from local releases of large amounts of material. As the U.N. has inspected some of the areas that we bombed after the war and, again, this does not provide data on what was there at the time we bombed, but certainly later, some of the facili- ties turned out to be empty. The Iraqis dispersed a lot of their mu- nitions. That's why it was recovered after the war. They were not necessarily in the places that we attacked. As part of our planning, we did studies of impact of releases. We've gone back afterwards taking weather data from the Air Force and other meteorological conditions and have made estimates about how far plumes from released material might have impacted people. For the southern most facilities that we attacked, I believe that the plume extends out, at most, 10 or 12 kilometers for inca- pacitating roughly 5 percent of unprotected people. And again The Chairman. See, the problem with that is when you say inca- pacitating unprotected people, first of all, we're talking about some- thing that we don't have a lot of good research on, obviously. 46 But if you're getting these low-level exposures — let's say you're an American service person out there and you're getting these re- peated low-level exposures and the alarms keep going on, going off all the time. And we're sajdng, well, that's just because they're faulty alarms. It's even an embarrassing assertion because I think it's so incred- ible and unbelievable. But this stuff is wafting down through there and that's why the alarms are going off, and people are getting ex- posed to it. Now, I don't know that we know enough today as to what kinds of exposure levels at lower levels, but on a chronic basis and over a period of time, are going to make somebody sick, make you sick, make your son sick. Maybe some person in the unit is going to get sicker a lot faster and more seriously than the next person in the unit who either has a different kind of a system or the exposure, for one reason or another, isn't quite as severe for that person. But, again, I find this remarkable blind spot that's right in the center of the screen here where you've got all of the surrounding information, most significantly being all the sick veterans who keep coming forward. I think until somebody — and maybe you've done this, I hope so and if you haven't, we're going to help you do it. You need to talk to some of the sick spouses, whose hair is falling out, who can't sleep, whose reproductive cycle is not working properly. They're showing a lot of the same physical symptoms that their husbands are showing, who were the veterans, although we have women vet- erans, too, who have these problems. I don't know where the breakdown is coming from because we have this enlarging body of sick people out there who something happened to. They weren't sick before they went to the Gulf. Some- thing happened to them there and now they're back and now they're sick. Can anybody tell me what happened to them? You're convinced, by and large, at least that's the testimony and that's the official Defense Department line, that it was not exposure to chemi- cal and biological weapons. I think part of it is due to that and we're putting a much strong- er case on the table than you are. But if it isn't that, after all this period of time, and as important as this issue is, what is causing it? Dr. Kriese. Sir, if I can just comment for a minute? I don't think the Defense Department is saying that it was not, the Gulf War Syndrome was not due to CW and BW. The Chairman. Chemical Warfare and Biological Warfare agents. Dr. Kriese. Yes, sir. I think the Defense Department is not tak- ing that stance. The Chairman So you're not saying that that's not the cause. Dr. Kriese. That's right. The Chairman. That could be the cause. Dr. Kriese. Yes, sir. I think Dr. Dom said that very, I hope, clearly earlier. I think he came to people for advice on what might be causes as he ran down the list of the possibilities. He asked the Defense In- telligence Agency for our assessment of use of CW and BW. As I heard him say, thank you very much, it's still on my hst. 46 The Chairman. What do you think is causing it? What's causing all these veterans and their families to get sick? What's your best judgment? Dr. Kriese. Speaking totally as a nonexpert, I think that The Chairman. I hope you're an expert because the Defense De- partment shouldn't bring you up here if you're not something of an expert. Mr. DORN. But not in health. Dr. Kriese. Sir, I'm not an expert on the whole range of medical issues that might be involved in this question. The Chairman. Well, take us as far as your expertise can take us, then. Dr. Kriese. I think we're learning about dangers of a whole range of chemicals that exist in our environment. I think there's a lot that we have to learn. The Chairman. You think this is part of the problem here? Ev- erything you've seen, your own wisdom, logic, and common sense. Do you think that chemical and biological exposure may in fact be part of what's making these veterans sick? Dr. Kriese. I think there were a lot of chemicals that were in the atmosphere in the Gulf from a range of sources, whether oil fires, chemical weapons. You can make a list of things that I think that there's a real possibility that low-level chemicals, or a com- bination of low-level chemicals may be one of the contributors to this disease. The Chairman. Do you believe that, too. Dr. Prociv? Dr. Prociv. I wouldn't discount it. Again, I'm not a medical type. My biggest dilemma is I don't understand how the chemicals would get there in sufficient quantity. If I understood that, I would be- lieve that. The Chairman. What do you believe, Mr. Dom? Mr. DoRN. Senator, as I said, we're exploring a large range of possibilities, including the one that we've discussed extensively here today. However, let me go back to something that I said in my state- ment. There are a large number of theories out there, each with a strong proponent, for multiple chemical sensitivity, for parasitic infections, for chemical agents, for other possible causes. We are trying to explore all the possibilities. I think it would be a mistake for us to focus on one possibility to the exclusion of all others. I could get a great headline here if I were to point to a single cause. But that would be a disservice to this Committee and it cer- tainly would be a disservice to the veterans to try to speculate about matters that we are still trying to study. We do not understand it. Senator, I have had the experience of being shuffled from physi- cian to physician, trying to find the answer to a simple question. So I empathize with the frustration being experience by Col. Smith and other veterans. I was not in the Persian Gulf, but I think many of us in this room have gone through that type of frustration. And as one goes from specialist to specialist, not getting answers, the fear and the frustration build. There were many, many times when I would have loved for someone to say, aha, I know exactly what the prob- 47 lem is. I will not try tx) offer veterans speculation when I think we need to The Chairman. They don't want speculation. I'm with you up to that point. Mr. DORN. — Support clear research. The Chairman, Now I think — respectfully, that veers off into something, that doesn't really have a lot of relevance here. The question is what can we offer them? Let me give you some specifics. No. 1, to ones that are sick and can't work, they ought to have 100 percent disability. That you can offer them. That you can fight for and that you should get and we shouldn't wait another day to do it. No. 2, if you've got family members that are sick, showing the same syndrome, they ought to get care from the Grovemment. The Defense Department ought to be fighting to get the money for it. If vou have to not build another battleship or something else in orcier to get the money to take care of the sick family members, you ought to stand up and say it. And so should the Secretary of De- fense, because the veterans are a lot more important than the equipment. [Applause.] I think there should be an epidemiological study of every single Gulf War veteran to find out what's going on out tnere and if some are being affected now, there might be some that are going to be affected 3 or 4 years from now. We could learn something and do something about helping them at the present time. I'm also concerned that there are a lot of other things that we haven't done here that we could have done with respect to getting to the bottom of these pretreatment items. I think we've got to streamline the appeals process within the Veterans' Administra- tion. There are a whole host of things. I've spelled them out. It would be very helpful that in the recommendations area, which is not designed to go to a single-cause issue, to go to the question of what do we do now to deal with the damage? It's very specific and it's very clear and I think it's sound. I think it's good national policy and I think the Defense Department today, the best thing it could do for itself as it's trying to fi^re out what happened is to go on an all points effort to deal witn the aftermath of this problem and see to it that these veterans and their families are getting the full scope of care immediately that they need and not wait to find out exactly what happened in each and every instance but to get that job done. I'll tell you very bluntly, that is not happening. And you can say this is way up on the priority list of the Secretary of Defense. But I've listened to the Secretary of Defense. I've listened to him on the radio. I've watched him on television. I've been waiting for him to talk about this problem. He can get a mike any time he wants it. He can step outside his office door and say, get the networks in here. I've got something to say on the Gulf War Syndrome issue. And you know what? They'll be there. They'll be happy to come. He can talk about this and he can deliver a message that's so powerful and so clear that shows where the priority is in treating these sick veterans and their famihes, that it's unmistakable. 48 The silence is deafening. That hasn't happened. And there's no excuse for it. I wouldn't have a Secretary of Defense that didn't do that, quite frankly, if I were running the show. It's not enough to do all the other things. I'm making my statement, Mr. Dom. You can make yours in a minute. I know you've got to defend the Department. That's your job. It doesn't happen to be my job. That's why we've got a balance of power difference in this Government of ours. I think he's got an obligation to speak out and give some leader- ship on this issue. I think he's got to address Col. Smith's problem and these other veterans who are here in this room and there are thousands more that aren't here. And especially these spouses and these sick kids. I've seen the sick kids. You ought to go see some of them. You ought to go talk with them. It will change your thinking about this problem, I guarantee it. It will make you a lot more passionate about it and a lot more determined to get to the bottom of it in terms of at least treatment for people, because we're not treating people today. Where does the spouse and the child go today? Can they go to the VA hospital? No, the VA hospital isn't geared to take them. It doesn't want them. Mr. DoRN. Senator, the law can be changed if you introduce the appropriate legislation. The Chairman. That's exactly right. The law can be changed and there are a lot of ways that can change it. It would certainly help if the Secretary of Defense, representing a continuum of decisionmakers, who organized this whole effort and sent everybody off to this war, would step up to the plate and sav, look, we've got a problem that's a fall-out of this war. We don't fully understand it. Maybe we didn't do some things right. Maybe we had the wrong sensors. Maybe we didn't anticipate the problem. Maybe when we get to the bottom, somebody's reputation is going to get nailed. Maybe it turns out somebody somewhere along the line said, we don't have to worry about this problem. It turns out we did have to worry about the problem. I've seen that happen before, too, and I'm sure you have. We give you a very good-sized budget. I had to fight to get $5 million in the appropriation to do some medical research, which I did last fall on the Senate floor. It's been hard to get the money even spent, I might say, to hire the people to go out and do the work. That's another whole story. We won't get into that here today. But it would be very refreshing if the Defense Secretary said, we've got a very tight budget and I know it's hard to pay for the medical care here, but we're going to set aside a half-billion dollars out of the Defense Department. That's like pocket change in terms of the totals, but it's significant pocket change to say, I want to make sure that those problems are taken care of. And I don't want any bureaucratic mumbo-jumbo that the Veterans' Affairs Depart- ment doesn't have the money that it needs or somebody else doesn't have the money that it needs. This is a Defense Department operation. These people went to fight because we asked them to go. We're responsible for what hap- pens to them at the end of the day. They're sick and this is an 49 anomaly and we want to get to the bottom of it. And while we're trying to do that, we want them treated. We'll pay the bill. You know something? The people of the country would like to hear that because that's an acceptance of responsibility. That isn't to say that somebody did anything deliberately or anything of that sort. It's an acceptance of the responsibility after the fact of the human need that's there. That would be a wonderful gesture and it's what ought to be done. Now I'll bet you that nobody's even thought about that at the De- fense Department. Or if they have, they sure kept it a secret. Mr. DORN. Mr. Chairman, I began my testimony by reading a let- ter to all Persian Gulf veterans from Chairman Shalikashvili and jointly signed by the Secretary of Defense. I will be pleased to read it again into the record. I should point out, however, that that letter, which promises treatment, which encourages people to come forward, which tells people that there are no classification restrictions against what they may wish to say about their experiences, is the last of about a dozen messages that various people in the Defense Department have sent out within the past 8 to 10 months. Now it is true that when we send out a message to veterans which says, we're treating you, we do not get quite the same amount of attention as we can get with a more sensational story. However, we can discuss the resources being dedicated to this ef- fort. I can assure you that a soldier who comes forward, or a family member who comes forward to a military medical facility will re- ceive care. This information is often missed because it seems to be a positive reassurance which some people are not interested in hearing. Let me say it again loudly. If a soldier comes to a military treat- ment facility, he or she will be treated. If that soldier brings a member of his family in, he or she will be treated. If there is any- one in this audience who feels that has not happened, I will take the names, I will make the calls, and it will happen. The Chairman. Let's have order in the room. You have some people here that feel that way who are standing. They feel that they have been given the brush-off in that area. So we'll see to it that you have their names. Let me ask you this. When was this letter put out? Mr. DoRN. It's dated today. The Chairman. So, in other words, the letter was put out today. Mr. Dorn. That is the last, as I said, of about a dozen messages coming out of DoD on this matter. The Chairman. But this is the one you're citing because this is the one that's obviously directed to the veterans with the kind of focus that you've just described. But again let's be honest with each other. There's no coincidence, is there, in timing, that the fact this letter is coming out today and we're having this hearing today. Mr. Dorn. Yes, Senator, it absolutely is a coincidence because that letter has been working its way through the system for some time. I should mention that a week or so ago, a message came out from the Assistant Secretary of Health focusing on this. I will be glad 50 to provide you the list of a couple of dozen things that have gone out — either briefings or memoranda or messages — since the end of the Persian Gulf conflict. I should also point out something else, Senator, because there is a great deal of discussion about delay and attention. I am grateful that sometime late last spring or last summer, sev- eral Members of Congress, including Senator Shelby and Mr. Mont- gomery, began approaching the Defense Department, saying, "Hey, I keep getting groups of veterans from my constituency coming for- ward and they think they have a problem." Most of these veterans are in the reserves or National Guard units. It is not fair to say that this is a problem that everyone has been aware of since the end of the Persian Gulf War and that we are only beginning to attend to. It is fair to say that it is a problem that has become apparent over time, it did not crystallize either in the Congress or in the Defense Department until less than a year ago. We have, I believe, tried to attend to it since then. I think we can be faulted in any number of ways. You may be correct that, in spite of this letter and in spite of dozens of other attempts to com- municate, we have not done as good a job of getting the word out as we should have. I think you probably are also right that we had doctors in our military facilities and in VA facilities who, not having identified a pattern or syndrome, were not as sensitive to the matter as they might have been. There were also, as you know, up until just a few months ago, restrictions on treatment. The Chairman. I don't want to stop you. If you'll permit me to interrupt just for a minute because I want to hear your full state- ment. We have a vote that's on. The lights back there are on and I've got about 8 minutes to get to the floor. I want to make the vote. It's a cloture vote and my vote may decide the issue. I hesitate to interrupt this to do that. I want to recess the Committee for that purpose and then I'll come back and I'll let you finish. As nearly as I know, there has been no letter like this before today signed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Sec- retary of Defense sent to all Gulf War veterans. Now, am I right in believing that? Mr. DORN. That is correct. The Chairman. Isn't this the first letter like this? Mr. Dorn. I think the previous correspondence has gone to peo- ple in the military chain of command for treatment instructions and to commanders. The Chairman. OK. Let me let you check that while I'm gone. Let me also ask you to do something else. You offered to talk to the veterans here who feel that they're not getting the response to their medical problems. That's not an unlikely situation. There are a lot of veterans who feel that way. Mr. Dorn. Absolutely. The Chairman. You had some stand up over here. You've had three in uniform stand up over here. While I'm gone, I would ap- 51 predate it because I'm going to come back and resume the hearing, if you could chat with some of them. Mr. DoRN. Absolutely. The Chairman. I'd like it to be a civil conversation. I know every- body feels strongly about this. I'd ask everybody to conduct the dis- cussion in an orcferly manner here because I know this arouses a lot of tensions and feelings. But talk to Secretary Dom while I'm out of the room. 111 vote. I'll come back and then we'll finish up this session. The Committee stands in recess for a short period. [Recess.] The Chairman. Let me ask that everyone take a seat. Secretary Dorn has to step out for a minute. Kelly, would you ac- company Secretary Dom just for a minute. In any event, let us resume then, if you're ready to go. I want to just make a clarification on the memorandum today from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and Secretary Perry that's gone out to the Persian Gulf veterans. Does the statement cover Reservists and their families, including those both still in the Re- serves and those that may have left the Reserves since the War? Mr. Dorn. I think to the extent that the law permits, it does. I've got to check. If you're saying does it allow Reservists and their families to re- ceive medical care in regular military facilities, the answer is no, and that is a legal problem which we need to discuss with you and certainly need to discuss with the Committees on Armed Services and the Committees on Veterans' Affairs. The Chairman. Let's get a clarification on that as quickly as pos- sible. I would hope they would be included because obviously if they are out there part of the walking wounded, their problem is precisely the same as someone else. Mr. Dorn. Clearly, nothing in this changes existing law, and the existing law says active-duty personnel and their families get treat- ed in military treatment facilities, that Reservists, under normal circumstances, would go into the VA system. Now the law can be changed, but The Chairman. Here's what I'd like you to do. I'd like you to get together with the VA and let's resolve that we're covering every- body here. I don't want somebody that was out there and who's sick, operating side by side with somebody else who was out there and sick, and one person gets one kind of treatment and the other person either doesn't get treatment or gets a lesser kind of treat- ment. We obviously don't want that, so I just want to make sure that that gets reconciled within 24 hours in some way so that the mes- sage that's going out is that anybody that suited up and went is going to get the same response that's being pledged here within this Tetter. Mr. Dorn. Again, within the constraints of the law. We need to work, as I said, on the law. We may need to work on those changes, to make that happen. The Chairman. Ill tell you something. If we need to do that, I think I can make you a guarantee. If the Defense Department de- termines we need a change in the law in that area, let's get it 52 drafted. I'll offer it on the floor to the next bill through. I'll bet I can get close to 100 co-sponsors and we'll get it passed. There'll be no barrier, I don't believe, to getting that done if we need that, but I don't want that to become a Catch-22 either. So Mr. DORN. And it clearly is a limitation because, under current law, Reservists' families cannot be treated, either by the regular military facilities or in VA facilities. The Chairman. See, I don't know that we've had a situation quite like this one where we pressed so many Reservists into action quickly and so many of them are now sick. They were operating under color of the U.S. Government obviously in a war zone. So the last thing they deserve is an answer that says, sorry, we can't get to you because the law's that way. Mr. DoRN. I understand. The Chairman. You know, we've got to fix that problem. Mr. DORN. Mr. Chairman, may I say further in response to that, the discussions while you were voting were helpful. A couple of things are clear. One is that we need to send a clearer, stronger message to the physicians who are responsible for treating folks regarding the need to take these illnesses very seriously and regarding the need to lay out a very strict protocol for them. Our expressions of good intention must be reflected where it matters, and that's in individ- ual clinics around the Nation. We need to make sure it happens. The Chairman. Let me cover another item with you right up front. We have some service personnel in the room here other than the group that's accompanying you, and some have roles in the intel- ligence area and may have very important information, firsthand information that they gathered as part of their official duties, that they feel and know to be highly relevant to the inquiry we're doing. They've identified themselves. They want to convey that informa- tion, and they've been told by superiors not to do that. That they're not to give us classified information. I mean, my blood pressure goes to 5000 when that happens be- cause precisely what we need to have is all the information, and I would like an assurance fi'om you now, provided you have the au- thority to give it, and if not, then I want you to go and get it fi*om whoever you have to get it from, that present and former military personnel and Defense Department personnel are fully free and au- thorized to give us what information they have and not be in the situation where they're having a gun put to their head by the De- fense Department that says, no, you can't tell what you know. Mr. Dorn. The Secretary and the Chairman say that people should be free to talk about their experiences, but let me clarify it further, addressing specifically that clause which says that this in- formation is not classified. The Chairman. See, I think all this information related to this topic should now be declassified. I think everybody in the public do- main ought to have a right to see it, including the medical re- searchers and others. But very specifically, I don't want any of us who have proper congressional roles to play here to be denied ac- 53 cess tx) any of this information. That is absolutely unacceptable and I want to get that cleared up today. Mr. DORN, Let me clarify further. The Chairman. Now, earlier, you made a statement or a state- ment was made by one of the three of you that all of the chemical agents and related equipment that was discovered was found stored far from the Kuwait field of operations. At An Nasiriyah, and we've got a map over here where bombings occurred and many chemical weapons were found, that area is only 125 miles from the Kuwait/Saudi border and it's well within SCUD missile range of most coalition deployments. Weren't U.S. forces lo- cated around this area? Dr. Prociv. Yes, they were. I'll say frankly the word, far, got in the last draft of Dr. Dom's testimony this morning. I thought we had that fixed to be stricken from the draft testimony that he was given. It is not correct to say that all munitions were found far from the KTL, sir. The Chairman. Well, that's an important clarification. So there were instances then where some of these munitions were found close to where we had troop deployments? Dr. Prociv. That's correct. The Chairman. This would be one. Can you cite others? Dr. Prociv. Not off the top of my head. Just a second. [Pause.] I think the answer, sir, is that we attacked Talil but U.N. inspec- tions show nothing in that after the War. That's it. The Chairman. But in terms of An Nasiriyah here, we did find them there. Do I assume that we continued to use our forces to se- cure that area as the War went along? We would not have just been in that area and then left, would we? Dr. Prociv. I don't know those details of how long we were in that area. My understanding is that munitions were found not at the site we bombed, but some 15 nautical miles away from where we attacked. The Chairman. How close would U.S. forces have been stationed to that? Dr. Prociv. I think they were across the river. Not stationed but during the ground force phase of the campaign, that's as close as we got. The Chairman. The river would be how wide, roughly? What are we talking about? Dr. Prociv. It's a desert area so I expect it's not very wide there. The Chairman. So it's a pretty narrow river? Dr. Prociv. Right. The Chairman. Our troops were right across this narrow river from where we found these things. Is that right? Dr. Prociv. They got that close but I don't know how long they were there. The Chairman. We've got a lot of questions here. We've covered a lot of ground earlier with Senator Bennett, and I'm going to give vou a number of questions for the record to ask you to respond to. 54 and to respond to fiilly. I know you will. I know it'll be your inten- tion to do that. I don't want to call you back to pick up the loose ends. I will do that if necessary, so I want to make sure that some staff aid doesn't put a lot of doubletalk in the answers. I want good, straight, pointed answers to the questions I'm going to give you for the record. I would ask to have them answered that way. I want to make another suggestion to you, because when we started out on this way back when, it was to try to understand what the control regimes were that we had within our own Govern- ment that would have prevented Saddam Hussein from getting the things that he needed to make biological weapons or the things he needed to make chemical weapons. It was really astonishing to find that our own Government had licensed a shipment of those very things to Saddam Hussein and many of them going directly to military units. There was no subter- fuge, they were going to go right into his war production system. Then, of course, when we decided the necessity of going to war with Iraq, we had our own troops suddenly facing weapons that we had helped develop by providing critical items to them. You're nodding in the affirmative. I don't want to put words in your mouth, but that's correct, is it not? Mr. DORN. As my opening statement says, it appears that our ex- port control regime was not effective. The Chairman. Right. We helped him create these diabolical weapons by supplying a lot of the critical things he needed for them. We also knew that he had a history of using these weapons. He used them on his own people. He used them on the Kurds years earlier, gassed and killed a lot of people. So when we went into the War, we must have anticipated a real problem here. I mean we just didn't send these chemical alarms out just to have something to do in all these MOPP 4 outfits. We sent them out there because we anticipated that there was a real threat, did we not? Mr. DoRN. That is true, sir. The Chairman. We understood that he had this capability and that it posed a threat to our people and we took various steps. We had the pretreatment pills, we had training, we had chemical mon- itors out in the field, we had teams designed to do this. All of that certainly creates a very strong supposition that we were worried about what he might do. I don't think the Defense Department did this for an exercise. There was a real worry that he might use these chemical weapons or biological weapons, wasn't there? Mr. DoRN. There was. The Chairman. There was that worry. So these precautions were taken. Now, as it turns out, and this is where the firsthand statements of veterans I think are so important because they're the ones that were out there, we weren't, and they're the ones, in many cases, who are sick. When these alarms go off, I must say to you, it's incredible and unbelievable and unsustainable and shouldn't, I don't think, be of- fered to come here today, any of you and say, look we had all these chemical alarms and they kept going off in various areas through 55 the War zone, but they were all misfires. It was all accidental alarms. It doesn't mean there were any chemicals in the area. There are no chemical incidents, and so forth and so on. Even as Senator Bennett pointed out, going back to some of our firsthand accounts, that in many cases the gear was picked up afterward and who knows what happened to it. We've had lots and lots of other accounts on that. These alarms went off for a reason, and I think it's clear, it's clear in my mind they went off because the things they were de- signed to detect came into that zone and set them off. I mean, they didn't ^0 off ahead of time, they didn't go off afterward; they went off during the time that things were going on in the War zone that they were designed to detect. I think it's very important that the Defense Department bring it- self to face the reality that a lot of veterans were exposed to chemi- cal agents during this war period. And whether they were fired in an offensive capacity in some instances, or delivered that way, as I also think they were, is really incidental here. The question is, did people come into contact with these agents, and in all likelihood some biological agents as well, and in some mixture that we don't yet fully understand, is this the foundation for the sickness that a lot of tnem have? I think the facts now are essentially inescapable that that is a significant part of this prob- lem. If the Defense Department can't believe that or won't believe that, or if there are institutional reasons, or numerous other rea- sons that prevent that kind of acknowledgement, I think this prob- lem's going to get a lot worse. In the end, the main losers are going to be the veterans and their families. The second loser is going to be the Defense Department because you're going to end up with your reputation in ruins. I'm not exag- gerating and so I don't want to be misunderstood when I say I'll bring veterans in here and have them, one after the other, and their family members, for days on end, I will do that if I have to, because I want this problem paid attention to. They don't want to come. I don't want to ask them, but we will ask them and they will come. That's not the way to solve this problem, but if there is no other way, then that's the way we will do it. This is not a shot across the bow. This is about as direct as the communications get between the Legislative Branch and the Exec- utive Branch. I will fight to get you what you need. You want money to treat sick veterans and their families? I'll go to the floor. I'll get a coali- tion of Republicans and Democrats. I think you saw that here today. This is a bipartisan concern. If we need to change the laws, we'll get the laws changed. What we won't do is allow this thing to be swept under the rug or covered up or fuzzed off in some way to say that it's not a big deal or it's not very serious, or something else. So to the extent that there's a willingness to acknowledge this problem and deal with it directly and solve it, then you're going to find you've got a lot of friends here that will help you get that done. Every additional minute that there's foot dragging, or Catch-22 logic or fine-shaving of statements and so forth, for whatever the 56 reasons, then you're going to have a war, and it won't be a war you win in the end, and it's one you shouldn't wage. I'd Hke to have an understanding here that we solve this prob- lem. These veterans, I've talked to hundreds of them now directly. These are not malingerers, these are not malcontents, these are not people who are having fantasies. These are sick people who, in every case, were well when they went to the War or they could not have even gone to the War. In many cases, they are people who were among the most fit. People that have gone through survival school, paratroop training, run marathons, and various other things. The fact that their health has been turned upside down is a genuine national tragedy. We can't hold back anything that they need to get to the bottom of this and fix their problems as best we can. I do want you to talk to some of these spouses and children because you're not going to appreciate this problem until you do. When you talk to a veteran's wife whose hair is falling out and whose reproductive cycle has been knocked completely haywire who was healthy before ner husband came back from the Gulf War, you're going to understand this problem in a way you can't under- stand it before that. You've got to put a real face, lots of real faces on this thing to understand tne severity of it. I think the Defense Secretary himself needs to do some of this, to make it real and tangible in terms of the urgency of this prob- lem. I'm going to expect a good faith response from everybody here. What we can't tolerate and what I won't tolerate is a situation where anybody's intimidated, anybody's called up and it is sug- gested to them that they give a programmed answer. Anybody told, don't come forward, or in some oblique way is urged not to come forward, I mean that's not tolerable. I don't believe you would do that or countenance that and so I would ask you, as an agent for this Committee on this issue, pursu- ant to this discussion, to please go back to the hierarchy up and down the line and make sure the message is delivered as clearly as you are capable of doing it — and you are a very good commu- nicator— that we've got to get to the bottom of this and we've got to do it as fast as we possibly can. And whatever it takes to do it, has to be done. The old suppositions and the old ways of analyzing the problem I think have to be put aside to see if there isn't some new way to look at it. Senator Bennett, whose father was a Senator before him, has a long record of support of defense issues. I think he gave you some very wise counsel and advice, and that is that this is a problem that may have to be looked at. You're not going to find the answer until you escape from a preconditioned way of looking at it, to look at it in a new way and in a fresh way. I'm going to expect that done and I'd like to end on that kind of a note of constructive agreement that we will cooperate in achiev- ing those goals. But I don't want there to be any illusion or mis- understanding. We have to get to the bottom of this, and if I'm not satisfied within a short period of time that we're really moving at top speed, and that we're escaping from all of the kind of double- talk that's been associated with many cases up until now, I'm going 57 to start holding the hearings, and you know, I don't want to have to do it that way. Mr. DoRN. Mr. Chairman, I hear you clearly. I will try to re- spond. Thank you. The Chairman. We're going to give you questions for the record and we would appreciate, as I say, full responses to those and we'll look forward to getting those back. The Committee stands in recess until our next hearing, which will start at 2:45 p.m. [Whereupon, at 2:01 p.m., the Committee was recessed, to recon- vene the same day, Wednesday, May 25, 1994, at 2:45 p.m., in the same place.] 58 AFTERNOON SESSION The Chairman. [2:57 p.m.] The Committee will come to order. Let me welcome all those in attendance. We're starting a little late because we ran so long this morning. We're joined by Senator Kerry who has a very important interest in this matter and who's been out into this area. Let me call on Senator Kerry. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN F. KERRY Senator Kerry. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. First of all, I want to apologize to you. I had wanted to be here earlier, but un- fortunately, the way the Senate works, as you well know, some- times that's impossible. But I wanted to come here now to thank you for your tremendous leadership on this. I have really been im- pressed, as a veteran, particularly given my long involvement in the effort to get an Agent Orange presumption and a bill through here finally, I'm particularly sensitized to the stonewalling and re- actions people will put in the path of those who put on the uniform. I was quite surprised to find it, and I am personally extraor- dinarily gratified and impressed by your pursuit of this. You've been passionate on the floor, you've been dogged in the Committee and in private, and a lot of veterans around the country I think are deeply indebted to you for your concern that regrettably has not been as forthcoming as it should have been given the lessons we've learned from other entities that are responsible for behavior toward those who put on the uniform in this country. There always ought to be a presumption, I believe, and that's something we argued about very hard on the Agent Orange issue, a presumption in favor of the veteran. You shouldn't have to beat down the doors to get people to level with you and explain to you what may or may not be factual. You have a done a brilliant job of forcing some information out on this that lends a much clearer view about what the possibilities are and what may or may not have happened. So I want to thank you. I also want to thank those who have suffered because of this ex- posure, whatever it may be, yet to be fully explained, but I really want to thank them for their pursuit of this and for their willing- ness to endure. I always thought that after we won the Agent Orange victory, we had learned a lesson and there would not have to be another gen- eration coming along and enduring. So I'm here expressing per- sonal anger and frustration with the fact that it's been a real tug of war to get at this. I cannot underscore enough my own personal admiration and respect for your efforts to try to get at it, and I think a lot of veterans just feel gratified that this Committee is doing it, and I support you in those efforts. The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Kerry. Those words mean something special to me, coming from you, given your history years ago as a Vietnam War veteran and since that time. I think we've made some important progress with this work, with your help and the help of others, to get to the bottom of what has happened here and why we have so many sick veterans and in- creasingly so many sick veteran family members. 59 Spouses whose reproductive cycle is not working properly or suf- fering hair loss, a lot of the symptoms that the veterans themselves are experiencing and now increasingly their children. This was an unanticipated finding by us, as we got more deeply into this, but the numbers are growing in this area, and we're now pursuing that aspect of it. But the question of exposure to chemical agents and to biological agents in this war zone and the implications for veterans and also a lot of active-duty personnel, there are a lot of active-duty person- nel who are afraid now to come forward because there's a down- sizing going on and they don't want to be invited to leave because they've been identified as having a medical problem. Many of the veterans who were already out of the service tell us that if you don't get any real help out of the VA or in terms of a disability rating, and you're too sick to work, you're absolutely un- insurable, the insurance companies don't want to see you because you need the help and you need the coverage. So there's a diabolical end-game situation facing more and more Desert Storm veterans. And when you think back to the parades, the deserved parades at the time as the war was ending and people were coming back, they don't mean much now if a veteran is sick or his family members are sick, and they need a response, they need a proper diagnosis, and they need proper care. Even today with respect to the family members, we were able to get from the Defense Department this very day, coincidentally, a statement to all Gulf War veterans, signed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Defense Secretary indicating that they are now being urged to come forward, and they will be given help. That is a constructive statement. Now we've got to see that statement fully implemented, and there are questions as to how it affects Re- servists and others. I've also made the pledge today, just for your own information, that if we don't get the response that is needed here, I'm quite pre- pared to conduct hearings where we have veterans come in endless numbers. I hate to go through the process of asking people to make that effort, but if it's needed in order to really force this issue to a proper conclusion, we'll do that, and we'll have hearings that go on as long as they need to go on, until the powers that be under- stand that this is not going to be an issue that's swept under the rug. We're not going to have a 20-year hiatus as we had with Agent Orange. We've had a lot of veterans from Desert Storm already die, who went over in perfect health. Senator Kerry. Well, it's very curious, I must say. I mentioned a moment ago to the staff that I was in Kuwait about 2 days after the liberation as part of the observer group from the Senate, and apart from biological or chemical, I found that the acridity of the air and the thickness of the air just from the oil fires. I remember turning to one of the soldiers there in Kuwait and asking him whether the air he was breathing bothered him, and how he felt about being outdoors. In fact, several people there who were from Reserve units out of Massachusetts mentioned to me that they were very concerned about breathing the air. I've got to tell you, for the 24 hours or whatever that I was there, I found a significant impact and discomfort from the air I was 60 breathing, not unlike Bangkok where you can go out and you can't run. In 15 minutes, you feel your lungs searing. I certainly felt the effect of those fires and wnthin miles around, when it rained buildings were covered, cars were covered. I mean, you had, as far away as in Rihad, you had buildings that turned black by virtue of the rain. You had black rain. So that means you have particles in the air, and if you have particles in the air, you are clearly breathing those particles. I don't know what the air quality was, I don't even know if we measured that air quality, but I remember distinctly feeling it and having concern expressed to me by people. Now I'm told that that has not yet showed up or there isn't some indication of that, but I would personally be surprised if, for those who were there for some period of time, there isn't some kind of impact or potential for it. Anyway, I think you're doing very important work here. I apolo- gize to those who wish more of us were here and able to stay, but the Senate doesn't always allow that. The Chairman. Thank you very much again, Senator Kerry. Let me introduce our first witness this afternoon. Dr. Mitchell Wallerstein, who is the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Counterpro- liferation Policy, Department of Defense, and we're pleased to have you. You've come in the trail of an earlier discussion this morning, as you know. Why don't you proceed and give us your statement at this point, and then we'll go from there. OPENING STATEMENT OF DR. MITCHELL WALLERSTEIN, DEP- UTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR COUNTERPROLIFERATION POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASfflNGTON, DC Dr. Wallerstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. My prepared remarks are really not so much a statement as a comment that is supplementary to the testimony given this morn- ing by Under Secretary Dorn. And so I simply wanted to say that I'm pleased to be here this afternoon to answer any questions that you might have regarding export controls and DoD's counterpro- liferation policies, particularly in the areas of chemical and biologi- cal weapons proliferation. We obviously wish to be fully cooperative with your hearing, your investigation, and are prepared to do so. As Under Secretary Dorn explained, the Department of Defense was a major contributor, in 1990, to the development of the En- hanced Proliferation Control Initiative, which expanded DoD's role in the review of export requests, and which promoted greater inter- agency cooperation through the establishment of interagency sub- groups on export controls. Let me underscore once again, however, the fact that DoD has never been in the business of export control licensing, either for dual-use items or for munitions. We do, however, continue to be an active participant in the li- cense review process, particularly and increasingly, in areas involv- ing chemical and biological materials. These are coordinated multi- laterally through the Australia group. 61 We will continue to play a leading role in the U.S. Government's efforts to counter the proliferation of chemical and biological weap- ons, but we do not license. We are simply a reviewer of licenses. As you know, in the period immediately prior to the conflict in the Persian Gulf, DoD's role in the review of chemical and biologi- cal related dual-use export licenses for non-communist countries, such as Iraq, focused only on the assessment of risk of diversion of these dual-use items to the Soviet Union or to other CoCom pro- scribed destinations. We had, at that time, no authority to review licenses destined for Iraq, per se, in terms of their risk of proliferation. Additionally, of the export licenses that we did review for Iraq, we are aware of none that supported Iraq's chemical or biological weapons efforts. Since the revelations of the Persian Gulf War, law and regula- tions have been modified to permit us to be more aggressive with regard to the review of dual-use export licenses to proliferant states per se. As you know, the Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative was passed in November 1990, and, of course, Iraq today is subject to a total embargo on such items. We weigh in heavily now with rec- ommendations against approval of cases where the end user is questionable, or where the items appear to have no legitimate de- fense or peaceful purpose. As you also know, Mr. Chairman, the Administration's bill for the renewal of the Export Administration Act, which is now before your Committee, would give us the latitude to further review a large number of cases, and we could designate the categories that we wish to review. In addition to these initiatives, we have now in prospect the mul- tilateral support of 157 states, which have signed the Chemical Weapons Convention. When it is ratified, these states will under- take not to acquire, retain, or transfer chemical weapons or their precursors for the purposes prohibited under the CWC. Finally, the President has directed that we pursue measures to strengthen the 1975 Biological Weapons Convention in order to en- hance transparency and to promote increased verifiability of the use of these biological agents for peaceful and civilian activities. Mr. Chairman, that concludes my comment. I'd be very happy to take your questions. The Chairman. How long have you been in your present job? Dr. Wallerstein. Since July 1993, sir. The Chairman. What did you do before that? Dr. Wallerstein. Before that, I was the Deputy Executive Offi- cer of the National Academy of Sciences. The Chairman. Did you have a position at any time in the De- fense Department or anything related to it prior to that last assign- ment? Dr. Wallerstein. No, sir. The Chairman. So you were not, in a sense, in the Government, you were not in the loop when the request was made for these ex- port licenses on, say, the biological items that were sent over to Iraq? Dr. Wallerstein. That's correct, sir. 86-55R n - oc. _ -3 62 The Chairman. You've reviewed all that carefully, however, in terms of what happened on somebody else's watch? Dr. Wallerstein. I have, yes. The Chairman. Now, and I want you to think very carefully about this because I'm prepared to challenge your statement, and that doesn't mean your statement might not be right, but did I un- derstand you to say that none of the items that were shipped over to Saddam Hussein ended up being used in his biological or chemi- cal weapons capability, things that were licensed and shipped from the United States? Dr. Wallerstein. No, sir. What I said was that in none of the cases that DoD reviewed are we aware that those items wound up being used in chemical or biological weapons programs. The Chairman. OK Dr. Wallerstein. But again, let me repeat that we had only very limited review authority, because it was only the retransfer issue at that time. It was only the potential for retransfer of items to the Soviet Union or to other communist countries at that time were we authorized to review. The Chairman. Then you would not have reviewed the requests that were made directly by the Iraqis that came into the research labs here for some of these very dangerous biological specimens which we, in fact, shipped to them. You would not have reviewed those? Dr. Wallerstein. Only if the case was referred to us by the Commerce Department and, again, they would not have been refer- ring those cases unless they anticipated the possibility of retransfer. The Chairman. In other words, those would not have been with- in the scope of your review? Dr. Wallerstein. Not as a general practice, that's right. The Chairman. OK, so you can't assert, one way or the other, as to whether those items ended up in Saddam Hussein's war ma- chine, the stuff that we know we sent him, not for transshipment to somebody else, but the end shipment to him. Dr. Wallerstein. That's correct. The Chairman. OK. Because it's clear, when you go back and fol- low the pattern of what was being done here, that when they were requesting these biological specimens, they were being shipped over to, in some cases, the front operations within the Iraqi government, that were in fact part of their military apparatus. You are aware of that? Dr. Wallerstein. I have read information to that effect, yes, sir. The Chairman. Did vou happen by chance to see the letter, which had a little bit of*^a frantic tone to it, from Secretary Baker in the Bush Administration, as the war was getting ready to start, that we suddenly stopped the shipments to Iraq of these kinds of items, things that could be either used in chemical weapons or bio- logical weapons or nuclear weapons. Are you aware of that letter that was sent around? Dr. Wallerstein. No, sir, I am not. The Chairman. We ought to give you a copy of it, because it was a case of suddenly it dawned on people that we were going to have a real problem facing off against weapons that we had inadvert- 63 ently, one presumes, helped create. And that's part of our problem here, but your testimony is that you only looked at the things that were going to be transshipped to the so-called rogue regimes that were on the bad guy list at the time. Is that right? Dr. Wallerstein. To the countries that were proscribed by CoCom, which were the Soviet Union, China, and the other com- munist countries of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. I might also mention, Mr. Chairman, that of course, these tech- nologies are classically dual use in nature. They have both commer- cial and military applications. And so, in the period prior to the outbreak of the war, there was a legitimate comm.ercial trade which may have contributed to the problem, but that is beyond the purview of the Department of Defense. The Chairman. Are you in a position to tell us whether Iraq's bi- ological warfare program was offensive in nature? Dr. Wallerstein. The indications certainly after the war were that, from the evidence obtained, they were making strong efforts to obtain an offensive capability. Whether they had actually achieved that or not, I do not know, personally. The Chairman. Were they capable of incorporating those items into weapons systems? Dr. Wallerstein. In my judgment, they would have been capa- ble of doing that, yes, sir. The Chairman. You know, after the war, after even the bombing destroyed a lot of the weapons, we had taken into possession, very large quantities of chemical weapons. You are aware of that? Dr. Wallerstein. Yes, sir. The Chairman. And in a deliverable form, a variety of deliver- able forms. What initiatives has the United States undertaken now to ensure an effective successor regime to CoCom? Dr. Wallerstein. That process is now fairly well advanced, and I am a major player in that process representing my Department. We are, as you know, negotiating not just with the original 17 CoCom member states, but with a larger group that includes many of the other advanced industrialized countries of Europe, such as Switzerland, Sweden, and Austria. Agreement has been reached in principle for a regime that will have two pillars; a dual-use pillar similar to the old CoCom, as well as an armaments pillar. We hope very much that the arms pillar will focus particularly on these countries of greatest proliferation concern. The final details of the regime are still being negotiated, but it is our expectation, and we have preliminary agreement among the participating states, that the new regime will begin operation in the latter part of this year, after October. The Chairman. What kind of controls would you recommend that we have in place to prevent chemical and biological, and for that matter, nuclear materials getting to countries in situations such as we've now seen where Iraq exploited our openness to their advan- tage and then ultimately as a threat to us and to others? What kind of controls do we need to have in this area to avoid having another one of these situations arise? 64 Dr. Wallerstein. Well, we do have in place the Enhanced Pro- liferation Control Initiative, which provides us with a safety net. Thus, in situations where an end user is considered to be question- able, where a company knows or has reason to know that an end user may not be intending to use the item in question for civilian application, it should be applying for an export license and the Government has the means to insist that they apply for such a validated license. In addition, as I said, the new Export Administration Act will provide the necessary framework for the Department of Defense and for other national security-related agencies to request to re- view all broad categories of licenses related to chemical and biologi- cal precursors and other related items. On the multilateral front, we have the Australia g^oup operating today. As I noted in my comment, we hope very much that perhaps by early 1995, we will have a ratified Chemical Weapons Conven- tion, which will then obligate the 157 signatory countries. This will include most, but I should say not "all" of the countries of concern, to a transparency regime where we and the multilateral authority, more importantly, would have the ability to inspect and to ensure that items were not being turned to military use. I will add that the biological weapons problem is somewhat more difficult. It is, as I'm sure you know, much easier to conceal and it therefore presents us with a much greater challenge. President Clinton, as part of his announcements last fall, has called for enhanced transparency measures to be developed in the Biological Weapons Convention. We are pursuing that and hope to be working with the other countries that are signatories to the Bio- lo^cal Weapons Convention to promote greater transparency there. The Chairman. You know, as we started down the track of trying to determine what was causing the sickness of the Gulf War veter- ans and their family members, and taking the symptoms and try- ing to overlay on the symptoms what kinds of exposures could have caused those health effects and health symptoms, that by the proc- ess of elimination, we worked our way back to biological exposures. It was out of that that we continued to work back on an inves- tigative trail to fmd that the United States had authorized, at the highest levels of our Government, the shipment of these very kinds of biological items to Saddam Hussein going into his war-making machine. And so there's a very powerful case and logic and se- quence of factual activity that would suggest that we had a big hand, presumably unwittingly, in helping him develop his biologi- cal warfare capability. It's led me to believe that we ought to be very careful about who we're shipping these biological items to, and the fact that they are easier to conceal also should raise our alarm levels because I think you've got more and more of these regimes that are willing to go to any lengths in using these diabolical weapons even against their own people, which Saddam Hussein has a history of doing. It seems to me we ought to be trving to strengthen the Biological Warfare Convention. I'm just wond.ering what you think we can do in that area, given the fact that it's in a sense more difficult to do the monitoring. How do we tighten this thing down so we don't end up having another situation like this arise in the future? 65 Dr. Wallerstein. I think that the key, Senator, Hes in trans- parency. Where countries are not prepared to be fully transparent in their dealings, which involves intrusive inspections. I might note that that raises, in turn, the problem of proprietary information, because we have to bear in mind that it's the same technology that's used in pharmaceutical manufacturing, for exam- ple. And so just as we would have to prevail upon our pharma- ceutical companies to be open to this kind of inspection, so would other countries. But it is only through intrusive inspection, and by countries agreeing to be open, that we can have any kind of con- fidence that these things are not being hidden. I might also note, in response to your earlier comment, that the Defense Technology Security Administration, which is a part of the program elements that I am responsible for, has had an on-going program to identify the linkages between the front companies and the cutouts and the third party purchasers that are used, not just by Iraq, but by other proliferant countries, and we are pursuing this very aggressively. And, again, as we now assert the right to review these cases, we will be looking very carefully for these kinds of practices to prevent their recurrence in the future. The Chairman. Let me ask you what role, if any, have you played in the Department of Defense's investigation into the Iraqi chemical and biological warfare programs and into the discovery of or use of unconventional weapons during the Persian Gulf War? Dr. Wallerstein. My office, which is newly reorganized as part of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, does play a direct role in support of UNSCOM and the IAEA. Indeed, one of my staff participated as the chief inspector on a recent mission to Iraq, where he directed the emplacement of chemical air samplers at strategic points around the country, to ensure that the Iraqi chemical capability is not reconstructed. We have also been active in other aspects of ensuring that the thorough-going inspections that have been undertaken since the end of the war are completed. That is, we've been marshalling the capabilities of the laboratories and of other U.S. Government tech- nical agencies to provide UNSCOM with the necessary technology that it needs to monitor on a long-term basis. And the same appHes to the IAEA in the nuclear area. The Chairman. How much knowledge do you have, as you sit here today, on the chemical and biological capability that Saddam Hussein had crafted for himself prior to the war? Dr. Wallerstein. Sir, I only know what I have read in the brief- ing papers. As we discussed earlier, I was not part of the U.S. Gov- ernment at that time. The Chairman. You have access to any and all records of that kind if you seek that access? Dr. Wallerstein. I believe I do, ves, sir. The Chairman. I think it would probably be a smart thing for you to do. If you're going to figure out a way to make sure that we don't have a problem like this in the future, it's very important to do a careful reconstruction of what happened because I think the evidence now is so powerful, from so many different directions. I don't know if you were here earlier, but we heard some infor- mation presented by the witnesses from the Defense Department, 66 an estimate of some 14,000 sensors, chemical agent sensors put out into the field, that might have been going off on the average 3 times a day, but they were all false alarms. Dr. Wallerstein. Yes, sir. I unfortunately was not present this morning for the testimony, but I have read that assertion. I might just add that one of the other responsibilities of my office is to work with the Services and with the acquisition part of the Pentagon to develop new sensor capabilities. We are actively pursu- ing as a top priority the procurement of new battlefield sensors in both the biological and the chemical area. We very much hope that, when and if we have to put soldiers in harm's way again, we will have more accurate and more rapidly responsive capabilities. The Chairman. Does that also include the development of new chemical agent detection alarms? Dr. Wallerstein. Yes, sir. The Chairman. Are we still using the ones that we used in the Persian Gulf War? Are those still a standard issue item? Dr. Wallerstein. There has been no new technology introduced in that area to my knowledge, sir, at this point. But, there is sub- stantial research going on. The Chairman. You know, the amazing thing about that, I mean, it's so incredible that it's unbelievable but if you put those two ar- faments together, it would be that the alarms that we had that ept going off when they shouldn't have and therefore were not useful to us, we're still using. I mean, it just Dr. Wallerstein. It takes time to come up with a better techno- logical solution, but as I said, it is one of the top priorities that have been identified. We've had a series of groups that have been working under the Under Secretary for Acquisition. That was for- merly Dr. Deutch. Dr. Deutch is still overseeing this process. He is now the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the chemical and bio- logical sensor issue is one of the top priorities that have been iden- tified for further work, and to field as rapidly as possible. The Chairman. Do we have biological sensor capabilities that are now able to be deployed and give us real-time readings on biologi- cal exposures and biological weapons being used? Dr. Wallerstein. No, sir. There is no fielded biological sensor. The Chairman. How close are we to having something in that area? Dr. Wallerstein. I believe that we expect that we may have something before the turn of the century. We would be able to have something fielded by then, sir. The Chairman. Does North Korea have a chemical weapons ca- pability? Dr. Wallerstein, I would defer that question if I may, please, to my colleague from the Central Intelligence Agency, who will be appearing as your next witness. The Chairman. Do you know one way or the other? Dr. Wallerstein. I have seen some information, but I'm not in a position to reach a net judgment on that. The Chairman. My understanding is that they apparently have both, chemical and biological. It's a very important question, as vou know, because things are tense there and you've just indicated that 67 we do not have a biological weapon sensing capability that we can deploy at the present time. And we're still using the chemical sen- sors that the earlier witnesses told us don't work properly. So it would seem to me that if you put all that together and if, in fact, the North Koreans have that kind of a capability, somebody would have to think an awfully long time before they order Amer- ican troops into a combat situation where we can't be assured that they're going to have adequate protection against those two kinds of weapons systems. Isn't that right? Dr. Wallersteen. I know that Greneral Luck, the Commander of U.S. Forces Korea, has given substantial attention to this problem. He has indicated that he is satisfied with the readiness of his forces to anticipate any scenario that might involve the use of weapons of mass destruction. The Chairman. Well, I hope that's right. When I went back, in an earlier staff review I asked the question of how many of the senior military officers that were directing the war were up in the area where the chemical alarms were going off. I found that very few, if any, were. They were much further back, and it didn't give me a very good feeling. These folks think there are adequate protections, I kind of like the picture of the Civil War generals that got on the horses and got out in front, and I'd feel a little more comfortable and a little more confident in the judgments if I saw some of the major signal callers in the strategy right up in the front areas breathing the same air, working with the same chemical detectors, relying on their own advice in terms of putting their own health at risk. I have a bit of bitter feeling about it because I've seen so many sick veterans. So I would hope that the people who have this level of confidence would, you know, we'd see them right up there, right up in the front when the going is unpleasant, and not back in some protected base area working out of a bunker. I think that's all I have for you right now. I appreciate your com- ing. I'd urge you to stay with this. I think it's very important that we catch up to what the events are that are actually taking place in the world. I think we're behind in these areas. Dr. Wallerstein. Thank you. Senator. The Chairman. Thank you. Dr. Gordon Oehler, we'd like to invite you to come forward. You serve as the Director of the Nonproliferation Center at the Central Intelligence Agency. We're pleased to have you here. I'd like to have you give us your statement at this time, and then we'll go to questions. OPENING STATEMENT OF DR. GORDON C. OEHLER, DIREC- TOR, NONPROLIFERATION CENTER, CENTRAL INTELLI- GENCE AGENCY, WASHINGTON, DC Dr. Oehler. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I'm pleased to appear before you this afternoon to address our concerns about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. I'm specifically going to address Iraq's efforts to obtain critical tech- nologies for its' weapons program in the years preceding the Per- 68 sian Gulf War. Finally, HI close with some observations regarding the Export Administration Act. First let me tell you briefly what we knew about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs prior to Desert Storm. As we reported extensively, Iraq had aggressive CW and BW pro- grams prior to Desert Storm. The Iraqis used nerve and blister agents during the war with Iran, and as you will recall, they also targeted their own Kurdish population witn chemical weapons. In mid-1990, Iraq had one primary site for chemical weapons production, Al Muthanna, located in Smarra, about 80 kilometers northwest of Baghdad. By early 1990, we calculated that the Al Muthanna facility was capable of producing more than 2,000 tons annually of the blister agent mustard and the nerve agent Sarin. Iraq also had begun to build a complex of chemical production plants near Al Habbania, as well as additional CW storage sites. U.N. inspectors have found more than 46,000 filled munitions, including 30 warheads for ballistic missiles, bombs filled with mus- tard gas, and nerve gas containers. Additional munitions remain buried today in bunkers attacked and damaged by coalition forces. The U.N. cannot remove them safely. The inspections have also re- vealed 5,000 tons of stockpiled chemical agents. The U.N. is only now completing the task of dismantling this massive program. With regard to biological weapons, we estimated, prior to the start of the war, that Iraq had a stockpile of at least 1 metric ton of biological warfare agents, including anthrax and botulinum toxin. Research reports released by the Iraqis to the first U.N. Biologi- cal Weapons Inspection Team showed highly focused research at Salman Pak on anthrax, botulinum toxin, and Clostridium perfringens. U.N. inspectors believe that there was an advanced military biological research program which concentrated on these agents. The Department of Defense reports that no chemical or biological warfare munitions were found stored or used in the areas occupied by coalition forces during Desert Storm. We do not have any intel- ligence information that would lead us to conclude otherwise. The Chairman. Now let me just stop you right there. First of all, everything you've said so far has been very helpful to us, and much of this is new information on the record in a de- classified form for the first time, and I'm grateful for that. I think it advances the level of knowledge, and in the end, it will help us get to the bottom of some of the«e sickness problems with our vet- erans. In the paragraph you've just read, that no chemical or biological warfare munitions were found stored or used in areas occupied by coalition forces during Desert Storm. Now that's a very carefully worded sentence. As I read that sentence and heard you speak that sentence, that does not cover, as I read it and that's why I want the clarification, a situation where chemical or biological agents might have gotten loose in some way and gotten into these zones. In other words, you're saying you found no evidence that they were stored or used. Used to me conveys some effort to aim at our people and trigger their use in some fashion, but that sentence, as 69 it's written, would not, unless you specifically tell me otherwise, in- dicate that there were no occasions on which either chemical agents or biological agents, by one means or another, would have gotten into areas occupied by coalition forces. Dr. Oehler. What I'm saying very carefully here is that the De- partment of Defense reports that no chemical or biological warfare munitions were stored or used in areas occupied by coalition forces. This is a Department of Defense statement, because they had peo- ple on the ground and we didn't, for the most part. The Chairman. Right. Dr. Oehler. What I'm trying to say is that we do not have any intelligence information that would lead us to conclude otherwise. The Chairman. Yes. I understand the marriage of the two sen- tences and that we're working off a predicate of a Defense Depart- ment report. But I want to come back now to the chemical alarms that kept going off in various areas of the war zone, where we have all these firsthand accounts and we also have these descriptive ac- counts of people who were there who described symptoms, physical symptoms, blistering and other things that would correlate to an exposure to a chemical agent, say, at the very time the alarm was going off saying there was a chemical agent in the area. The CIA is not saying here that there were not exposures of American service personnel. You're not making a categorical state- ment that there were not exposures of American service personnel to either chemical agents or biological agents? I take it you have no way of knowing on a firsthand fashion? Dr. Oehler. That's correct. The intelligence information we have does not suggest that they were exposed to chemical or biological agents. The Chairman. But didn't I just hear you say that, for the most part, you didn't have your own people there? Dr. Oehler. That's right. The Chairman. So you're relying on the Defense Department? Dr. Oehler. In terms of on-the-ground surveys. We, of course, have intelligence sources that talked to people be- fore and after the Gulf War about what they knew was happening, and we're basing our intelligence judgment on that plus technical, national technical means, et cetera. The Chairman. Would the CIA have a theory on why these chemical alarms kept going off? Dr. Oehler. I'm certainly not an expert in these systems. The Chairman. But don't you find it a little, I mean, we're all logical people and if these attacks were coming and explosions were taking place and the alarms were going off and people were told to put on their gear and so forth, and yet, after the fact, we say, well there were never any chemical agents in the area, how does one mesh these two things? I understand you're saying you're relying essentially on Defense Department reports, but I'm looking for something different here. I'm looking for a categorical denial that American forces were ex- posed to chemical agents or biological agents. As nearly as I read this, the CIA is not able to come in here and give that categorical denial as you sit here at this moment. Now am I wrong in that? ,70 Dr. Oehler. What we're sajdng is that we have no evidence that they were, and it cannot be any stronger than that. The Chairman. Do you have a theory as to what was going on then? Dr. Oehler. I don't know if my theory counts much. As a sci- entist, I know that trying to design sensors to detect specific chemi- cals and not others is a rather difficult job and false alarms are a way of business. 1 11 also note that the battlefield is a pretty messy place with in- coming rockets, which when they impact have unexpended rocket fuel that vaporizes, you have explosives that go off, vou have solid fuel missiles going with pollutants in the air. There s an awful lot of what would be hard-to-identify chemicals in the atmosphere at any time. The Chairman. So much of the Department of Defense reports now rest on the fact that the chemical alarms that they put out there that kept going off did not work right. Maybe they are right that they did not work, and they bought a lot of equipment that did not work right. But I do not find your answer satisfactory, quite frankly, and let me just be blunt about it. If you have got some information, classified or other, that will bear out what you are saying, I would like to see it. I would like to see it all. Dr. Oehler. I have no information to suggest, that leads us to the conclusion that any BW or CW agents were used against coali- tion forces. The Chairman. Well, you see, again, that is a very — that is what we call in the business the use of a very carefully structured phrase. Let me give you an example. Suppose a bombing run hits a munitions facility and blows up into the air some of these agents, either gas agents or biological agents, and they are carried by the windstream down over our troops, and they are impacted by it. Is that a use? Dr. Oehler. Let me address those two specifically. The Chairman. First of all, I would like a yes or a no — in terms of the way you are using the word "use." Is that a use or not a use? Dr. Oehler. I would call that exposure, certainly. The Chairman. But is that a use within the way you are using it here? Dr. Oehler. No, but I would not sit here and try to use some legal definition to get around a problem like that. I do not have any intelligence information to suggest that coalition forces were ex- posed, whether it be by intentional use or by accidental discharge to BW/CW agents. Let me address these two separately, because I think this is sig- nificant. The coalition forces did not nnd any CW agents stored in the Kuwaiti theater of operations, with the exception of some the U.N. found near An Nasiriyah. The Chairman. Right. We talked about that earlier. Dr. Oehler. And, if in fact a munition blows up a chemical war- head storage site and chemical agents are released into the atmos- phere, the modeling that has been done on this suggests that noth- ing is going to go further than maybe 10 miles. So if your American troops, if the coalition troops are much farther than that, they are not going to be exposed to chemical warfare. 71 Biological is a very different situation, because particularly if it is dispersed at a high altitude the biological agents can go very long distances. But there is no evidence that any of that was ever released. The CHAraMAN. Let me just read you one item here, because there are obviously some strong differences of opinion on this. U.S. military doctrine warns that, according to its calculations, the use of a nerve agent against a target area of no more than a dozen hectares can, under certain weather conditions, create a hazard zone downwind of up to 100 kilometers in length. Within this downwind area, friendly military units would have to take pro- tective measures. That is from the United States Department of the Army Field Manual, 100-5. Dr. Oehler. Yes. The difference here is, I was speaking of a mu- nitions storage facility on the ground, and what that refers to is a chemical attack where the release is at an optimal height to burst. The Chairman. We were asking about An Nasiriyah earlier today and how close these were. The description we were finally given was that it was the width of a narrow river. Does that ring a bell with you? Dr. Oehler. The distance between? The Chairman. The distance between where our troops were and where these items were stored was the distance of a narrow river. Dr. Oehler. The troops came into the Tahji Airfield area, which is, to my recollection, 10 to 15 kilometers from An Nasiriyah. The storage site that was declared to the U.N., where the U.N. found chemical weapons stored, is just slightly south of the 31st Parallel, which is a little bit south of An Nasiriyah and a little bit north of Tahji Airfield. The Chairman. Well, you have just given us a different descrip- tion than we got this morning, in terms of what the proximity was here. I guess then what you are saying here is — I want to understand this right, because you know, the CIA has a little bit of a credibility problem itself these days related to other matters. So I want to make sure that I understand precisely what it is you are saying and not saying. According to Central Intelligence information, the detections these chemical monitors that kept going off, were not going off for reasons of the fact that they were detecting gas agents, chemical agents, during the war. It was something else. Dr. Oehler. I am not making any such statement. What I am saying is The Chairman. You are not saying that? Dr. Oehler. No. What I am saying is- The Chairman. So it could have been? It could have been? Dr. Oehler. We were not on the ground. We are taking the De- partment of Defense's word for that. We have no reason not to. The Chairman. So we are back to the Department of Defense. Dr. Oehler. On the operation of the ground sensors, absolutely. The only thing I am competent to talk about The Chairman. I think you have just given me my answer. You are not in a position to give us an independent answer one way or the other. 72 Dr. Oehler. The only part I can give you an answer on is, what is there in intelHgence information that might suggest an exposure to these agents by coaHtion forces? I am telling you, in our intel- ligence holdings, we do not see anything. There is some evidence that some chemical weapons were moved into the Kuwaiti theater of operations, but then withdrawn prior to the beginning of the air attacks, with the exception of the ones that were found still in An Nasiriyah. The Chairman. They were moved in and taken out? Dr. Oehler. That is what some intelligence suggests. The Chairman. Just one instance? Several instances? Dr. Oehler. No. There were a couple of instances in intelligence that suggest that. We do not know moved where or what. The Chairman. What would be the caliber of the intelligence source that would give you that information? Dr. Oehler. That was a generally reliable source. The Chairman. More reliable than these sensors? [Laughter.] Dr. Oehler. But according to this fragmentary reporting, these were withdrawn prior to the start of the air attack. The Chairman. Let me ask you a little different question. In terms of the qualitative ability of the CIA to do its own independ- ent assessments, to really be cheek to jowl with this problem, on a scale of 1 to 10 in terms of a CIA presence in the area to really be able to monitor this and not have much of anything slip through, if a 10 were the complete ability to have that kind of a capability, and a 1 was the least that you could have, where would you say the CIA's capability was across this war theater at that time? Dr. Oehler. We were not in a position on the ground, nor tasked, to provide monitoring for BW/CW, because that was the re- sponsibility of the Department of Defense. We had other things that we were trying to do at the time. The Chairman. So it would have been where, at the level of maybe a 2? Dr. Oehler. We were not there basically at all. That was not our mission. The Chairman. It was less than 2? Dr. Oehler. That is right. The Chairman. Maybe 1 or between 0 and 1? Dr. Oehler. Now, I do not want to imply that the intelligence community does not have the capability to detect CW/BW agents. The Chairman. But you were not tasked to do that in this situa- tion? Dr. Oehler. That is correct. That is correct. The Chairman. But that is what is so important, and it has taken us awhile to get to that, because in a sense you did not have your own ability to do that, you are relying in a sense on the De- fense Department who did have that task of doing it. Also, you are saying that, by the absence of anv contradictory in- formation to what they are saying, even though you had a very minor way of doing your own independent measurement, you are not in a position to, in effect, challenge their finding. That is what I hear you saying. 73 Dr. Oehler. That is right. We have a lot of intelligence on the build-up of the chemical warfare capabilities, pipes, munitions, and so forth. The Chairman. I can see that. I am impressed by what you have said up here in that area. Dr. Oehler. I am not trying to say that there was no informa- tion that the intelligence community was collecting at all. What I am trying to say is, out of all this stuff that we have gotten, there is not anything to suggest that coalition forces were exposed. The Chairman. But, the big "but" that has to go with it was, the CIA was not in there doing the monitoring job on the ground. Dr. Oehler. Absolutely. That is correct. The Chairman. If we were to try to measure that on a scale of 1 to 10, it was less than a 1. So, I mean, that is an honest answer. Dr. Oehler. Yes. That is right. The Chairman. But what it does is, it cuts the guts right out of that paragraph that you just read. Dr. Oehler. Oh, I think it is The Chairman. Well, I know. It is a matter of opinion. You have an opinion you are bringing. I am just telling you what my opinion is after getting to that bottom line in laying that fact against that paragraph. Dr. Oehler. Fine. The Chairman. Let us agree to disagree on that, and go on to the next paragraph. Dr. Oehler. OK At the same time Iraq was developing CW and BW agents, it was also developing the missile delivery capabilities. By the time of the invasion of Kuwait, Saddam could field up to 450 SCUD type sur- face-to-surface missiles. The Soviet-origin SCUD's originally had a range of 300 kilometers, but Iraq reconfigured them into a series of other missiles with ranges of up to 750 kilometers. Prior to the war, Saddam claimed to have developed and tested a missile with a range of 950 kilometers, which he called the Al-Abbas, but dis- continued the system because of in-flight stability problems. With regard to Iraq's nuclear program, the bombing of those Iraq nuclear research reactors The Chairman. May I stop you one more time because you are going to go to another subject and it is almost better to take these as we go. Dr. Oehler. Sure. OK The Chairman. If you take the fact that he was lengthening the delivery capability of these SCUD's and had them apparently with some accuracy up to a range of 750 kilometers, I do not know if you have had a chance to review some of the first-person accounts that we have had of people, veterans out there who feel that they were in an area where a SCUD exploded where there were chemi- cal agents, in their opinion, as part of that SCUD attack. I do not know if you have had a chance to read those. Dr. Oehler. I saw the press reports of that, sir. The Chairman. All right. Jim, I am just wondering if you can tell us where those locations were. Whether the SCUD's would have come, could have come, and likely did come from a launching site 74 that would have been vsdthin that distance of 950 kilometers. I as- sume it would have. Mr. TuiTE. My understanding is that there were SCUD sites up in the area near the Euphrates north of Kuwait. Dr. Oehler. There were SCUD sites all the way into Baghdad. Mr. TuiTE. OK But there were southerly deployed Dr. Oehler, Southern launches as well, and western. Mr. TuiTE. — ^And those with 750-kilometers range would have reached well down into the Saudi peninsula, correct? Dr. Oehler. That is right. They had to launch them from fairly far south to reach down to coalition forces in Saudi Arabia. They had to launch them from pretty far west to reach Tel Aviv. Mr. TuiTE. To reach the border area where the disputed terri- tories were, they could have actually been launched from quite a bit north? Dr. Oehler. From Baghdad. Mr. TuiTE. Yes. The Chairman. Now, Jim, let me just ask here, with respect to the first-person accounts that we were discussing with Senator Bennett earlier today, with the belief on the part of some of the people in the area where the explosion happened, that a SCUD came in with this kind of a warhead, do you recall from memory where that location was where that SCUD attack occurred? Mr. TuiTE. There were a number of SCUD attacks in the report. But each and every attack, each and every event that is listed in the report is within SCUD range. The Chairman. It is within the 750 in terms of the extended range. Mr. TuiTE. Yes. The Chairman. Would it be within the 300 range which was the original range? Dr. Oehler. No. No, it would not. The Chairman. OK. So the extended range that he was working on would have put him in a position, if somebody fired one of these, to at least get it to that site? Dr. Oehler. Yes. The Chairman. All right. Why don't you go ahead then with the next part here? Dr. Oehler. OK With regard to Iraq's nuclear program, the bombing of this Iraq nuclear research reactor by the Israelis in 1981 drove Saddam to extreme lengths to cover diversity, and disperse his nuclear activi- ties. IAEA inspection of declared nuclear materials continued on a regular basis, but the IAEA did not inspect any of the undeclared facilities associated with a weapons program. We reported extensively on the existence of the nuclear weapons program, but post-war inspections added quite a number of details to our knowledge on that program. I would like to now g^ve you a sense of Iraq's procurement efforts and patterns. The Iraqi program was developed gradually over the course of the 1980's. By the time of the invasion it had become deeply entrenched, flexible, and well orchestrated. Project managers for the weapons of mass destruction programs went directly to vended European suppliers for the majority of 75 their needs. Throughout the 1980's, German companies headed the list of preferred suppliers for machinery, technology, and chemical precursors. German construction companies usually won the contracts to build the CW facilities in Iraq, and Iraqi procurement agents were sophisticated in exploiting inconsistencies in local export laws by targeting countries for substances and technologies that were not locally controlled. In the pre-war years, the dual-use nature of many of these facili- ties made it easier for Iraq to claim that the chemical precursors, for example, were intended for agricultural industries. European firms, arguing that the facilities in Iraq were for production of pes- ticides, built a Sumara chemical plant, including six separate chemical weapons manufacturing lines between 1983 and 1986. European middlemen brokered The Chairman. Now, may I ask just a question here? Dr. Oehler. Sure. The Chairman. This is all extraordinarily important and valu- able information. Am I to understand that the CIA would have had the knowledge of this going on contemporaneous when it was actu- ally happening? In other words, this was not learned later, and this is not a retrospective construction? We were tracking this, or we had knowledge of this, and knowledge of this would have been at the other high levels of Government at the time it was occurring? Dr. Oehler. That is right. What I am running through here is what we knew at the time, and what we had reported to our cus- tomers at the time. We had been quite aware of Iraq's chemical weapons development program from its very early inception. The Chairman. I take it the CIA must have had a concern about it to have kind of zeroed in on it to that degree? Dr. Oehler. Very much so. And that was reported to our cus- tomers, and our customers attempted to take actions. The Chairman. It would have been reported also to the Presi- dent, to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, I assume, as a matter of course? Dr. Oehler. Yes, sir. Those are our customers, sir. The Chairman. All right. Dr. Oehler. Continuing on that: European middlemen brokered chemical precursor deals for Iraq under the pretext that the mate- rials were intended for pesticide plants. A Dutch firm purchased supplies from major chemical firms around the world, supplying the Chemical Importation and Distribution State Enterprise in Baghdad in the 1970's, and in the 1980's supplying the Iraqi State Establishment for Pesticide Production, both cover names for the CW program. The middlemen supplied dual-use chemical precursors including monochlorobenzine, ethyl alcohol, and thiodiclocol. When the Iraqis requested phosphorous oxychloride, a nerve agent precursor banned for export under Dutch law without explicit permission, the supplier balked, and drew this request to the attention of Dutch authorities. Subsequent Dutch investigations found that two other Dutch firms were involved in brokering purchases of chemical pre- cursors. 76 Iraq exploited businessmen and consortia willing to violate the export laws of their own countries. As has been indicated in the press and television reports, the Consen Group, a consortium of European missile designers, engineers, and businessmen, estab- lished a network of front companies to cover its role as project di- rector of an Argentine, Egyptian, Iraqi sponsored Condor II ballis- tic missile program. Iraqi procurement officers, knowing full well the licensing thresholds, requested items that fell just under the denial thresh- olds, but nevertheless would suffice. Prior to Desert Storm, U.S. regulations on the export of these technologies were drafted to meet U.S. technical specifications and standards. Technologies of a lower standard worked just as well, and permitted Iraq to obtain the goods and technology consistent with Commerce Department regulations. The Chairman. Let me just stop you again. This is again very valuable, and I appreciate your presenting it for us so we can have it on the record. Before we get too far past it, you made a reference to phosphorous oxychloride. What agent is this a precursor for? Dr. Oehler. Sarin [GF]. The Chairman. Also, well I have interrupted you here. This backs up even further, but when you acknowledged that Saddam Hussein had SCUD chemical warheads, where did he get those? Dr. Oehler. They made them themselves. The Chairman. They made their own. Dr. Oehler. They had quite a missile refurbishment extension plant where they took the SCUD's and added in extra lengths and the fuel tanks, changed the warheads, and had a capability to make their own warheads. The Chairman. Were the Russians helping them with this? Dr. Oehler. No. There is no evidence of any Russian involve- ment at all in this. The Chairman. You see, part of the picture that emerges here — this is really an extraordinary story that you are sharing with us, because, according to your testimony, the CIA was tracking this in real time as it was happening, and had a great concern about it, and had figured out that this robust program on chemical weapons and these other areas was going forward. Yet, as we get down further in time, we are going to find out that, as Saddam Hussein needed other items to go into his war ma- chine, that he actually came and got some from us, particularly in the biological warfare area, that required licensing. So you wonder how anybody in the licensing regime who was reading the CIA reports at the time and who could see this buildup of this kind of weapons potential, you would think that people would have been very, very reluctant to approve anything that could go into a weapons production system of this kind. You would think that this would have had everybody on full alert to be ex- tremely careful about what is or is not licensed for shipment into this kind of a regime. Is not that the logic of learning this? Dr. Oehler. Well, what I would like to point out in the next sec- tion of this is that there really was not much involvement of U.S. firms, as we have seen. If I could go through that a little bit, and then we can stop and talk about the whole thing. 77 The Chairman. Right, right, right. Dr. Oehler. Continuing on: Regarding the involvement of United States firms, we were watching Iraq's programs very carefully, and it was clear that the major players assisting Saddam were not American firms. They were principally Europeans. We saw little in- volvement of U.S. firms in Saddam's weapons of mass destruction program. In discussing this issue, we should remember that by law the CIA as a foreign intelligence agency, does not focus on U.S. per- sons, to include U.S. companies. By this definition, companies founded by foreign nationals and incorporated in the United States are treated as U.S. companies. This is not to say that we did not occasionally come across infor- mation on a U.S. person that was collected incidentally to our for- eign intelligence target overseas; we did. But when we did, and when there was a possibility of a violation of U.S. law, we were ob- ligated to turn our information over to the Justice Department. The Chairman. Now, does that mean then, going back to the prior paragraph, that there would have been companies founded by foreign nationals incorporated in the U.S. supplying some of these materials, but they would be outside the scope of what you could properly zero in on? Dr. Oehler. We are not permitted by law to target the domestic activities of those companies or individuals in those companies. The Chairman. Right. So if you stumbled upon it some other way, that did not mean you were not entitled to know that fact, but you could not as a matter of investigative focus go after these foreign firms incorporated in the United States to really find out the degree to which they might be doing business with Saddam Hussein? Dr. Oehler. That is right to the extent that we cannot engage in law enforcement or target their activities in the United States. The Chairman. Do we have any reason to believe or know that there were such firms founded by foreign nationals incorporated in the United States that, in fact, did ship items like this to Saddam Hussein? Dr. Oehler. As I say here, we did provide what we call alert memos to Commerce, Justice, Treasury, and the FBI on a number of possible questionable instances. It is not up to us to make the legal judgment, but to point out that there is information that they need to look at. The Chairman. I see. Dr. Oehler. These memos resulted whenever this incidentally collected information indicated that U.S. firms had been targeted by foreign governments of concern, or were involved in possible vio- lations of U.S. law. Between 1984 and 1990, CIA's Office of Scientific and Weapons Research provided 5 memos covering Iraqis' dealings with United States firms on purchases, discussions, or visits that appear to be related to weapons of mass destruction programs. The Chairman. Are those classified documents? Dr. Oehler. Yes, they are. Can we go on to export controls? The Chairman. Yes, please. 78 Dr. Oehler. Continuing: Turning to export controls, the intel- ligence community was asked by the Department of Commerce dur- ing the 1980's to review export license applications primarily when the licenses had significance to intelligence collection equities. Here the concern was not so much Iraq, but whether there was a possibility the equipment would be diverted to the Soviet Union or other communist countries, as you heard from Dr. Wallerstein a little earlier. Prior to 1991, there were four instances in which the Department of Commerce sought information on Iraqi export license applica- tions, all dated in 1986. These applications involved computer tech- nologies and image processors. For some of these, we reported no derogatory information on the end user. In one case, we referred the Department of Commerce to a classified intelligence report. After evidence mounted in the mid-1980's about the use of chemi- cal warfare in the Iran-Iraq war, the United States began to put into effect unilateral controls on exports of chemical precursors to Iraq and other countries suspected of having chemical warfare pro- grams. The United States and several other industrialized nations joined what is called the Australia Group to establish more uniform li- censing controls for the export of several chemical weapons precur- sors. Since then, more nations have been brought into the Aus- tralia Group, and recently controls have been added for chemical equipment, certain pathogens, and biological equipment. The Chairman. Let me again just stop you here because you are about to go to the next paragraph. You go "since the war," and you go on with some observations there. My sense for it at this point is that the CIA had a pretty good fix on the biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons capability of Saddam Hussein. You were tracking it. You were watching these international firms. You had seen Saddam Hussein in a sense go underground with some of his activities after the Israelis came over and bombed some of his facilities in the early 1980's. And you were paying serious attention to it. You obviously saw it as a real prob- lem, and you were on top of it. Would it be fair for me to say that, before the outbreak of the war, the CIA was convinced, and had well-documented the fact, that Saddam Hussein had an advanced and dangerous chemical warfare, biological warfare capability underway? Dr. Oehler. Yes, sir. I do not think anyone will doubt that. The Chairman. I think the record is clear on that. I think it is to the credit of the CIA that it saw that and knew that and was reporting that in real time. It is my understand — and you may or may not know the answer to this, but if you do, I would like you to give it — that the Defense Intelligence Agency did not have either that assessment or the same assessment in terms of the capabilities of the Iraqis in that area? Dr. Oehler. No. The Defense Intelligence Agency was part of the intelligence community. I, at the time of the beginning of the Gulf War, was the National Intelligence Officer for Science, Technology, and Proliferation. So my job there was to pull together common 79 community positions on these matters. The Defense Intelligence Agency did not have any alternative views on this. Their estimate was that these programs were dangerous as well. The Chairman. So from your knowledge, you are saying the DIA also felt this was a real threat. Was their level of knowledge up to yours, the CIA's? Dr. Oehler. Yes, sir. We do not hold any information from each other. The Chairman. Now, in terms of war planning, if somebody is anticipating going in and shutting down Iraq, moving them out of Kuwait after they had moved into Kuwait, and then backing them up and shutting down most of their military capability in Iraq, would the Defense planning of that come off this combined assess- ment, your assessment, the CIA's, and the DIA's assessment? Where would the Defense planners go to get the picture of what the troops might face to the extent we had to go in and liberate first Kuwait and then go into Iraq, in the way of biological and chemical weapons risk? Dr. Oehler. Of course, the planning is done by the Military Op- erations Forces. What information do they have? They have all of this information. Now, whether they are ooligated to weigh the De- fense Intelligence Agency's estimates over someone else's, I do not know. You will have to ask them. But I did not see any significance difference it would have made, any kind of a difference in the cam- paign. The Chairman. So I guess you are saying to us then that the De- fense planners that would have had to put together a war strategy had quite complete knowledge as to the biological and chemical weapons capability that he had been working on over a period of time and refining? Dr. Oehler. I do not think any Defense planner or any policy- maker will say they have complete enough knowledge. The Chairman. I understand. Dr. Oehler. There are certainly pieces of our knowledge that were missing. What was clear was the existence of the program and the extent. The Chairman. Let me ask you this. Did the CIA for its part know ahead of the war that there were going to be the volume of these particular kinds of weapons systems tnat were found after the war that you cite in the early part of your testimony? Was there a CIA estimate that would have said that, "Our expec- tation is that there would be at least 40,000 field munitions, in- cluding 30 warheads for ballistic missiles, bombs?" How discreet would your assessment of his capability have been before the war? Is there that kind of a document? Dr. Oehler. Our assessments were based primarily on the pro- duction capability, and on how much — as I mentioned, they could be producing 2,000 tons a year. And then, what would you do with that? We did not have it broken down by so many artillery shells and so forth. The Chairman. Do you know if anybody would have had a mock- up, if you will, of this kind of a deliverable weapons system capabil- ity that was found after the war, before the war? Dr. Oehler. A mockup? 80 The Chairman. In other words, some very smart person Hke yourself had been tracking this for a decade and looking at all the stuff that they were buying from the European suppliers, and with aerial photographs, surveillance, and onsite sources or whatever else we had, would have said, "They have been cranking out this kind of a warhead now over a period of time, and we think they do 3 a week, or 3 a month, and we now think they have in their stockpile the following." So when a Defense planner turns to you and says, "Wait a minute. We are going to send all these troops in here. What are we likely to face in terms of their stockpile of chemical weapons and biological weapons?" How refined would the internal estimate have been based on all this other work, that would have said, 'This is what we think he has. got." Dr. Oehler, It was pretty good in terms of the capability. The reason was we watched Iraq use CW in its war with Iran. In the latter part of that war, in the Majnoon Islands at the very end of the campaign, they used a tremendous amount of agent. We could track that and we could see then how they could use that against coalition forces if they chose to do so. The Chairman. Did they use biological weapons? Dr. Oehler. No, they did not. Let me put my same caveat on here. We have no evidence that they did. We have a lot of evidence on what they used, and we did not see any use of BW. The Chairman. Is there any information to indicate that Iraq was coordinating research on genetically altered microorganisms? There is a concern because of the U.S. export of E-coli and other genetic materials. Dr. Oehler. We have not seen that as part of their BW research program. At least if they looked at it, it did not get very far along to our knowledge. They did those three agents that we talked about, and most of the production was — all the production we know of was in botulinum toxin and anthrax, which is bad enough, by the way. The Chairman. No, I understand. We are trying to push this envelope out as far as we can in terms of what was going on here, recognizing that our own Government is compartmentalized. You know a certain amount and you go up to a certain point. Then somebody else, in a sense, has a respon- sibility that bridges on from that point and goes on into another direction. For example, the CIA did not design the chemical sensors that did not work. Hopefully, the CIA, if it was designing a chemi- cal sensor, would have designed one that, when it went off it was not a false alarm, but it was a real alarm. Dr. Oehler. I would just mention that we in the intelligence community have needs for CW and BW sensors as well, and have been a bit frustrated by our — I will include ourselves here — inabil- ity to develop the technology rapidly enough to satisfy our needs. That is the same as the Department of Defense has. The Chairman. I think generally offensive weapons capability can move faster than defensive weapons capability, and especially if you have somebody that is diabolically minded enough, like Sad- dam Hussein, and who is organizing this very well-developed weap- ons development system. 81 You have described here already, in what you have said, a very sophisticated operation, where they knew what they were doing. They were working through these European suppHers. They were staying under the thresholds. They were figuring out how to put together what they wanted. They certainly were field-testing the weapons. They field-tested them on the Kurds, and apparently on some Iranians as well. They were lengthening their missile range. This is a very sophisticated operation in this area. They had gone underground to do a certain amount of it through these front oper- ations because they had gotten punished by the Israelis. So if you again just apply the logic, you would imagine that any operation as sophisticated as this, doing this many things, probably mixing chemical and biological cocktails as well — this is my own theory — was probably out on the forefront of what they could de- velop with respect to their offensive capability. I mean, I cannot imagine somebody this creative suddenly loses the creative spark when it comes to figuring out, how do we get more bang for the buck? Or how do we find a more powerful weap- on, or a less expensive weapon, or one that is easier to deliver, or one that we can somehow disseminate in a way that maybe they will not even find out? Dr. Oehler. No. These are centrally-directed programs with the highest authority behind them. The Chairman. But they seem to be very cleverly designed as well. I am not saying that they are as sophisticated as we might be, but I am struck by the sophistication of the system. Dr. Oehler. They learned this over a period of years in the 1980's, but they became masters at the procurement networks. Of course, there are companies that try to help them with that, too, because the profits were pretty large. The Chairman. Well, you know I really get a bad case of heart- burn when I find out that these export licenses, not long before we actually find ourselves in a war with these people, were being ap- proved by our own Commerce Department. We had a situation — I do not know if you are aware of this or not — but we had a hearing in the late fall of 1992. We were at that time looking at the shipment of devices that were incorporated into Iraq's nuclear weapons capability. We found that some licenses had been granted by our own Commerce Department to ship certain dual-use items over there. In fact, some of them had been shipped directly to Iraqi military installations, which should have been a warning sign that they were not designed for peaceful use by some- body who is a professor in agriculture over in a university some- where. When that document, because it is a written document, was sought by the Congress — the Senate, and the House — that particu- lar document was altered. The exact text of the words on the docu- ment, which indicated that it was to be shipped to an Iraqi military unit, those words were deleted, and something else was put in its place to create a false picture. That document was sent up to the Congress as a deliberately misleading document. Now, the person who was in charge of that area in the Commerce Department — this was late in 1992, there was a Presidential race 82 going on, so that heightened the sensitivity of all of this — was con- veniently out of the country. We tried to get hold of tnis person to bring them in as a witness to explain how this document had gotten altered to give a false ap- pearance and impression. We could never get this person because the person was outside the country and hiding out somewhere. So the election came and went, and the Bush people departed town, so we never did talk to that particular witness. I only cite that because we have had experiences, direct experi- ences, where official Government records were doctored and given to us to mislead us on shipments that were going into the center structure of Saddam Hussein's military operation. I am not talking about distant history. I am talking about some- thing that happened directly within the scope of what we are here talking about. This was a pretty sophisticated operation. It seems to me that, if the CIA knew as much as it did, and everybody else did, it is hard for me to understand why we were aiding and abetting this guy and authorizing these shipments. Doesn't that seem a little strange? Dr. Oehler. Well, the only thing I can say is that, since the Gulf War there have been a lot of enhancements in the licensing process and in the export controls. I think everyone realizes the signifi- cance of the problem. The Chairman. Why don't you go ahead? We are getting down near the end of your statement. Why don't I let you finish it? Dr. Oehler. All right. As I was saying: Since the Gulf War, U.S. export controls on CW/BW have been considerably strengthened. Enforcement mechanisms involving several Federal agencies have been put into place. The scope of the regulations have been broad- ened considerably. In 1991, export controls were tightened to require validated li- censes for all dual-use equipment being exported to end users of proliferation concern. Intelligence information is often the basis for this determination. This catch-all provision has served as a model for other countries interested in joining the U.S. Government's non- proliferation efforts. The intelligence community has an expanded role in this strength and export control regime. We work with the Department of State-led interagency forums to control sensitive technologies and equipment. Our analysis of international trade mechanisms used to transfer technologies from suppliers to consumers is provided to the U.S. policy, enforcement, and intelligence communities. The Department of Commerce now brings the intelligence com- munity into a large percentage of its license reviews. Let me say a brief word about the control of missile and nuclear technologies. The Missile Technology Control Regime, the MTCR, went into effect in April 1987, with the participation of the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Italy, France, Japan, and West Germany, all the leading suppliers of missile-related technologies. Initially the MTCR controlled ballistic missiles and their compo- nents that are capable of delivering a 500-kilogram warhead to a range of 300 or more kilometers. In recent years, the scope of the 83 MTCR has been expanded to include any unmanned system, with any range or payload, if it is beUeved to be intended for use with weapons of mass destruction. As you know, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, most often known by its initials, the NPT, provides the global framework to control the spread of nuclear weapons. Nations that have joined the NPT pledge not to transfer, seek access to, or assist the spread of nuclear weapons. The transfer of nuclear materials is covered by safeguards enforced by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Over the years, members of the NPT have developed lists of re- stricted items and technologies. The United States adheres to these controls, and has introduced its own restrictions on the spread of fissile materials necessary for nuclear weapons: plutonium and enriched uranium. The final issue I would like to address is the legislation affecting the export controls and other nonproliferation measures, specifi- cally the provisions the intelligence community needs in such legis- lation. The first thing I would say, Mr. Chairman, is that the bill you introduced at the request of the Administration incorporates provi- sions which address the intelligence community's concerns in the area of chemical, biological, and missile nonproliferation measures. We worked closely with the other agencies that developed this bill, and have endorsed the final result. Accordingly, I would strongly urge that these provisions be re- tained in the final bill passed by the Senate. To aid the Commit- tee's deliberations, I would like to outline the community's equities in this area. In disseminating our intelligence, one of our primary responsibil- ities and duties is to protect the sources of the intelligence, wheth- er human or technical, and the methods by which it was collected. Sources and methods are most at risk when intelligence informa- tion is directly or indirectly made public. The compromise of sources and methods inevitably results in a diminished capacity to collect intelligence for the future. The most dramatic consequences of a compromise of intelligence information is the threat of the life of an asset, but there are other significant consequences. For example, if we have intelligence indi- cating that a particular overseas company is actually, say a Libyan front company, we can often watch that company to learn more about Libya's programs and its acquisition network. The U.S. Government action that pubHcly identifies the company will often result in the company shutting down and reopening else- where under a different name. Identifying this new company can be difficult. But meanwhile, we have lost a window into the broad- er proliferation activity. This is not to say that intelligence should never form the basis for overt U.S. Grovernment action. To the contrary, it quite often does, and I feel strongly that providing this actionable intelligence is of the highest priority for the intelligence community. What is needed, however, is the flexibility to take the action that will best achieve our nonproliferation objectives, which in some cases may mean holding off on overt U.S. Government actions to protect the nonproliferation sources and methods. 84 The first goal is to ensure the sanctions, regimes established to punish proliferators, permit the President sufficient discretion in the imposition of sanctions to protect intelligence sources and methods. The second goal is to ensure that the Executive Branch not be statutorily limited or required to publish lists of end users to whom exports of technologies and commodities are controlled. The third goal is to ensure that the Grovernment maintains export control sufficient to ensure that exports of critical technologies are compatible with U.S. interests. The Administration's proposals achieve the first goal by explicitly permitting the President to delay the imposition of sanctions where it is necessary to protect intelligence sources and methods. Let me emphasize that the intelligence community views this as an excep- tional remedy that would have limited but critical application, and is necessary for further nonproliferation goals in the long run. The second goal is met by not requiring the intelligence commu- nity to create lists or databases of end users to which exports of goods or technologies are controlled, but still ensuring that intel- ligence is appropriately made available to other agencies for the purpose of analyzing export license applications. Finally, the Administration's bill would not relax or eliminate controls on key technologies, particularly encryption devices, which could be damaging to U.S. intelligence interests. This is the basic outline of the issues we face. I would offer my center, the Nonproliferation Center, any assistance to you if they are helpful in your deliberations on these important issues. Thank you. The Chairman. Thank you very much. I want to say, as we have gone back and forth here, I trust it has been constructive. I have meant for it to be, and I appreciate the professionalism and the work. I want to say to you and through you to the CIA that I appre- ciate the detail in this testimony today. You have declassified a lot of information today at our request, and made it a matter of public record. It is very helpful to us to do that, in terms of both recon- structing what happened and laying the right predicate for getting the Export Control Act reauthorization through here. Your recommendation on this one item that you mentioned at the end was not lost on me in terms of what we may be able to do be- tween now and the time we act on it in the Senate as a whole. We have just, as you know, reported that bill out of the Commit- tee by unanimous vote of 19 to 0. We have achieved a good strong bipartisan consensus, a regime that we think deals with some of these problems. So I appreciate the fact that you have validated these concerns and given us very important historical reconstruc- tion here today that is useful. I will say at the same time that I think that there is this prob- lem of where is the health difficulty coming from and how do we track it to its source so we have got a better way of knowing how to treat the veterans and try to heal them and protect their fami- lies— that I still see in the various Executive Branch participants, a problem where information leaves off at 1 point, and then it picks up at the next point. Things do not ever quite fully tie together. 85 I do not just put that on you when I say that. I am just saying I see that problem. It is not the first time I have seen it. I have seen it other times in my 28 years here on other problems and I am seeing it again here on this problem. I would give you this message to take back if you would. That we have got to do some more work to find out why these veterans are sick. If we had half of the top tier of the CIA professionals sick today themselves from the same problem, we would have a much more ambitious effort underway to get to the answer, just as we would if we had the high command of the military sick today from these problems. It is just the nature of what gets the priority and what does not. We have got to find out what happened here. We have got to find out because we have got a lot of sick veterans, many of whom are getting sicker, and their family members are getting sick in in- creasing numbers. We were not prepared for that finding. That finding presented itself to us as we were tracking back through this problem. I have talked to enough wives of returning male Gulf War veter- ans, who are now quite sick, that I am deeply concerned about what is going on here. Something happened out there, or some combination of things happened. The degree to which it comes out of this military or biological weapons capability, hopefully time will give us all those answers if we are aggressive about pursuing it. What is beyond dispute is the fact that we have got a lot of sick people who put on the uniform of this country, and on the basis of our best intelligence assessments and the belief that somebody in the command position was making wise decisions with their safety and well-being in mind, that they could go into a battle situation with the confidence that they were not going to be subjected to something that we did not anticipate, were not protecting them adequately against, or were not prepared to get to the bottom of if they came back with a health problem. Many of them are deeply discouraged right now, because they really feel like the Government has walked away from them, and despite all the talk, which is cheap and by itself does not mean anything, that not enough has been done to really ratchet their problems up on the priority scale and get at them. I agree with them. I think they are exactly right. I think it is shameful, the fact that we are in that situation. There is no excuse for it. I think every operational officer in the area of the Govern- ment that relates to these things, from the Director of the CIA to the Secretary of Defense, to the head of the DIA, to the President himself, to the head of the Veterans' Administration have an ur- gent task here to marshal the resources, marshal the knowledge, the professional focused effort, and figure out what happened here, and to try to get as much medical help to these veterans and their families as we can do, and not hold anything back. And by the same token, learn from that before we suddenly find we have got a situation where the same thing happens again in some other theater of war. We have a terrible problem in this coun- try— and I have seen it before — where, once somebody leaves active military service and becomes a veteran, they are in a different im- portance status as it relates to the Defense Department. 86 The Defense Department is looking ahead to the next war. The Veterans' Affairs Department is looking back at the veterans of the past wars, in effect. There is this dividing line. Some of that may be necessary, but I think in this situation, the precautions taken were not adequate. I think there were some seri- ous strategic errors made in putting people in harm's way. I think people are having a very hard time now who may have been part of that decision structure, facing it, acknowledging it, and dealing with it. The body of information that we have, the number of veterans who keep coming forward, many still on active duty, manv holding officer rank, who give us more and more information, tell me that we have got a problem here that the rest of the Government at the top is still reluctant, or unable, to fully see and deal with. That has got to change. You have helped us today with respect to the report that you have given us from the CIA. We will give you some questions for the record and we will look forward to having you respond to those fully. Thank you. Dr. Oehler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. The Committee stands in recess. [Whereupon, at 4:32 p.m., the hearing was adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.] [Prepared statements, response to written questions, and addi- tional material supplied for the record follow:] 87 PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR ALFONSE M. D'AMATO Mr. Chairman, let me begin today by expressing my gratitude and appreciation for your commitment to addressing the serious issue before us — that of whether ex- posure to chemical and biological agents during the Gulf War with Iraq are causes of what has come to be known as the Gulf War Syndrome. Saddam Hussein has once again been talking about Kuwait "as the 19th province of Iraq." Thus, this hearing and our inquiries are not limited to just a historical focus and it is not limited to only the ailments of veterans of the Gulf War and their families. Pursuing necessary questions and getting good answers may prove vital to the safety and success of future U.S. military operations. Today, thousands of Gulf War veterans across this country are experiencing ill- nesses that began after they returned from the Gulf War. Alarmingly, there appears to be growing evidence that the illness is spreading to the spouses and chiloren of the affected veterans. I believe, as you do, that it is the responsibility of all Government agencies, insti- tutions, and the U.S. Congress to follow every available lead which might assist medical researchers in finding the answers to the causes of illnesses faced by our veterans. Mr. Chairman, I know that you have been tireless in your efforts to get the De- partment of Defense and other Federal Government agencies to be forthcoming on this issue. Most, if not all, of the responses have been inadequate and sometimes even contradictory. It is my understanding that the Department of Defense contends that it has no evidence that U.S. forces were exposed to chemical and biological agents while serv- ing in the Persian Gulf. But, according to the Pentagon's official report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, written in 1992: "By the time of the inva- sion of Kuwait, Iraq had developed biological weapons. Its advanced and aggressive biological warfare program was the most advanced in the Arab world. Large scale production of these agents began in 1989 in four facilities near Baghdad. Delivery means for biological agents ranged from simple aerial bombs and artillery rockets to surface to surface missiles." With this report in hand, an acknowledgement that Saddam Hussein had the means to use such weapons, it is inconceivable that the Defense Department has no other information on the actual use or impact of such weapons on our veterans. Such information could prove vital to assisting medical research efforts necessary to define and treat Gulf War illnesses. The work of the Chairman alone on this issue, as indicated in the report released today, shows a growing link between the symptoms of the syndrome and the exposure of Gulf War veterans to chemical and biological warfare agents, pre-treatment drugs and other hazardous materials and substances. It is outrageous and unjustifiable that this Nation's own Defense Department not cooperate. I believe it is their duty and responsibility to provide information that could help treat the illnesses being sufTered by the very individuals who served their country bravely. These individuals survived the horrors of the battlefield only to re- turn home and face the horrors of war on another front. There is a critical need for immediate advanced medical research. A thorou^ and systematic review of all information and data from all sources, including our own Defense Department, could be critical to identifying the causes and treating the ill- nesses. I hope that the representatives of the Department here today are going to provide us with worthy information and not just more stonewalling. Mr. Chairman, thank you again for your complete commitment to this critical issue. I join you in continuing the fight against what is probably considered the sec- ond war by many of our veterans. 88 CHRISTOPHER S. BONO MISSOURI COMMrmu; APPBOPSUTIONS ■ANKING. HOUSING ANO UPBAM AHAJRS SMAU. BUSINESS Buocrr Bnitd <^tatt8 Senate WASHINGTON, DC 20610-2603 May 25, 1994 Hearing on the Impact on the Health of Gulf War Veterans Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs SD 106 Dirksen Opening remarks: Mr. Chairman, I thank you for calling this important hearin to investigate further the causes of the Persian Gulf War Syndrome from which so many U.S. veterans and their families are currently suffering. We owe it to our veterans to do everything we can to determine the causes of the Gulf War Syndrome, to develop and research cures for those veterans now affected, and to do whatever we can to prepare and protect our service personnel from illnesses associated with this syndrome in any future conflicts. Thousands of American servicemen and women are reportedly suffering from symptoms and undiagnosable disorders consistent with exposure to biological or chemical toxins. Allied bombings of Iraqi nuclear, chemical, and biological facilities were reported to trigger daily chemical "false alarms" on the front lines. Reports were made by U.S. service personnel of direct biological or chemical weapons attack on the 17th and 20th of January, 1991 and that as many as five gas attack alerts in one day were issued. Iraq not only had a vast biological weapons capability, including artillery shells loaded with mustard gas, rockets loaded with nerve agent, nerve agent aerial bombs, and SCUD warheads loaded with Sarin, but Iraqi official radio addresses on the 17th and 20th of January, 1991, indicated that Iraqi forces had and would use all means at their disposal to fight the U.S. and that they would soon unleash a secret weapon that would release "an unusual force." Lastly, the report of a Czech chemical decontamination unit detected the chemical nerve agent Sarin in the air during the opening days of the war and some of its members are believed to be suffering illnesses similar to those of our veterans. Collectively, these facts make it, at least, possible that Gulf War Veterans were e.xposed to chemical and/or biological toxins. I, therefore, fully support Public Law 103-210 which provides additional authority for the Secretary of Veterans 89 Affairs to provide priority health care to veterans of the Persian Gulf War who may have been exposed to toxic substances "or environmental hazards during the Gulf War. However, in light of the above evidence, it is apparent that we must investigate fully whether or not biological or chemical weapons were used on our troops. In the staff report to this committee on September 9, 1993 on the Gulf War Syndrome, it is stated that only the use of highly sophisticated, computer-enhanced electroencephalograms (EEGs) would be able to detect neurological disorders resulting from direct chemical or biological warfare, or chronic exposure to low levels of hazardous nerve agents. I believe it is imperative that we make such technology available to those veterans suffering from the Gulf War Syndrome to determine without a doubt whether biological and chemical toxins played a role in the health conditions of our veterans. The top priority of this committee, I believe, must be to ensure that the veterans who, have been affected are treated, not just adequately or minimally, but to the highest extent possible, and to support research for cures of the Gulf War Syndrome. I do, however, have several other concerns that I feel must be addressed. First of all, I find it very disturbing that the Department of Defense has not been as forthcoming en this issue as I feel they must. It has been almost two and a half years since the Gulf War, and the Department of Defense has still not made it a priority to get to the bottom of the causes of the Gulf War Syndrome. While the Gulf War Syndrome may not be the result of chemical or biological warfare, the odds of this syndrome affecting future units in combat is grave enough to warrant full and speedy investigation. Second, by not investigating the effects that possible biological attacks have had on our troops, the security of U.S. forces against such future attacks would be compromised. Data suggests that the M8A1 chemical agent detection alarm deployed during the war might not have been sensitive enough to detect consistent low levels of chemical agents. It would appear that a reevaluation of our defenses against biological and chemical warfare would be in order, especially as relations with North Korea continue to sour. Lastly, I am concerned about the adverse side effects that veterans have suffered from the administration of nerve agent pre-treatment drugs and inoculations distributed to our armed forces. Patricia Axelrod, a research specialist whose study of the drug pyridostigmine, which our troops were ordered to take prior to the commencement of the ground war, stated that the drug was "unproven." I think more research on the side effects of this drug and the advisability of administering it to our troops in the future is warranted. I thank the Chairman for this opportunity to address my concerns and look forward to reviewing the testimony of witnesses. 90 PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR CAROL MOSELEY-BRAUN I ampleased to submit this testimony for the record regarding those who have been afTiicted with the Persian Gulf War Syndrome. While stories of mysterious ail- ments connected to service in the Persian Gulf have been around for the last several years it is only recently that the symptoms plaguing some of our Gulf War veterans and their families have been taken seriously. Those who were forced to fight another battle with their health upon their return from the Gulf have been vindicated by an NIH technical panel held in April, that validated the service related claims of many of the victims. The panel found that the Desert Storm environment — biological, chemical, physical, and psychological — produced a range of illnesses for Desert Storm vets. Today I met with a twenty-four year old Illinois constituent who came to my office with his stoiy. I would like to share it with you, because it is representative of the experience of many of our Gulf veterans. My constituent, Tim Striley, left the Per- sian Gulf even before the war began due to unexplained symptoms including a rash, nausea, and fevers. Upon his return he completed his service commitment and began a private sector job. As his symptoms continued and worsened he received care from his local VA hospital. As is the custom of the VA, his bills were forwarded to his private insurer for payment. With no diagnosis, no treatments, and no cure, his medical bills soared and he missed time from work. He lost his job and was told by his insurer that they did not insure Gulf War vets. To add to Tim's problems, not only is he the victim of this amorphous syndrome, but as we are hearing more often, his wife and young daughter appear to also be affected. His illness has advanced to the point that he is now disabled and unable to work. Though he continues to receive care through the VA, he has been unable to access Social Security Disability Income because there is no diagnosis for his illness. His wife's employment provides the sole income for the family. My understanding is that the story of Tim's family is far from uncommon. It is very clear that we must do more to aid those who fought in the Gulf War and are experiencing severe health problems because of it. I support the NIH's recommendations to study the issue further, conduct a survey of Gulf War veterans, and to create a uniform protocol for evaluating Gulf War vet- erans in different treatment settings. In the meantime, however, we must assure that veterans suffering from Gulf related illnesses receive proper treatment and care not only for themselves but for their families. It is important that we move forward to determine a cause for this illness because it is real and very much a public health problem. We are now hearing about mys- terious bacterias and high incidence of cancer among Gulf War vets in their twenties. These claims and other claims that families of vets are also somehow experiencing related health problems must be thoroughly examined as expeditiously as possible. We must ensure that these families receive adequate care and we must ensure that we take additional measures to protect the public health. I plan to contact the Secretary of Health and Human Services to determine if there is a role for the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention regarding inves- tigation of the syndrome or measures to protect the public health. I also plan to work with Senator Riegle to continue to bring attention to the plight of our vets who served their country heroically in the Gulf. PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your work and your persistence in trying to answer questions about the Persian Gulf Syndrome. Like most people, I don't have the answers about why so many veterans of the Gulf War face chronic and often disabling illnesses, many of them from my home State of Colorado. My office has helped many Persian Gulf War veterans, but I want to tell you about one young man whose family lives close to my ranch in Colorado. I remember him as a strapping young high school student. He also served honorably in the Gulf War. Since returning from the Gulf, he has lost 40 pounds, he has trouble remembering things, and he has to fight bouts of dizziness and depression. The situation got so bad that he couldn't even make line-up. Yet the doctors at his base couldn't find anything wrong with him. He needed medical treatment, but they told him that his 91 problem was mental, and refused to treat him. When will the United States Grovern- ment believe them? At the funeral? Only after I called the commander of Ft. Carson Armv Base was he admitted to Walter Reed Army Medical Center for treatment. It shouldn't take a phone call from a Senator to help a veteran in need. Currently, the Federal Ckjvemment is engaged in at least 20 Persian Gulf related studies. They are investigating every possible cause or causes: multiple chemical ex- posures, leishmaniasis, oil well fires, microwave exposures, chemical and biological agents, vaccines and medications, and depleted uranium. Last month the National Institutes oi Health (NEH), along with the DoD, VA, HHS, and EPA, held the "NLH Technology Assessment Workshop on the Persian Gulf Experience and Health." After 2 days of presentations, the NIH adopted a writ- ten report which determined, among other things, that: • There is "no single disease or syndrome apparent, but rather multiple illnesses with overlapping symptoms and causes." • A "collaborative Government sponsored program has not been established" to evaluate undiagnosed illnesses. Of course, we don't need to wait for studies to know that these veterans are sick. The question shouldn't be: "Are these veterans sick?" It should be: "How can we take care of these veterans ouickly and equitably?" Last year Congress passed authority for the VA to provide health care for all Per- sian Gulf veterans on a priority basis. I thought this would mean veterans would be taken care of, but today we find out that care is meted out stingily, with sus- picion and reservation. Without question, eligibility for benefits, access to health care and compensation have to be provided sooner, with less red tape. I will be working with Veterans' Af- fairs Committee Chairmen Rockefeller and Montgomery to provide a presumption of service-connection for sick Persian Gulf War veterans. I hope that after these hearings, nobody argues with the need to carefully control potentially dangerous exports. Frankly, I m a little tired of hearing U.S. companies complain about export controls in the name of profits, and then not wanting to take responsibility for the uses of these products. This weekend, 50-75,000 veterans will visit the Wall — I would like to tell them that we are doing something, and that the U.S. is not dragging its feet. As a Member of both this Committee and the Senate Veterans' Affairs Committee, I look forward to working with you and Chairman Rockefeller on these issues. PREPARED STATEMENT OF HONORABLE EDWIN DORN Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness U.S. Department of Defensk Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I am pleased to provide informa- tion to support the Committee's review of how materials contributing to Iraq's chem- ical and biological warfare program were exported to Iraq from the United States. These are significant issues as you consider measures to strengthen the Export Ad- ministration Act. Secretary Perry has asked me to be the focal point within DoD for issues related to service in the Persian Gulf during Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm. I am here today in that capacity. Senator, I know that you and your colleagues are very concerned about Persian Gulf veterans who have developed health problems. So are we in the Department of Defense. In recent weeks we nave testified before the Armed Services Committees and the Veterans' Affairs Committees in both Houses, and I will be pleased to share with you the same information we have shared with them. Indeed, before we move on to discuss matters related to the Export Administration Act, I would like to offer a few points about our efforts on behalf of Persian Gulf veterans. We take the position that the veterans who say they are sick should receive the best care we can provide. Three years ago, we trusted these men and women to make life-and-death decisions in the heat of battle. Today, we should believe them if they're sick. We are committed to treating the symptoms, to fashioning appro- priate compensation for those who are disabled, and to identifying the causes of their illnesses. An interagency coordinating board ensures that the Defense Depart- ment's treatment and research programs complement related efforts by the Depart- ment of Veterans' Affairs and the Department of Health and Human Services. I should note here that Congress aided our ability to respond by authorizing VA to 92 provide priority care to Persian Gulf veterans for conditions that might possibly be related to their Gulf service. We are especially concerned about those Desert Shield/Desert Storm veterans who, since the war, have developed symptoms whose causes we cannot identify. These veterans represent a small proportion of the nearly 700,000 U.S. military per- sonnel who served in the Persian Gulf region during the conflict, and indeed ttiey represent a small proportion of those who have been treated for illnesses or injuries suiTered during the war. DoD and VA doctors have treated thousands of Persian Gulf veterans for readily identifiable illnesses and injuries; but we know of about 2,000 people for whom a clear diagnosis continues to elude physicians. We are working very hard on this. There are lots of theories about causes. We have heard from people who are convinced that we will find the answer if we focus solely on parasitic diseases, or Kuwaiti oil fire smoke, or industrial pollutants, or the effects of inoculations, or stress, or multiple chemical sensitivity. We are trying to maintain a program that explores all the possibilities. In the course of our work, some possibilities nave begun to appear less plausible than others. One theory involves Iraq's chemical and biological warfare capability. That theory provides a connection between the health problems of Gulf War veterans and the Senate Banking Committee's review of the Export Administration Act. At the time of its invasion of Kuwait in August of 1990, Iraq clearly represented a case in which past efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruc- tion had not been effective. Many American policymakers and military commanders were greatly concerned, going into the war, that Iraq would use chemical and/or bio- logical weapons. We knew they had used chemical weapons in the past and we had evidence that they had acquired a biological warfare capability as well. Our concerns led us to take measures to protect our personnel against such weap- ons, through immunizations, special training, equipment, and detection. The tension surrounding the possible use of chemical or oiological weapons was evident to every American who watched on television as journalists scrambled to put on protective masks in response to the SCUD-attack warning sirens in downtown Riyadh and other areas. There were many alarms, witnessed by U.S. and other coalition mili- tary personnel and by the civilian populations of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Israel. Following the war, we confirmed through the inspections conducted by the United Nations Special Commission that Iraa did have significant stocks of chemical agents and the weapons systems to deliver tnem, as well as equipment and materials suit- ed for chemical agent production. All of these chemical agents and related equip- ment were found stored at locations a great distance from the Kuwait Theater of Operations. These materials have been undergoing destruction at a centralized loca- tion in Iraq under the supervision of the United Nations Special Commission since late 1992. U.S. military personnel have been present, on site in Iraq, and involved in each of the teams overseeing these destruction operations. We have concluded that Iraq did not use chemical or biological weapons during the war. This conclusion is based on analysis of large amounts of detailed data gath- ered in the theater and reviewed after the war. First, throughout the operation, there was only one instance of a soldier who was treated for chemical bums that were initially attributed to mustard agent; but subsequent tests on the soldier and his clothing did not definitively support the initial finding. We know of no other re- ports of any U.S. military, coalition military, or civilians in the region having symp- toms caused by exposure to chemical or oiological warfare agents. The effects of chemical and biological weapons are acute and readily identifiable, and our person- nel had been trained to look for the symptoms. Second, our detectors were strategically located, and although many detectors alarmed, there were no confirmed detections of any chemical or biological agents at any time during the entire conflict. Third, no chemical or biological weapons were found in the Kuwait Theater of Operations — those portions of Southern Iraq and Kuwait that constituted the battlefield — among the tons of live and spent munitions recovered following the war. The international community agrees witn these conclu- sions. This is a complicated and contentious issue, however. To ensure that we have not overlooked or misinterpreted important information, we have asked an independent panel of experts, chaired by Nobel Laureate Joshua Lederberg, to review all the available evidence. We expect to receive the panel's report in June. We also remain eager to hear from Gulf War veterans who feel that they can shed light on the sources of the undiagnosed illnesses. I understand the fear and the frustration many Persian Gulf veterans are experi- encing: They are sick and their doctors can't offer definitive answers. To them, let me say: This Administration is committed to treating you fairly. You stood up for the Nation; the Nation will now stand up for you. 93 Now, let me turn to the Defense Department's role in the export licensing process. First, it should be noted that DoD is not a licensing agency. That responsibihty falls on the Department of Commerce for dual-use items. Trie Department of Defense re- views and provides recommendations on export license applications when they are referred to Defense or to interagency groups in which Defense participates. Records on the ultimate disposition of dual-use, biological, chemical, nuclear, or missile tech- nology-related licenses reside in the Commerce Department. DoD is a member of the interagency Subgroup on Nuclear Export Controls which was in operation throughout the 1980's. This group reviews export requests for nu- clear-related dual-use technology. In the missile area, Defense played a significant role in the establishment of the Missile Technology Control Regime in 1987, and subsequently helped set up an interagency license review group in 1990. In the chemical and biological area. Defense also plays an important role, as part of an interagency team, in reviewing export license requests for items controlled by the Australia Group. The Department has taken and will continue to take its responsibility here very seriously. For example, DoD made an important contribution in halting export of the Argentine Condor Program that was aiding Iraq's Weapons of Mass IJestruction Program and we spearheaded the effort to prevent Iraq from acquiring a more capa- ble missile than the SCUD. Defense also played a leading role in developing the President's Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative and most recently the com- prehensive DoD Counterpro lifer at ion initiative. The Department of Defense contin- ues to consider proliferation as a significant military threat. The growing ability to produce and use chemical weapons is a great concern to DoD. We fully support any measures that will prevent or control this proliferation, which include strengthening the Export Administration Act. It is important to re- member that all exports made to Iraq in the 1980's were completely consistent with the laws in effect at the time, and Iraq was not considered a hostile country. De- fense's role in reviewing exports was greatly expanded in 1991 — and would be fur- ther expanded through measures you are considering in this Conmiittee. I would now like to introduce the other members of the panel. Dr. Theodore Prociv is the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Matters. In that role, he oversees the Department's Chemical and Biological Defense Program; the Army program to destroy the U.S. stockpile of chemical weapons; and the implementation of bilateral and multilateral chemical weapons treaties, includ- ing the Chemical Weapons Convention which is being considered currently by the Senate for ratification. Additionally, his office has assisted the Defense Science Board Task Force examining the issue of Gulf War health, and has assisted my staff with technical support in the area of chemical and biological warfare defense. Dr. John T. Kriese is the Chief of the Office for Ground Forces at the Defense Intel- ligence Agency. He is responsible for the production of intelligence on foreign ground forces and associated weapons systems worldwide; and all aspects of foreign nuclear and chemical programs. Dr. Prociv and Dr. Kriese are with me here this morning. Dr. Mitchell Wallerstein, who will testify this afternoon, is an expert m Counterproliferation and Export Control for the Under Secretary of Defense for Pol- icy in International Security Policy. He is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counterproliferation Policy. Mr. Chairman, that concludes my opening statement. Before we turn to questions, I ask the Committee's indulgence while Dr. Prociv and Dr. Kriese describe their areas of expertise. PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. GORDON C. OEHLER Director, Nonproliferation Center, Central Intelligence Agency Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, I am pleased to appear before you this afternoon to address your concerns about the proliferation of weapons of mass de- struction. I am specifically going to address three aspects of Iraq's efforts to obtain critical technologies for its weapons programs in the years preceding the Persian Gulf War. • First, I wOl present a brief overview of the Intelligence Community's assessments of Iraqi chemical and biological warfare (that is CW and BW) capabilities prior to Desert Storm and subsequent discoveries based on post-war inspections. 1 will also touch lightly on our assessments of Iraq's missile and nuclear weapons pro- grams. • Second, my remarks will detail the means by which Iraq sought to procure items for its weapons of mass destruction programs. 86-558 0-95-4 94 • Third, I will address the role that U.S. intelligence agencies played in support of efforts to restrict transfers to Iraq that would have been of use in its CW and BW programs. Finally, I will close with some observations regarding the Export Administration Act. I will be as candid as possible in this of)en testimony. I'm sure you understand that further details could be addressed in closed session. First, what did we know about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs. As we reported extensively, Iraq had aggressive CW and BW programs prior to Desert Storm, as well as programs for ballistic missile delivery systems. The Iraqis used nerve and blister agents during the war with Iran and, in 1988, increased their usage of nerve agent dramatically during their final offensive campaign. As you wiU recall, they also targeted their own Kurdish population with chemical weapons. In mid-1990, Iraq's primary site for the production of chemical weapons was the Al Muthanna State Establishment located in Samarra, about 80 km northwest of Baghdad. In addition to that complex, the Iraqis had begun to build a complex of precursor production plants near Al Habbaniygih, as well as additional chemical weapon storage sites. By early 1990, we calculated that the Al Muthanna facility was capable oT producing more than 2,000 tons annually of blister agents and nerve agents. Although the Iraais claimed after the war that their chemical weapons production was inept and poorly organized, U.N. inspections showed otherwise. Iraq originally declared only about 10,000 CW munitions and less than 1,000 tons of chemical agents. U.N. inspectors have found and destroyed more than 46,000 filled munitions including 30 warheads for ballistic missiles, bombs filled with mustard gas, and nerve gas containers. Additional munitions remain buried in bunkers attacked and damaged by coalition forces — the U.N. cannot remove them safely. The inspections have also revealed 5,000 tons of stockpiled chemical agents. The U.N. is only now completing the task of dismantling this massive program. With regard to biological weapons, we estimated, prior to the start of the war, that Iraq had a stockpile of at least one metric ton of biological warfare agents, in- cluding anthrax and botulinum toxin. We reported that Salman Pak was the pri- mary biological weapons facility. U.N. inspectors did not find any evidence of large- scale production or weaponization during post-war inspections, suggesting that the materials and equipment were removed and hidden prior to inspections. Research reports released by the Iraqis to the first U.N. biological weapons inspection team showed highly focused research at Salman Pak on anthrax, Botulinum toxin, and Clostridium perfringens. The Iraais insisted, however, that their program did not proceed beyond basic research. U.N. inspectors believed that, contrary to Iraqi claims, there was an advanced miUtary oiological research program which con- centrated on these agents. The Department of Defense reports that no chemical or biological warfare muni- tions were found stored — or used — in areas occupied by Coalition forces during Desert Storm. We do not have any intelligence information that would lead us to conclude otherwise. At the same time it was developing CW and BW agents, Iraq was also developing missile delivery capabilities. By the time of the invasion of Kuwait, Saddam could field up to 450 Scua-tvpe surface-to-surface missiles. These Soviet-origin Scuds origi- nally nad a range of 300 kilometers, but Iraq reconfigured them into a series of other missiles with ranges up to 750 kilometers. Prior to the war, Saddam claimed to have developed and tested a missile with a range of 950 kilometers — which he called the Al-Aobas — but discontinued the system because of in-flight stability prob- lems. With regard to Iraq's nuclear program, the bombing of the Osirak nuclear re- search reactor by the Israelis in 1981 drove Saddam to extreme lengths to cover, diversify, and disperse his nuclear activities. IAEA inspections of declared nuclear materials continued on a regular bsisis, but the IAEA did not inspect any of the undeclared facilities associated with the weapons program. We reported extensively on the existence of the nuclear weapons program. Post-war inspections added a number of details. I would like to give you a sense of Iraq's procurement efforts and patterns. The Iraai program was developed gradually over the course of the 1980's. By the time of the invasion of Kuwait, it had become deeply entrenched, flexible, and well-or- chestrated. Project managers for the weapons of mass destruction programs went directly to vetted European suppliers for the majority of their needs. Throughout the 1980's, German companies headed the list of preferred suppliers for machinery, technology, and chemical precursors. German construction companies usually won the contracts to build the CW facilities in Iraq. And Iraqi procurement agents were 95 sophisticated in exploiting inconsistencies in local export control laws by targeting countries for substances and technologies that were not locally controlled. In the pre-war years, the dual-use nature of many of these facilities made it easi- er for Iraq to claim that chemical precursors, for example, were intended for agricul- tural industries. European firms, arguing that the facilities in Iraq were for the pro- duction of insecticides, built the Samarra chemical plant, including six separate chemical weapons manufacturing lines, between 1983-86. European middlemen broke red chemical precursor deals for Iraq under the pre- text that the materials were intended for pesticide plants. A Dutch firm purchased supplies from major chemical firms around the world, supplying the Chemical Im- portation and Distribution State Enterprise in Baghdad in the late 1970's, and in the 1980's supplying the Iraqi State Establishment for Pesticide Production — cover names for the CW program. The middleman supplied dual-use chemical precursors including monochlorobenzene, ethyl alcohol, and thiodiglycol. When the Iraqis re- quested phosphorus oxychloride — a nerve agent precursor banned for export under Dutch law without explicit permission — the supplier balked and drew this request to the attention of Dutch authorities. Subsequent Dutch investigations found that two other Dutch firms were involved in brokering purchases of chemical precursors. Iraq exploited businessmen and consortia willing to violate the export laws of their own countries. As has been indicated in press and television reports. The Consen Group — a consortium of European missile engineers and businessmen estab- lished a network of front companies to cover its role as project director of an Argen- tine-Egyptian-Iraqi sponsored Condor II ballistic missile program. Iraqi procurement officers, knowing full well the licensing thresholds, requested items that fell just under the denial thresholds — but nonetheless would suffice. Prior to Desert Storm, U.S. regulations on the export of these technologies were drafted to meet U.S. technical specifications and standards. Technologies of a lower standard worked just as well, and permitted Iraq to obtain the goods and technology consistent with Commerce Department regulations. Let me turn to the question of the involvement of U.S. firms in Iraq's proliferation programs. We were watching these programs very careftilly, and it was clear that the major players assisting Saddam's effort were not American firms — they were principally European. We saw little involvement of U.S. firms in Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs. In discussing this issue, we should remember that, by law, the CIA, as a foreign intelligence agency, does not focus on U.S. persons, to include U.S. companies. By this definition, companies founded by foreign nationals and incorporated in the U.S. are treated as U.S. companies. This is not to say that we did not occasionally come across information on a U.S. person that was collected incidentally to our foreign intelligence target overseas — we did. But, when we did, and when there was a possibility of a violation of U.S. law, we were obligated to turn our information over to the Justice Department. We provided what we called "alert memos" to the Departments of Commerce, Jus- tice, Treasury, and to the FBI. These memos resulted whenever this incidentally- collected information indicated that U.S. firms had been targeted by foreign govern- ments of concern, or were involved in possible violations of U.S. law. Between 1984 and 1990, CIA's Office of Scientific and Weapons Research provided five memos cov- ering Iraqi dealings with U.S. firms on purchases, discussions, or visits that ap- peared to be related to weapons of mass destruction programs. Turning now to export controls, the Intelligence Conmiunity was asked by the De- partment of Commerce during the 1980's to review export license applications pri- marily when the licenses had significance to Intelligence Collection equities. And here the concern was not so much Iraq, but whether there was a possibility the equipment would be diverted to the Soviet Union or other Communist countries. Prior to 1991, there were four instances in which the Department of Commerce sought information on Iraqi export license applications — all dated in 1986. These ap- plications involved computer technologies and image processors. For some of these, we reported no derogatory information on the end user. In one case, we referred Commerce to a classified intelligence report. After evidence mounted in the mid-1980's about the use of chemical warfare in the Iran-Iraq war, the United States began to put into effect unilateral controls on exports of chemical precursors to Iraq and other countries suspected of having chemical warfare programs. The U.S. and several other industrialized nations joined what is called the Australia Group to establish more uniform licensing controls for the export of several chemical weapons precursors. Since then, more nations have been brought into the Australia Group, and recently, controls have been added for chemical equipment, certain pathogens, and biological equipment. 96 Since the Gulf War, U.S. export controls on CW/BW have been considerably strengthened. Enforcement mechanisms involving several Federal agencies have been put into place. The scope of the regulations has also been broadened consider- ably. In 1991, export controls were tightened to require validated licenses for all dual-use equipment being exported to end users of proliferation concern. Intelligence information is often the basis for this determination. This catch-all provision has served as a model for other countries interested in joining the U.S. Government's non-proliferation efforts. The Intelligence Community has an expanded role in this strengthened export control regime. We work with Department of State-led interagency forums to control sensitive technologies and equipment. Our analysis of international trade mecha- nisms used to transfer technolo^es from suppliers to consumers is provided to the U.S. policy, enforcement, and intelligence communities. And the Department of Commerce now brings the Intelligence Community into a large percentage of its li- cense reviews. Let me say a brief word about the control of missile and nuclear technologies. The Missile Technology Control Regime (the MTCR) went into effect in April 1987, with the participation of the U.S., the UK, Canada, Italy, France, Japan, and West Ger- many, the leading suppliers of, missile-related technologies. Initially, the MTCR controlled ballistic missiles and their components that are capable of delivering a 500-kilogram warhead to a range of 300 or more kilometers. In recent years, the scope of the MTCR has been expanded to include any unmanned system, with any range or payload, if it is believed to be intended for use with weapons of mass de- struction. As you know, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty — most often known by its ini- tials— NPT — provides the global framework to control the spread of nuclear weap- ons. Nations that have joined the NPT pledge not to transfer, seek access to, or as- sist the spread of nuclear weapons. The transfer of nuclear materials is covered by safeguar(fe enforced by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Over the years, mernbers of the NPT have developed lists of restricted items ana technologies. The U.S. adheres to all these controls and has introduced its own restrictions on the spread of the fissile materials necessary for weapons production — plutonium and uranium. The final issue I would like to address is legislation affecting export controls and other nonproliferation measures, specifically the provisions the Intelligence Commu- nity needs in such legislation. The first thing I would say, Mr. Chairman, is that the bill vou introduced at the request of the Administration incorporates provisions which address the Intelligence Community's concerns in the area of chemical, biological, and missile nonprohfera- tion measures. We woriced closely with the other agencies that developed this bill, and have endorsed the final result. Accordingly, I would strongly urge that these provisions be retained in the final bill passed by the Senate. To aid the Committee's deliberations, I would like to outline the Community's eq- uities in this area. In disseminating our intelligence, one of our primary responsibil- ities and duties is to protect the sources of the intelligence, whether human or tech- nical, and the methods by which it was collected. Sources and methods are most at risk when Intelligence information is, directly or indirectly, made public. The com- promise of sources and methods inevitably results in a diminished capacity to collect intelligence in the future. The most dramatic consequence of a compromise of intelligence information is the threat of the life of an asset. But there are other significant consequences. For ex- ample, if we have intelligence indicating a particular overseas company is actually a Libyan front company, we can often watch that company to learn more about Libya s program and its acquisition network. U.S. Government action that publicly identifies the company will often result in the company shutting down and reopen- ing elsewhere under a different name. Identifying this new company can be very dif- ficult, and meanwhile we have lost our window mto the broader proliferation activ- ity. This is not to say intelligence should never form the basis for overt U.S. Govern- ment action. On the contrary, it qruite often does and I feel strongly that providing "actionable intelligence" is of the highest priority. What is needed, however, is the flexibility to take the action that will best achieve our nonproliferation objectives — which in some cases may mean holding off on overt U.S. Government actions to pro- tect nonproliferation sources and methods. The first is to ensure that sanctions regimes established to punish proliferators permit the President sufiicient discretion in the imposition of sanctions to protect intelligence sources and methods. The second goal is to ensure that the Executive Branch not be statutorily required to publish lists of all end-users to whom exports of technologies or commodities are controlled. The third goal is to ensure that the 97 Government maintains export controls sufficient to ensure that exports of critical technologies are compatible with U.S. interests. The Administration proposals achieve the first goal by explicitly permitting the President to delay the imposition of sanctions where it is necessary to protect intel- ligence sources and methods. Let me emphasize that the Intelligence Community views this as an exceptional remedy that would have limited but critical application and is necessary to further non proliferation goals in the long term. The second goal is met by not requiring the Intelligence Community to create lists or databases of end-users to which exports of goods or technologies are controlled, but still ensuring that intelligence is appropriately made available to other agencies for purposes oi analyzing export license applications. Finally, the Administration's bill would not relax or eliminate controls on key technologies, particularly encryption devices, which could be damaging to U.S. interests. This is the basic outline of the issues we face. I would offer any Nonproliferation Center assistance or resources which you or your staff would find helpful as you pro- ceed in your deliberations on these important issues. 98 THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON. THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA I S MAY 1994 MEMORANDUM FOR PERSIAN GULF WAR VETERANS SUBJECT: Persian Gulf War Health Issues As you may know, there have been reports that some Persian Gulf War veterans are experiencing health problems that may be related to their service in the Gulf. We want to assure each of you that your health and well-being are top priorities for the Department of Defense. There are many hazards of war, ranging from intense combat to environmental exposures. Anyone who has health problems resulting from those hazards is entitled to health care. If you are experiencing problems, please come in for a medical evaluation. Active duty personnel and their eligible family members should report to any military hospital and ask to be included in the Depanment's Persian Gulf War Veterans Health Surveillance System. You will receive a full medical evaluation and any medical care that you need. Reserve personnel may contact either a military hospital or their nearest Veterans Affairs Medical Center and ask to be included in the DoD Surveillance System or the VA's Persian Gulf War Health Registry. You will receive a full medical examination. Depending on the results of the evaluation and eligibility status, reserve personnel will receive tnedicai care either from military facilities or from VA facilities. There have been reports in the press of the possibility that some of you were exposed to chemical or biological weapons agents. There is no information, classified or unclassified, that indicates that chemical or biological weapons were used in the Persian Gulf There have also been reports that some veterans believe there are restrictions on what they can say about potential exposures. Please be assured that you should not feel constrained in any way from discussing these issues. We are indebted to each one of you for your service to your country during the Persian Gulf War and throughout your military careers. We also want to be sure that you receive any medical care you need. Thaitk you for your service. y John M. Shalikashvili ^^ WiUia^. Pen? /V A Chairman Secretary of Defense^' V |>f the Joint Chiefs of Staff 99 THC SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON'. THC DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 1 5 NAY 1934 MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS SUBJECT: Persian GulfWar Health Issues Chainnan Shalikashvili and I want to ensure that sick Persian Gulf veterans receive the best care available. The attached memorandum provides essential reassurances about thaL The memorandum makes the following points: veterans who believe they have health problems resulting from service in the Gulf should come forward for examination and treatment; our forces were not aitacked by chemical or biological weapons: and. military personnel are not barred, by any classification restrictions, from discussing issues related to their health. Please ensure that this memorandum is distributed through all the channels necessary to reach the men and women who served in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Edwin Dora. Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, is coordinating the Depanment's efforts to deal with the health effects of Persian Gulf service. Attachment: As stated ^JU^C^- ^^ 100 in«TED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND 7J 13 SOUTH BOUNDARY BOULEVARD MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE. FLORIDA 33621-3101 13 NOV '1394 CCJl Subject: Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Request 94-41 Mr. James Tulte Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Washington, DC 20510-6075 Dear Mr. Tuite: This is in reply to a FOIA request from Senator Riegle dated 16 Meurch 1994 and received within the US Central Command 5 October 1994, as a referral from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) . The DIA searched and forwarded nine docximents responsive to your request for our review amd release determination. These documents were reviewed and determined to be properly classified and should not be reclassified at this time. They will be returned to the Secretary of the Senate, Office of Secxirity, U.S. Capitol S-407, Washington, DC to Mr. Michael OiSilvestro's attention. If you have additional questions regarding your request, Major Blaisdell or Senior Master Sergeant Skinner are the command's FOIA Officers and stand ready to assist you. You may reach them at (813) 828-6679/6685. When calling, please refer to FOIA number 94-41. Sincerely, irt J. Itarti'nelli lonel, United States Air Force rector of Manpower, Personnel and Administration Enclosures 101 UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE H^^ 4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON \, irA T WASHINGTON. DC. 20301-4000 O* ' ' '' PCmONMCL AMO MOOINCSS r- :. 2 1994 Honorable Donald W. Riegle, Jr. Chainnan Conunictee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs United States Senate Washington, DC 20510 Dear Mr. Chaiiman: Thank you for your letter of July 29, requesting information to questions from the May 25 Hearing on U.S. Dual Use Exports to Iraq and their Impaa on the Health of Gulf War Veterans. An interim response was sent on August 31. The unclassified responses are enclosed. They also are being provided to Ms. Kelly Cordes as requested. The classified responses have been forwarded under separate correspondence in accordance with the appropriate security procedures. I want to thank you for your concern and interest. Please be assured tiiat we are deeply committed to the health and well being of our current and former Service members and it remains a top priority within the Department. Sincerely, Enclosure: As stated cc: Honorable Alfonse D'Amato Ranking Republican Ms. Kelly Cordes Chief Clerk W 102 3.4 Department of Veterans' Affairs Gulf War Syndrome Registry BREAKDOWN BY STATE OF RESIDENCE OF THE 12,774 VETERANS WHO HAVE TAKEN THE GULF WAR REGISTRY EXAM THROUGH MARCH 1994. State of Residence Frequency Percent of Total Alabama 979 7.7 Arizona 258 2.0 Arkansas 253 California 439 Colorado 161 1,3 Connecticut 37 0.3 Delaware 88 0.7 District of Columbia 62 0.5 Florida 612 4.8 Georgia 923 7.2 Hawaii 35 0.3 Idaho 26 0.2 Illinois 317 2.5 Indiana 356 2.8 Iowa 196 1.5 Kansas 152 1.2 Kentucky 352 2.8 Louisiana 184 1.4 Maine 146 1.1 Maryland 145 1.1 Massachusetts 149 1.2 Michigan 277 2.2 Minnesota 205 1.6 Mississippi 233 1.8 Missouri 319 2.5 Montana 76 0.6 Nebraska 140 1.1 Nevada 27 0.2 New Hampshire 162 1.3 103 State of Residence Frequency Percent of Total New Jersey 119 0.9 New Mexico 150 1.2 New York 509 4*0 North Carolina 827 6.5 North Dakota 82 0.6 Ohio 269 2.1 Oklahoma 191 1.5 Oregon 185 1.4 Pennsylvania 589 4.G Puerto Rico 48 0.4 Rhode Island 34 oT South Carolina 238 1.9 South Dakota 61 0.5 Tennessee 410 3.2 Texas 630 4.9 Utah 10 OT Vermont 85 0.7 Virginia 248 1.9 Washington 66 0.5 West Virginia 69 0.5 Wisconsin 630 4.9 Wyoming 13 0.1 104 QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HONORABLE DONALD W. RIEGLE, Jr^ CHAIRMAN COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS VS. DUAL USE EXPORTS TO IRAQ AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE HEALTH OF GULF WAR VETERANS MAY 25, 1994 QUESTIONS FOR HONORABLE EDWIN DORN, UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL AND READINESS [Senator Riegle letter of July 29, 1994] Questions from Chairman Riegle 0.1. Was the Department of Etefense intelligence apparatus aware of the items exported to Iraq by the United States which were converted to use in the Iraqi chemical, biological. and nuclear programs prior to the Pereian Gulf War? Provide specific details. A.l. During the earlier years associated with Iraq's build-up of its scientific, industrial and military capabilities, Iraq was neither a proscribed nation to be denied military critical technology, nor an enemy. The U.S. intelligence community is forbidden from monitoring the activities of U.S. citizens and U.S. companies. Consequently, very little was known by the Intelligence Community about U.S. exports of technology with military potential, particularly to a non-proscribed non-enemy nation, unless it was informed of such exports by the Department of Commerce. During 1980-1994, the Department of Commerce requested that DoD review only 16 dual-use export cases. Of these, only two were forwarded to the DIA for technical review. They involved computers and signal processing equipment. DIA recommended denial in both cases. DIA was aware of the illegal export of thiodiglycol to Iraq by the Baltimore company Alcolac. DIA assisted customs and the FBI in their investigation and successful prosecution of that company. 0.2. Were Iraqi chemical and biological facilities among the priority targets hit bv Coalition bombers during the first davs of the air war? A.2. Yes. Some Iraqi chemical and biological (CB) facilities were priority targets and were among the first attacked on and around the first days of the air war. However, not every CB target was attacked during the first days. CB targets were themselves prioritized, generally by the intelligence community, then more specifically by the 105 CENTCOM operators and were attacked accordingly. Generally speaking, CB Urgels were attacked at the very beginning of the air war and throughout the air campaign. O.3. Were U.S. national laboratories contacted prior to the war and requested to assess the danper from the fallout of bombing Iraqi chemical, biological, and nuclear facilities? What was their advice? A.3. Yes. The Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) was tasked to assess the danger of fallout from bombed Iraqi facilities. An example of the analysis conducted by the DNA to assess the effects of bombing Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) facilities is at Attachment A. DNA developed the Army's Automated NBC Information System (ANBACIS n) to analyze the impact of NBC contamination on military operations. Downwind hazard modeling of the southem-most storage facilities showed that chemical contamination would not occur beyond 11.1 kilometers downwind from the target The closest U.S. or coalition forces to the Ash Shuyabah chemical storage area, the southern- most storage facility, was 150 kilometers. It is for this reason that reports of detections associated with downwind drift from bombed chemical facilities are discounted. The ability to quickly communicate with DNA analysts was available to commanders in the Gulf theater. Twenty-one sets of ANBACIS II equipment, which provided direct conimunications between the units and DNA stateside, were distributed in theater. Over 600 plots were run by DNA at the request of deployed units conducting vulnerability analysis. A complete description of the ANBACIS system and how it functioned during the war is at Attachment A. O.4. Did the automatic chemical agent detection alarms begin to sound more often with the initiation of the Coalition bombings? If so. whv? A.4. Yes, because more alarms (M8A1 and M43A1) were placed into operation after the bombing started to prepare for any Iraqi retaliation. The M8A1 alarm is activated during normal preventive maintenance checks and services (see Attachment B). The M43A1 (the detector component of the M8A1 system) will alarm when exposed to heavy concentrations of rocket propellant smoke, screening smoke, signaling smoke, when engine exhaust is present or when a nuclear explosion occurs. Additionally, the alarm will sound in response to a heavy concentration of tobacco smoke, burning rubber, insecticides, low battery indicator, or strong percussion such as proximity to heavy vehicles or incoming artillery. There were approximately 13,200 M8A1 deteaors in theater. 106 0.5. Was the M8A1 automatic chemical agent detection alarm deployed during the Persian Gulf War suFricientIv sensitive to detect chronic harmful exposure levels of chemical nerve agents? A. 5. Yes, for levels known to be hannful. The M8A1 G and VX agent sensitivity of 0.1- 0.2 mg-min/m3 is more than adequate to warn ground troops against known effects of chemical warfare nerve agents. The only known effect of nerve agents at this level of concentration is pinpointed pupils. 0.6. Was the M256 or M256A 1 chemical agent kit sufficiently sensitive to detect harmful exposure levels of chemical blister agents that could pose a chronic exposure hazard to U.S. troops? A.6. The M256A1 sensitivity to blister agents is as follows, and is more than adequate to warn ground troops against blister agent vapors: H - 2mg-min/m3; L - 9mg-min/nn3; and CX - 3mg-min/m3. Normally, the first indication of exposure to blister agent vapors is eye injury, which occurs at concentrations of 100-200 Ct(mg-min/m3). Incapacitating blisters occur at 2,000 Ct(mg-min/m3), death through respiratory inhalation at 1,500 Ct(mg-min/m3). O.7. Were positive readings ever obtained with the M256 or M256A1 test kits? Include in your answer positive results obtained even though another tests may have been conducted with negative results? How long does it take to conduct an M256A1 kit reading? A. 7. The records reviewed to date have not revealed any positive readings. M256A1 response time for G.V.H.L.CX, and CK is 15 minutes and 25 minutes for AC. G - non-persistent nerve agent V - persistent nerve agent H - mustard or blister agent L - lewisite or blister agent CX - choking agent CK - blood agent AC - blood agent O.8. Does the M 17 gas mask provide sufficient protection against chronic exposures to chemical nerve agents? If so. why is it not recommended for use in chronic exposures in U.S. Army material safety data sheets? A. 8. Yes. Material safety data sheets provide infonnation on safe storage, handling, and disposal of all types of chemical and hazardous materials throughout the civilian, military, and industrial communities. The particular material safety data sheets (;ontained in the Senate Banking Committee Report of May 25, 1994, for example, refer to 107 protective measures required by personnel working in production, depot storage, and transportation of chemical material. The possible exposure to very high concentrations of chemicals and hazardous materials in these circumstances requires levels of protection that far exceed tactical military requirements. Soldiers require protection from fiefd concentrations of chemical agents and therefore, soldier protective equipment must be more rugged, have greater wear time, require less logistic support, and be light weight equipment available for non-tactical applications. For example, the soldier's field mask must allow for weapons sighting, be worn in extreme hot and extreme cold, and be strong enough to survive infantry operations. O.9. Did the U.S. have field automatic biological detection monitors deployed durine the Persian Gulf War? What type? Are they currently deployed with U.S. field units? A.9. Automatic biological detection nronitors did not exist during the Gulf War. All biological detectors were manually operated. Biological agent detection units are deployed based upon theater requirements. If a biological detection requirement is identified in the force structure, a chemical corps units will be deployed for that purpose. See response to Question #14 for additional information. O.IO. Are all biological agents lethal? Isn't it true that one biological warfare strategy is to debilitate vour adversary's capabilities and another is to overload his medical facilities? A.IO. No. Not all biological warfare agents arc lethal; some are only lethal if untreated, while others are almost always lethal, even with medical treatment. Incapacitating BW agents could be used to debilitate an adversary's capabilities and to overload his medical facilities. Bacillus anthracis, botulinum toxin, francisella, tularensis, and yersinia pestis are examples of lethal agents; VEE virus, Q fever, and staph enterotoxin B are examples of incapacitating agents. The BW strategy statentent is true for chemical, biological, nuclear, unconventional and conventional warfare strategy. 0. 1 1 . Are the presence of sick or dead animals and birds one of the indicators U.S. forees are trained to look for as a warning of biological warfare agent use? All. Yes. The BW usage indicators are: o Occurrence of acutely ill military and civilian patients o Illness reflects an unusual or impossible agent for the geographical area o Unusual distribution of disease o Unexplained number of dead aninuils o Direct evidence • discovery of munitions with BW agents. 108 Q.12. Might widespread flu-like symptoms also be an indicator of biological warfare use? A. 12. Possibly. Some infectious agents known to be potential biological warfare agents can have flu-like symptoms as part of an early infection. Examples would be Q-fever, anthrax, tularemia, and plague. Ru-like symptoms including fever, sore throat, cough, loss of appetite, and muscle and joint aches are very non-specific and are generally the first signs of any infectious disease, many of which are not known to be biological warfare threats. 0.13. Were there outbreaks of antibiotic resistant strains of E. Coli and Shigella among U.S. forces during Operations Desert Shield or Desert Storm? How were the bacteria identified? Given the nature of the U.S. exports to the Iraq Atomic Energy Commission- were full DNA polymerase chain reaction studies conducted on these bacteria to determine if they were genetically modified? ^■13. Approximately 40-60% of enterotoxigenic E. Coli and 20-80% of Shigella spp. isolated from cases of acute diarrhea among Desert Shield troops were resistant to standard antibiotics used to treat diarrhea (trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole, tetracycline, and ampicillin). Resistance was determined using standard laboratory methods. It was also found that no single strain of bacterial eoteropathogen was Che cause of antibiotic resistant diarrhea. Enteric bacterial pathogens resistance to commonly used antibiotics were expected at the beginning of Operation Desert Shield because resistant organisms are now found throughout the worid. particuiariy in developing and tropical countries. Antibiotic resistant enteric disease pathogens can be obtained easily in nearly all tropical/developing countries by using simple, standard laboratory techniques; genetic modification is not necessary. Full DNA PCR analysis was not performed because there was nothing unusual or unexpected about the resistant, bacterial, enteropathogens identified in the Gulf. 0.i4. What procedures did the U.S. follow to determine whether U.S. forces were exposed to biological agents? What was tested for? What were the results of those tests? A.M. Several years before the Gulf War, U.S. Aitay scientists a.id engineers crafted a contingency plan to address the threat of biological agents. A monoclonal antibody technology detector test was developed. When intelligence sources assessed Iraq as having a potential anthrax and botulinum toxin oRensive capability, ten thousand anthrax and ten thousand botulinum toxin test kits were distributed throughout the Desert Storm theater of action. No biological warfare agents were identified during Operation Desert Shield/Storm. 109 Fifteen teams from the 9th Chemical Company were deployed by the U.S. Army to collect and analyze samples using the XM-2, a high volume air sampler, which operates by collecting aerosolized material into a liquid solution. That solution can be analyzed to determine the presence of biological warfare materials. The Naval Medical Research and Development Command deployed the Navy Forward Laboratory (NFL) to perform the biological warfare (BW) analysis mission. Other NFL missions during Operation Desert Shield/Storm were: o Laboratory diagnosis of clinical cases of infectious diseases o Threat assessment of infectious diseases of military importance o Detection capabUity for potential BW agents 0 Public health assistance to the local population and to the Coalition Forces. The NFL consisted of four microbiologists, two infectious disease specialists, and two advanced lab technologists. The laboratory had the capability to test for the following agents: salmonella, shigella, vibrio cholera, V. parhemonlyticus, escherichia coli, salmonella typi, s. partyphi, yersinia enterocolitica, Cryptosporidium, rotavirus, legionella pneumophila, yersina pestis, francisilla tularensis, neiserra meningitidis, N. gonorrhoeae, straphylococcus, streptococcus, hepatitis A,B, hantaan viriis, chlamydia, intestinal ova and parasites, malaria parasites, sandfly fever (Naples and Sicilian), West Nile fever. Rift Valley Fever, Crimean-Congo Hemorrhagic fever, sindbis, dengue, Q fever, murine typhus, Mediterranean spotted fever, mycoplasma pneumoniae, adenovirus, parainfluenza virus 1,2,3, influenza vims A&B, respiratory syncitial virus, steptococcus pyogenes, neisseria meningitidis, and streptococcus pneumoniae. The NFL could perform specific BW agent identification by performing bacterial culture and antibiotic sensitivities, indirect fluorescent antibody assay, antigen capture ELISA, IgM and IgG capture ELISA, and polymerase chain reaction assay. The labs conducted analysis of dead animals, verified air samples collected by the biological sampling teams, tested water and soil for agents and toxins, and analyzed the rapid field assays. In addition, U.S. Army specialists provided B W consultation and hands-on assistance to allies in the British, Canadian, and French armies. Great Britain and Canada developed and deployed reconnaissance vehicles, each of which included an air sampler, a particle sizer and various antibody-based tests (immunoassays). The French also deployed antibody-based tests for BW agents with assistance from U.S. Array specialists from Fort Detrick and Edgewood Arsenal. 0.15. Were any biological agents or materials capable of being used to cause disease or other illnesses di.scovered by the U.S. or any other Coalition forces in Iraq. Kuwait, or Saudi Arabia? What were tho;;e materials? 110 A. 15. No such materials were found by U.S. or Coalition forces. 0.16. Were any Iraqi vaccines discovered or did interviews of enemy prisoners of war. or others, reveal what biological warfare-related materials the Iraqis had defended against? A.16. No. Q17. Did Iraq have a biological warfare program that appeared to be offensive in nature? A17. Yes. The classified package provides additional information and is being addressed by separate correspondence. 0.18. In the spring of 1993. the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq sent a biological warfare inspection team to Iraq under the leadership of U.S. Armv Colonel David Franz (USAMRIID). One of the sites visited was a facility of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission which also does biological research. Was Colonel Franz briefed on the nature of the materials shipped bv the United States to Iraq prior to the war to alert him that genetic research may have been being conducted. A.I8. Prior to his leading the UNSCOM BW inspection team in March 1993, COL Franz was briefed on the major microbial strains which the Iraqis had obtained from the ATCC before the war. Observation and questions regarding genetic research are part of the biological inspection modus operandi, with or without a prebrief on the subject. Mr. Jim Tuite showed COL Franz a list in the spring of 1994 that included genetic constructs and vectors. During COL Franz's visits to Tuwaitha in March 1993 and M-.y/June 1994, he found no evidence of prohibited research, genetic or classical, ongoing, planned or having been conducted at Tuwaitha. Ill Q.19. Were chemical munitions or binary precvirsor materials capable of being used in chemical warfare discovered in any area of Iraq. Kuwait, or Saudi Arabia before, during, or after the war by U.S. forces. U.S. civilian personnel, or other coalition participants? A. 19. Classified response received from the Department of Defense [deleted]. Response archived in U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs files. Q.20. What evidence, if any, is there concerning the forward deployment of chemical and biological warfare agents or weapons prior to or during the Persian Gulf conflict? What evedence. if any, is there of Iraqi attempts to avoid destruction of chemical or biological warfare agents or weapons by coalition bombings? For example, transshipment activity just prior to the initiation of the air war from chemical production facilities such as Samarra. Al Muthanna. Habbanivah. or others? A.20. Classified response received from the Department of Defense [deleted]. Response archived in U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs files. 112 0.21 . What evidence, if any, exists of Iraqi chemical and biological warfare defensive measures during or prior to the Persian Gulf War? A. 21. Iraq claims it did not have a dedicated BW defensive progrant Iraq distributed drugs for the treatment of nerve and mustard exposure to at least some of its Republican Guard Divisions. There was an effort to outfit their troops with chemical protective gear; this usually consisted of a gas mask, gloves, boots, simple poncho, and individual chemical agent antidote kits. Additionally, decontamination stations were established throughout Iraq. Q.22. What evidence, if any, exists of Iraqi command instructions to use chemical weapons prior to or during the war? A.22. Classified response received from the Department of Defense [deleted]. Response archived in U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs files. Q.23. Were any Iraqi chemical units in Iraq or Kuwait located or reported on by U.S. or coalition sources during Operation Desert Shield or Desert Storm? Explain? A.23. Classified response received from the Department of Defense [deleted], response archived in U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs files. 113 0.24. In the Department of Defense's final report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, it was reported that 88 Scud launches were detected. Saddam Hussein has claimed to have launched at least 93 Scuds. Can vou explain the discrepancy? Were any Scud missiles launched bv Iraq against Turkey or any other location other than Israel or Saudi Arabia? Were U.S. forces and dependent personnel in Turkey ever ordered into MOPP gear? A.24. The Department records indicate a total of 88 SCUD launches against Israeli and Saudi Arabian targets only. Iraq only launched SCUD missiles against Israel and Saudi Arabia. We cannot explain the discrepancy between Saddam's claim to have launched at least 93 SCUDs. All units, which were in a SCUD missile threat area, responded with chemical defense standard operating procedures. Commanders at the lowest level of command determined the appropriate level of chemical defense for their units. No specific records were maintained at the unit level to indicate the use of MOPP gear. The Department is not aware of any personnel in Turkey being ordered into MOPP gear. 0.25. What targets were Spirit 1. Spirit 2. and Spirit 3 fU.S. Air Force AC-1 30 Spectre gunships) directed against on January 31. 1991? Were any of the targets of their mission - in which one of these aircraft was shot down in the battle for Khafji - suspected of being chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons? What were the results of those missions? A.25. Spirits 01. 02, and 03 (three AC-130H aircraft) were launched sequentially to provide close air support to U.S. ground forces engaged in and around the town of Khafji. Spirits 01 and 02 attacked the following targets: a tnick park, a border post, a radio station and antenna, and a radar site with associated Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs) and personnel. Spirit 03 attacked similar targets; however, the specific targets cannot be determined because the aircraft was shot down during the mission. Spirit 03 was attacking a free rocket over ground (FROG) missile site just before it was shot down. None of the targets were NBC. The results of the attacks indicate minimal damage inflicted on the truck park, border post, and radio station. Three APCs were destroyed around and near the radar site. 114 Q.26. Did Iraq conduct test firings of Scuds or other short or medium range ballistic missiles during Operation Desert Shield? What was the assessed purpose for these tests since Iraq already had extensive knowledge of the capabilities of Scud missiles? A.26. Classified response received from the Department of Defense [deleted]. Response archived in U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs files. Q.27. Did Iraq have the capability to deliver biological weapons via ground- based aerosol generators, aircraft, helicopters, or FAW missiles? Do they have any other means of delivering biological weapons? A.27. Classified response received from the Department of Defense [deleted]. Response archived in U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs files. Q.28. What was the Defense Intelligence Agency evaluation of Iraq's chemical and biological weapons programs and delivery means prior to. during, and after the Persian Gulf War? What delivery means were within range of coalition forces at the beginning of the air war and by the end of the ground war? A.28. Classified response received from the Department of Defense [deleted]. Response archived in U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs files. 0.28. Did any Iraqi aircraft, helicopter, or FAW ground-to-ground missile ever penetrate Saudi airspace or areas over U.S. naval forces in the Persian Gulf? Include in vour answer any areas where chemical and biological materials could have been distributed to contaminate U.S. forces even if not directly over Saudi Arabia. A.28. The Iraqi Scud attacks on Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Israel were highly publicized. The Iraqi offensive air capability was destroyed the first day of the ground war. There was no release of chemical or biological materials. 115 Q.30. Describe the evolution of Iraq's battlefield employment of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq war, did Iraq's ability to use these weapons improve over the course of the war? A.30. Classified response received from the Department of Defense [deleted]. Response archived in U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs files. Q.31. What chemical and biological agents were assessed to be in the Iraqi operational inventories and test inventories prior to the Persian Gulf War? A.31. Classified response received from the Department of Defense [deleted]. Response archived in U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs files. 0.:^2. Were I IS. or NATO chemical protective overganrv-niLs or masks vulnerable to specific tvix^s of chemical or biological agents in the Iraqi inventory? A. 32. There were no equipment vulnerabilities specific to the Iraqi chennical agent inventory. No biological warfare agents were identified during Operation Desert Shield/Storm. O. 33. Was IIS, and NATO detection equipment capable of detecting Iraqi biological agenLs? Explain. A.33. Yes, although U.S. Forces did not deploy any NATO biological detection equipment to Southwest Asia . See Response to Question #14 for information on U.S. equipment 0.34. What evidence exists, if anv. to indicate that Iraq deployed chemical mines in tlK Kuwaiti theater of operations? A.34. There is no evidence that Iraq deployed chemical mines in the KTO. In fact, over 350.000 Iraqi mines have been found and removed from Kuwait, none of which were chemical mines. 116 Q.35. Did Iraq deploy any chemical units or establish any chemical decontamination sites in the Kuwaiti or Iraqi theater of operations - or in the disputed territories? A.35. Classified response received from the Department of Defense [deleted]. Response archived in U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Affairs files. Q.36. Which country provided the chemical Scud warheads to Iraq that were later located by the UN inspections? If by another country, how many of these warheads were initially provided? Did Iraq also manufacture its own? A.36. Classified response received from the Department of Defense [deleted]. Response archived in U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Affairs files. Q.37. Was the former Soviet Union ever suspected of providing chemical or biological warfare training to Iraqi officers either in Iraq, the Soviet Union, or any other country? Explain. A.37. Classified response received from the Department of Defense [deleted]. Response archived in U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Affairs files]. Q.38. Is the Department of Defense aware of any Soviet assistance to the Iraqis in setting up any chemical training center or production facility in Iraq? Explain. A.38. Classified response received from the Department of Defense [deleted]. Response archived in U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Affairs files. 0.39. Did the United States ever provide chemical or biological warfare training to Iraqi officers either in Iraq, the United States, or any other country. Explain. A.39. At one tinie the United States and Iraq had friendly relationships, to include niiUtary exchange programs. Iraqi officers attended the U.S Army Chemical School until the 1978-1979 timeframe. 117 O.40, Is (h^re ^V classified or uncla-ssified information that would indicate anv g;^PQ$Mres (0 or detections of chemical or biological aoentj;? AJQ. Other than the Czech detections in January of 1991 , which have been discussed at length during testimony and other questions for the record, there is no information, classified or unclassified, which would indicate any exposures to or valid confirmed detections of chemical or biological agents. There were many, probably thousands, of false chemical alarms experienced by the Coalition; however, no alarm ever was verified using follow-up confirmation procedures. This includes the French reports, the FOX vehicle moving into Kuwait, and the bunker incident after Uie war. As with the alleged CW detections, there are some unsubstantiated reports that allege exposure to BW agents. However, despite concerted efforts, Coalition assets were not able to confirm any of these reports. 118 0.41. Is there any classified or unclassified information that would indicate the discovery of any chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear warfare related materials by U.S. or Coalition forces before, during, or after the Persian Gulf War? A.41. There is no information, classified or unclassified, that would indicate the discovery of any chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear warfare related materials by the IIS or Coalition forces before, during or after the Persian Gulf War. After the war, Iraq declared and turned over nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) related material to the UN inspection teams. None of the material which Iraq turned over to the UN teams originated within the KTO. The Departnient is not aware of any information derived from the UN inspections that supports any allegation that Iraqi NBC programs are responsible for the Gulf War Syndrome, either directly or indirectly. See classified package for additional information. 0.42. In February 1994. the Defense Science Advisory Board contacted the Banking Comnfuttee and asked for a list of witnesses to what may have been direct Iraqi attacks. A representative list of at least one person from each event noted was sent to the Department of Defense. It has been reported back to mv office bv a number of those interviewed bv the DoD that rather than ask substantive questions about the events and to locate other witnesses, high-ranking military officers called these individuals to inform them that thev were mistaken and to tell them that Iraq had did not have the ability to initiate these types of attacks -- which, of course, is false. Under whose personal direction are these officers operating -- and if operating without direction, what corrective or disciplinary steps will DoD take to ensure that in the future. Department representatives ask for information, rather than try to convince these veterans that they didn't see what they reported? A.42. In suppc rt of the Defense Science Board on Gulf War Health Effects charter, the Department interviewed several Persian Gulf veterans, including witnesses who related their Persian Gulf experiences to the staff members for the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. The majority of the individuals, who were interviewed, expressed their appreciation that the DoD was taking an interest in them and answering their questions concerning Operation Desert Storm chemical and biological issues. No disciplinary action is planned. 119 0.43. What is the role of your office in the investigation into the exposure of U.S. forces to chemical and/or biological materials during Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm? A. 43. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs), OASD(HA) is responsible for all Persian Gulf health-related issues. The Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy), OASTD(AE), provided administrative support and researched material for the Defense Science Board Task on Gulf War Health Effects. OATSD(AE) has also reviewed records, collected information and interviewed personnel with knowledge of chemicalA>iological operations related to the Gulf War and provided information to a variety of individuals and agencies. OATSD(AE) is assisting OASD(HA) in implementing a Desert Storm records research and declassification effort. 0.44. What role, if any did the Defense Nuclear Agency plav in the destruction of hazardous materials during or after the Persian Gulf War? A.44. DNA did not have a role in the destruction of hazardous materials during or after the Persian Gulf War. DNA persotuiel did participate in identification of stocks and their location, and identification of nuclear production facilities. Follow Up (0.45). Did anv personnel from the Defense Nuclear Agencv or working under the direction of the Defense Nuclear Agency or any other Department of Defense element participate in the destruction of chemical, biological or nuclear materials before. during, or after the war. If so. what materials were destroved? A. 45. No DNA personnel or anyone working under the direction of DNA participated in the destruction of chemical, biological or nuclear nmterials before, d'jring or after the war. In June 1991, a Destruction Advisory Panel was established to assist and advise the United Nations Special Conrunission (UNSCOM) on the safe destruction of Iraq's chemical weapons. The multi-national Chemical Destruction Group, which supports UNSCOM missions, oversees the chemical warfare munitions destruction in Iraq. Members of the U.S. Army Chemical Material Destruction Agency and the U.S. Army Technical Escort Unit have provided support to UNSCOM in this munitions destruction. 120 0.46. What is the role of the Defense Iniellipence Agency in the investigation into the exposure of U.S. forces to chemical, biological or radiological materials during Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm? A.46. DIA's role, as always, has been to provide intelligence to the Department of Defense. DIA has been deeply involved with the investigation into alleged exposure of U.S. forces to chemical, biological or radiological materials during Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm since the investigation began in early summer 1993. DIA has reviewed every aspect of its assessment of Iraqi chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs, the possibility of their use against Coalition troops, and the possibiUty of accidental release from bombed Iraqi targets. DIA has spearheaded the investigation into the alleged Czech detections, making the assessment that the Czech detections were likely valid but that they are unable to confirm the detections. DIA traveled to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Israel. Czech Republic, France and England to further investigate the issue. Through the Defense Attache system, DIA requested information and assessments regarding the issue from other Coalition members and allies. To date, all of DIAs efforts and contacts point to the unanimous conclusion that Coalition troops were not exposed to chemical or biological agents, either accidently (as a result of downwind exposure from bombed Iraqi facilities) or purposely (from direct Iraqi use). Q.47. Is it true that North Korea is reported to possess both chemical and biological weapons capabihtv? A.47. Classified response received from the Department of Defense [deleted]. Response archived in U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Affairs files. Follovy Up (Q.48.): There has been much discussion of the possibility that the crisis over the North Korean nuclear weapons program could develop into a major war involving a Desert Storm-sized force on the Korean Peninsula. If such a conflict were to occur, are you concerned that the North Koreans might use chemical and biological weapons agadnst U.S. forces? A.48. Classified response received from the Department of Defense [deleted]. Response archived in U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Affairs files. 121 Questions from Senator D'Amato Follow Up (0.49'i. What steps are you taking to ensure that the medical capabilities of U.S. forces are improved so that they could deal with mass casualty events involving chemical and biological weapons? Since the Korean crisis could come to a head in the very near future, measures that will take more than a year to be effective will be too late to do any good. A. 49. The Department is aggressively pursuing full FDA approval and licensure of all drugs and vaccines used as prophylaxsis or treatment against chemical/biological warfare agents wherever possible. The Department is assuring that training in the prevention and treatment of chenucal/bioiogical warfare casualties is a priority and will be a pan of the Department's Medical Readiness Strategic Plan. O.50. Hvpotheticallv. assume that the thesis of the report that is being issued today is correct, that U.S. forces in Southwest Asia during Desert Storm were exposed to a mixture of chemical and biological warfare agents. Isn't it strongly in the Department's interest to understand the nature and effects of such exposure, in orde^ to protect U.S. forces better in the future? Why has the Department seemed so resistant to a full, comprehensive review of this issue? A. 50. Under the auspices of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, a Defense Science Board Task Force on Persian Gulf War Health Effects conducted a comprehensive review of the use of chemical and biological weapons in the Gulf War. Their report was published June 1994 and concluded, "The Task Force found no evidence that either chemical or biological warfare was deployed at any level against us, or that there were any exposures of US service members to chemical or biological warfare agents in Kuwait or Saudi Arabia. We are aware of one soldier who was blistered, plausibly from mustard gas, after entering a bunker in Iraq during the post- war period." The suggestion that US forces were exposed to a mixtarc of chemical and biological warfare agents is, indeed, a hypothetical thesis. The illnesses suffered by some of our veterans at this time are not hypothetical, the illnesses are real. Time, resources, and effort should be expended towards identifying the causative factors of our veterans' illnesses. Scientific evidence, operational analysis and common sense have eliminated chemical and biological warfare agents as a causative factor of the illnesses. U.S. forces can best be protected in the future by identifying the causes of the Gulf War veterans' illnesses and identifying methods to neutralize and/or eliminate these causative factors. 122 0.5 1 . There are extensive published reports that Saddam Hussein has not abandoned his ambitions to conquer Kuwait and make it the "19th Province of Iraq". Indeed, he appears to be able to maintain his military power and his political base in Iraq, and appears to be working hard to undermine both the sanctions regime against him and the United Nations inspection regime. This leads me to conclude that we may again face Iraq on the battlefield. Do vou agree that Iraq remains a threat to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, among others in the Middle East? A.Sl. Yes, the Department agrees that Iraq remains a threat to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, among others in the Middle East. Iraq is still reeling from its thrashing at the hands of the Coalition, as well as UN inspections and sanctions. However, Iraq remains a viable regional force which no Persian Gulf ally could defeat, much less defend against, without US assistance. Follow Up (0.52). If Iraq remains a threat, and there is a possibility that our defense arrangements with our Desert Storm allies may again become the basis for direct U.S. involvement in armed conflict with Iraq, doesn't it make very good sense to press ahead with all possible speed to unravel and understand the causes and treatments of Persian Gulf Syndrome? Do you agree that this is not merely an illness affecting veterans of the past wars, but a threat to U.S. forces who may be engaged in a future war against the same enemy in much the same place. A. 52. We agree that we must proceed with our efforts to uiu-avel and understand the causes and treatments of these illnesses. 053. Can vou assure this Committee that all drugs and vaccines used on U.S. troops deployed to Southwest Asia had successfully completed the full FDA review and approval process? A. 53. Two drugs. Pyridostigmine and Butulinum toxoid, were used under an Investigational New Drug (IND) authorization from the FDA. With the exception of Pyridostigmine and Botulinum toxoid, any drug or vaccine administered to U.S. personnel would have been fully approved and licensed by the FDA, and listed within DOD medical formularies. Follow Up (O 54). Please list all drugs and vaccines used on U.S. troops and their FDA approval dates. If a drug or Vaccine did not receive FDA approval, please list its status in the approval process when it was administered to U.S. troops. And, its status today. 123 A. 54. With the exception of Pyridostigmine and Botulinum toxoid, any drug or vaccine administered to U.S personnel would have been fully approved and licensed by the FDA, and listed within DOD medical formularies. Pyridostigmine is a drug approved by the FDA since 1955 for use in the treatment of myasthenia gravis (MG), a neuromuscular disease. Botulinum toxoid has been in use more than 20 years, and has been sponsored by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) for important public health situations. During the Gulf War both drugs were considered "investigational" in accordance with FDA regulations and used only after careful review by the FDA under the auspices of a treatment protocol against biological and chemical warfare agents. The Department is pursuing action to have both drugs licensed and approved by the FDA for their intended military purpose. Attachment C is a list of all FDA approved drugs that were available for use in the "Medical Customer Shopping Guide for Saudi Arabia" and also those drugs which were taken to the field by medical units as noted in the "Defense Medical Standardization Board". 0.55. Did the development process for the medical procedures involving these drugs and vaccines fullv take into account possible synergistic reactions with other chemical and biological warfare agents? A. 55. No, not fully. The synergistic interaction of multiple drugs, vaccines, chemicals, thermal stressors and other environmental exposures with chemical and biological warfare agents is not a well defined area of medical knowledge. As a result of the Gulf War experience, the Department recognizes the need to increase its understanding of the physiologic effects of preventive measures within the context of co-existing exposures to environmental hazards and chemical and biological threats. Follow Up fO.56). What level of risk did you determine was acceptable in administering the drugs and vaccines? A. 56. Both Pyridostigmine and Botulinum toxoid have been used for many years by the medical profession without any evidence of adverse long term health effects. DoD and FDA shared the opinion that the risks from potential exposure to Iraqi biological or chemical warfare agents and the lack of any alternative therapy was significantly greater than any risks associated with the administration of these drugs to protect U.S. forces. 124 125 '•■l'|'!''"!'!v.'i' "I'l^ i' Mr - ftfi-«i'^A O - 95 - 5 126 An Icproved CSiaaiol and Biological Downwind KazArd Pradiction Syatea Colooel Joseph P. Phillip, USA LieutenAnt Colaa«l Ben Z. Moberley, DSA Captain David L. Da Vrias, DSA Oefonse Noclaar Agmacj 17 July 1991 ABSISACT It is ctaential that coabat commandari have elaar, tiaely, and definitive information and advice on the potential effects of cheaical and biological (CB) wespona for decisions affecting troop safety and operational Bobility. However, current prediction aethods generate broad outlines of total expected areas of pocenti&l hazards. Even where autoaatcd and enhanced, because of necessary allowances for statistical variability of weather, these aethods show hazard areas encoop&ssing even larger portions of terrain without any better appreciation for the significance of the true hazard. Capitalizing on expertise in nuclear effects modeling, the Defense Huclear Agency in January 1991 rapidly conducted wor)c to provide an isproved CS downwind hazard prediction systea for Operation Desert Stora. The project was undertaken in direct response to concerns over the CB warfare threat in the Persian Gulf conflict. The Brsttm, called ANBACIS XI for beneficial association with the Aroy's Automated Nuclear, Biological And Cheaical Information Systea, provides for greater definition of potential hazard areas by drawing aap overlay contours of different dosage intensity according to specific, detailed weapons Intelligvnc* inforaation. AHBAdS ZI . paclcages detailed weapons effects models together vitb real-tiae veather input and digital raster aaps; all within a user fri«ndly< iataractive graphical interface. The result is dramatic visualization capability coupled with substantial coaputer power, nie benefit to the eoobat rrwiiander Is a aore discrete prediction of the probable aztant of aarloui coQtaalaatloa froa cloud travel, greatly enhancing the understanding of < apart on alasloa . .. accooplishaent . (See Output Coaparlson, Figure 1). The concept for the A.SEACIS ZI aystea was developed and coordinated in -- Noveaber and Oeceaber, 1990. Kork effectively started th« first of January, ■ 1991-and was co&pleted within 45 days. Xbe systaa becaae fully -oparatlonai on 30 January and served the United States Central Coaaind iCBXTCCM) throuohout- Desert Store. As finally configured, strike and azarciae raptt^ froa field conainds were telephoned into t.^e Defense !luclaar Agency's Operations Canter. There, systea operators used t.^e interactive AHBAdS II systaa to access a— - pre-coaputed database of over 11,OCO contour "footprints" for various weapons, agents, and weather conditions. The aystea and Its operators were challenged by over 600 test exercise ard strike aeasage requests called into the Continental United States (COKUS) operations canter froa O.S. forces elaacnta within the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations. Xasponses %ferc provided within 10 Binutes by facsimile transaission over secure telephone lines . The replies, in the fors cf asp contour overlays of different cheaical and biological dosage li=:t5 rC sicr.if ;c:.r.Ci, illowed for Ecenaris ar.elysis arji better advice to cszr^r.zezz- . UtBfiCZS II shows great crosise as a sodular iaproveaent to autoaated NBC warning and reporting sysceos. Additionally, the graphical interface proves 127 that coaaon handling and display of various affects basa modals ia poaalbla, not only in warfare but alao in evaporation aodels for accidents and apilla. Kapid development and iaprovement in weather and terrain accoaaodation are also posaible, to include three dimensional resolution. The software ia readily adaptable to coaaon user type equipaent and saall, notebook-size coaaercial personal computer platforms. In synergy with detection capability, ANBACIS II la • significant advance la contasination avoidance capability, thereby proaotlng success on the contaalnated battlefield. 1. ZmiOOOCTZOR 1.1 Purpoae The Automated Nuclear, Biological and CSieaical ZnforBation Syatea XZ (ANBACIS II) was developed to provide a «ore realistic, real-tine chemical and biological (CB) downwind hazard prediction capability for Onlted States and coalition forces to aval\:ate potential hazards to forces and availability of terrain for maneuver. The effort focused on improving the existing Alliad Technical Publication No. 45 (ATP-45) system which provides a very large, safe-sided hazard area estimate containing more than 99% of cheaical and/or biological agents. The final user products are prediction contour plots that are of tactical significance. (See Output Comparison, figure 1) 1.2 Current Service Capabilities Throughout the services, there Is United capability for CB hazard prediction. The doctrinal standard. Vol II, ATF-45, allows for changing wind directions, but this only eakes a larger, mora conservative fan. It also is not an automated process. Tlie Air force continues to rely on existing aanual aethod of ATP-45. The Any ANBACIS I systea autoaates AT7-45 od DOS personal cooputers. It provides significantly faster computations, but still gives a large fan and has Halted biological capability. The Cbeaical Kesearch, Oevelopaant and Bigineering Center (CROZC) developed the basic defensive resear^ iieapons aodels (called NUSSE-4 and FARACOKFT) which have been incorporated into ANBACIS II. The U.S. Marines acquired a handheld ZZNBC lystea recently developed by the Onlted Kingdoa. It also automates ATT-45 and is ruggedized and iwrtsble but provides less capability than ANBACIS I. It has no biological hazard prediction capability. Tfae-OrST-Navy developed .VLSTRACK for chealcal hazard. prediction. Zt has_ a siailar capability as the basic wespons aodels Incorporated into -ANBACIS. II but is able to use varying winds. It was not fully developed sor evaluated before Desert Storm. The Naval Surface Narfare Center (NSWC) developed a biological "Plume" model which provides more intuitive, realistic looking- - plota using varying weather conditions. Pluae is now incorporated into ANBACIS II. 2. BACKQIOUNZ) 2.1 Concept Initiation During the buildup of Operation Desert Shield, there was great concern over the CE warfare threat in the Persian Gulf. In Novecber 1990, the Director of DNA, Ha^or General Gerald C. Watson, viewed a computer visualization demonstration of a three dimensional transport and diffusion model incorporating local wind and terrain data. Prom this, he conceived the idea 128 of Including such a oodel in the Any ANBACIS program which was already deployed to Aray cooimands in Saudi Axabia. Ha than foraed a teas of chemical experts to review and survey existing models that could be used to develop an improved CB hazard prediction visualization product for COrzcoH comaanders. 2.2 Model Evaluation At the time, there were no operational models svallable which incorporated both weather and terrain data. Several research and developoent models were reviewed for feasibility and operational tisa. The team evaluated a model by the U.S. Army Atmospheric Sciences Laboratories (ASL) which incorporated weather and terrain Inputs but was not sufficiently developed for iBaedlste y operational use. The United States Army Huclear and CSieaical Agency (USANCA)- v^ funded Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) model - HOTMAC/RAPTAO - was also /reviewed but it was not able to handle bursting munition data. Therefore, the • , team initially settled on using NUSSE-4/PARACOKPT for chaalcsl prediction and • GAPCAP/VAMTZCAF for biological. Tbese models, developed by CRDEC for single and multiple munitions scenarios respectively, contain essential munitions data but only basic single vector winds for weather input. 2.3 Justification for ONA Lead DNA's past work on nuclear, dust and smoke transport modeling provided the necessary technical and eieperience base to develop and integrate such an ambitious project. DNA also supported the Army's development of the ANBACIS I program which automated the safe-sided prediction of ATP-45. Beeatise of its mission, DNA also had a core of chemical officers already assigned who became the nucleus of the modeling and validation. 2.4 Coordination Coordination in initiating the project and to kacp it on track was constant and very thorough. Technical experts from within OKK initially visited the U.S. Army Chemical School, Ft MeClellan. AL and ASL «t Mhlt* Sands . Missile Range, MM. As the initial concept came to life, scvaral dlaeusclons pertaining to modeling, and its various factors, war* dlBCUSSod with ASL, LAML and CIU>EC. The operational concept was coordinated with Offices of the Secretory of Defense (OSD), Joint Staff, Department of the Arav Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCSOPS), the Defense and Central Zateillgenoe Agencies, CROEC, the U.S. Arsy Chemical School, and CBtTOON. 2.5 Schedule From the onset and throughout the active project, a schedule was developed and continually modified according tc the circumstances. As_work_transpired£the actual acconplishments were: ~ "; — Zta Git* Initiated Project 1 November 1990 Concept Briefings November 1990 - January 1991 Support Contract Awarded 24 December 1990 Concept Message (J-3 CZNTCOM) 28 '*«~->^'- 1990 System runctional 11 January 1991 Install EcJipaent in Theater 22 - 30 January 1991 System Operational 30 Jantiary 1991 129 24 Hour Operations Stopped 4 March 1991 Operations Terminated '1 March 1991 3. ACnORS PRKEDIHC COWFLICT (Desert Shield) 3.1 Project Teas AS the v«rious input Bodels were being gathered and asslinilated, Applied computing SyBtemsT Inc. was contracted to Integrate the models into an operational system and provide for an enhanced visual output. Selected oereonnel from Other government and contractor organirations (Air force SvstMrcommand, LANl; CRDEC, SAIC, MITRZ, JAYCOR) were also brought in to firther develop, evaluate, and operate the worJcing models. A representative from Air Force Global Heather Center (ATCWC) also joined the project and assisted in establishing on-line *#eather support and an operational weather analysis cell. He Installed the Automated Weather Network (AWN) in the DMA Operations Center which provided the hotirly surface weather observations used tocontinually update weather forecasts for the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations. The ATCWC also provided three military weather forecasters which gave a round- the-clock weather analysis capability. v^3.2 Model Selection «ie CRDTC-developed mJSSE-4 and PARACOMPT models were selected for chemical predictions and the CAPCAP and VAMTICAP models were initially used for biological predictions. A limitation of these models was that they only accepted single vector winds in their calculations. This was not considered a serious deficiency for the chemical predictions since the significant level of contamination from haxardous clouds usually lasted only 1 to 3 hours and traveled only a relatively few tens of kilometers downwind. The larg* numbers of fielded chemical detectors able to alarm on actual contamination offset micro-climate capabilities. Biological agents, however, could drift downwind e to 12 hours and possibly extend several hundred kilometers irtiile still ytemaining virulent, for this reason, the NSKC biological Plume aodel, which \/ accounted for varying meteorological conditions (wind speed, direction, and stability category) and varying biological decay rates (in the night/day transition), was finally selected to be the primary biological prediction model. The NUSSE-4 and Plume models were written in a combination of fORTRAR and C programming language, for \ise-ln-a-Unlx operating environmestj These models did not have user friendly input interfaces nor operating routines.- -- Consequently, operstors made numerous errors and spent much time entering data and calculating responses to messsge reports because lengthy path and file names were required. To correct this, ACS developed a user friendly,, menu. _ ; driven interface so anyone with minimal training co\ild perform special chemical or biological calculations. This interface proved invaluable and allowed for continued use of these models by non-modeling or computer experts. 3.3 Operation and Methodology The Sun SPARC 2 workstation was the primary operational platform used to do the hazar:! predictions. As fast as this computer is, it still often took 15- 20 minutes to perform some calculations and was not sufficient to meet the operational turn around time goal of 10 minutes (from receipt of a strike report from the field to faxing back a contour prediction plot). This 130 prompted • deciclon to crcat* a database of pre-computad chealcal footprints based on sucpectad Iraqi sunitions and agents and various preselected oeteoroiogical conditions. The ANBACIS II systeo has the capability to interact directly with supporting technical Bodels for special computations, or to access a precoaputed chemical database in normal use. (See the System Design, Figure 2) To help create the database rapidly, modelers and operators ran the various prediction probleos reaotely on the DNA Cray computer located at LANL. In the end, nore than 11,000 pre-cooputed footprints were established for the database.' At one tine, four Cray computers were linked together to perform spray tystea calculations qxilckly. While the Crays were neccMary, the reason was solely to accospllsb a large volume of calculations in a short tlae. Kith a lass atrcMful schedule, lesser platfoma can adequately perfora all neccssarr calculations. On the workstations, biological footprints reoaln processed on subordinate windows using interactive screens which drive the aodel and allow input of forecast and changes in weather data. The Pluae andel within AMBACIS II runs quickly (only about 5 more ainutes for a IS ainute turn arotmd time). Biological requests can be updated with weather changes until actual weather reports signify s cofflpleted pattern. (See Exaeples of Znput Screen and Overlay Output, Figure 3) 3.4 Product for the Field The team also decided that rather than deploy computer equipment to CENTCOM for a centralized in-theater hazard prediction focal point, it would be less burdensome and more efficient to have all the calculations and analyses performed in the United States. To get the necessary information back and forth quickly (strike reports from CZHTCOM units and haxard prediction plots returned to CENTCOM) , the Director, DNA offered to provide and install classified facsimile machines and STU-ZZZ secure telephones. Zn all, 21 sets of equipment were deployed according to a CQRCOM distribution plan. There were several factors Influencing the numbers of systems - overall cost and ayailabillty as well as the number of reasonable comasnd nodes requiring assistance, yet able to collate and manage the NBC Naming and Reporting System (MBCHRS). 4. ACTIONS DORZNG COHFLICT (Oasert Stoim: Air t Ground Campaign) 4.1 Deployment and System Operation Shortly after the air war of Desert Storm began, DNA sent four officers to Saudi Arabia with secure facsimile machines and STU-IZI telephones. The equipment was Installed at IS locations as directed by CENTCOM. By 30 January, all the equipment was in place, many pre-cooputed footprints were already developed, and the operating craws Jiera trained.. The DNA_^eratlona^_ Center became fully operational en a 24 hour basis. Three shifts, each with an operations call (military personnel from within ONA), a modeling cell, and a weather cell conducted round-the-clock operations. The modeling cell consisted of computer snd chemical experts from LUil, SAIC, MITRZ, and JATCOR. This cell, via a hl^ispeed computer network link to the 0NA Cray computer at LANL, created the footprint database and ran special calculations as requested by CZNTCOM units. The Central Intelligence Agency (CZA) also used the ANBACIS ZI products for their own aitalysis. Once completed, all footprints a..d other calculation results were stored on a local computer at ONA. This information was then available for all operators to use as an immediate response to a chemical or biological strike or test exercise report. The weather cell consisted of trained military weather analysts and forecasters from the V.S. Air rorce Air Heather Service. Normally, one non- 131 coaaissioned officer was assigned to a particular shift. He was responsible for validating the significant weather entries on the NBC-2 reports or predicting weather forecasts for special exercise aissions. 4.2 Scheme of Operations The general scheme of operations was: 1) Units would telephone in NBC-2 reports to the Operations Center. The NBC-2 report would be completed lAW standard doctrine; each report would have a unique strike serial nuober and the local weather data. 2) Concurrent with a weather check, one of the coaputer operators would input the KBC-2 report data into the Sun workstation and call up the correct pre-computed footprint. He would than scale It to the user re<7uested map scale and print it. 3) The printed hazard prediction, containing remarks blocks with the original NBC-2 report and essential text data supporting the contour plots, was reviewed for accuracy by the Qieaical and Shift Offlcer-in- Chargc. 4) Once approved, the Coaaunications Officer dispatched the prediction plot to the originating unit via secure facsiaile. All of this was accomplished within 10 minutes. To allow for receipt of multiple strike reports from different units at the saae time, six coaputer operators were always available to conduct slaultaneous , aulti-tasking calculatioiis froa any of the six networked workstatioiis if necessary. 4.3 System Usage (then Desert Stora first began, a series of bunker problems were calculated to estimate the effects of coalition bombing of suspected CB production and storage facilities in Iraq. Heapoiis storage quantities were based on estimates provided by personnel froa the United States Army Armament Munitions and Chemical Coaaand (AMCCOM) . The resultant downwind hazard prediction plots were provided to Joint and Service staffs and to the National Military Cotmiisnd Center (NMCC) to assist in overall battle damage assessment. Special calculations were conducted at the request of several agencies. These included assessing potential hazards resulting froa intercepts of Scud missiles and the extent of effects of possible chemical or biological attacks on population centers. An important part of the ANBACZS ZI system was the integration of Defense Happing Agency (DMA) ARC Digitized Raster Graphics (ADRG) maps on compact disc rcad-only-meaory (CD-ROM) optical disks. DMA provided CD-ROM maps in scales -of 1:250,000, -1:900, X>O0_U1,000,Ji0Q^aad_Lr2, 000, 000 for each - area of interest in a most timely manner. Since CD-ROM maps were not available in 1:50,000 scale, DMA provided paper aaps for those areas surrounding the major CZNTCOM air bases of interests. These were then digitally scanned at DNA, logically linked together and added to the map database on the systea server. All hazard prediction plots could then be printed (in black and white or in color) with a aap background if requested. Usually, the map background was not provided because of the additional time in printing the coaplete aap and plot, and in transmitting that detail of information over a 2400 bits per second, analog voice circuit with the facsimile. Hap backgrounds were routinely provided in CONUS when the plots were to be presented during coanand and staff briefings. Overlay plots were routinely sent for CT2TTC0K for posting on operations maps. 4.4 Coordination and Briefings Continuous coordination was made with the Aray Cheaical School, CRDZC, Surgeon 132 C«n«ral'a Office r/4*<./;?ipi>.i> 4. incorporate ANBACIS ZI into the D.S. ANBACZS and NATO ATP-45 as an iaprovaacnt to the current NBC-3 report. 5. downsize and proliferate ANBACZS ZI softwar* to operate on cooBon user platforma. 6. aasign developaent and operations centers to build and use general and theater specific databaaea of footprints. 7. create unclaaaified databaaea for use in classrooa training and field exerciae- situations. e. aaintain a network for exchange of data and to conduct regular teat •JMreises. aaong all elaaenta. - . . . _ __; ■ - ■- 134 ARMYTM3-6665-312-12&P ■ AIR FORCE TO 11H2-1 7-1 | Table 2-1. Preventive Maintenance Checks and Services B - Before Operation 0 - During Operation Item No. Interval 8 0 Hem to be Inspected/Procedure Equipment is Not Ready/Available H: M43A1 DETECTOR Operational Check. NOTE jif alarm sounds when battery is J / connected, allow the alarm to sound I I at least five times. Then press BAT- I I TERY TEST AND RESET PRESS I I button. The above procedure may / I have to be repeated several times^ J Press and hold BAHERY TEST AND RESET PRESS button (23). Read detector meter (24). Detector meter should read in black band. Release BAHERY TEST AND RESET PRESS button. Detector meter does not read in black band. Chann«? 9.19 135 Table 2-1. Preventive Maintenance Checks and Services B • Before Operation 0- During Operation nam No. Interval B 0 Item to be Inspected/Procedure Equipment is Not Ready/Available it: I M43A1 DETECTOR Operational Check. Press and release BAHERY TEST AND E:SET PRESS button (23). Within 2 .~1 inutes alarm should sound. — 1 NOTE 1? alarm does not sound within 7 2 minutes repeat test once more / with a new test paddle. Discard j old. test paddle. i Detector does not/ alarm within two / minutes. I 2-25 136 AIR FORCE TO tlH2-1M | f MO^QggaATING PROCEDURES. I bt^ Fixed Emplacen^nt. (1) M43A1 Deteclof and BA3517/U Batlery. NOTE Notify personnel within audible range that an alann may sound. If alarm sounds when power is connected, allow the alarm to sound at least five times. Then press BATTERY TEST AND RESET PRESS bunon. The above procedure may have to be repeated several times. (d) Connect bat'.ery cable (5) into 24 VOC INPUT on detector. (e) Press BAHERY TEST & RESET PRESS button (6). Detector meter (7) indicates batlery voltage and should be in black band (8). Release. (f) Observe meter (!) until needle returns to green band (9). NOTE If detector has not bc«n in tat lor a long time, it may take 15 minutes lor meter to reach green band. Your equipment is now operating. Change2 2-71 137 Section IV. OPERATION UNDER UNUSUAL CONDITIONS 2-13 OPERATION UNDER UNUSUAL OR SEVERE CONDITIONS. This section tells you how to use the detector under unusual or severe operating conditions. Unusual operating conditions are: a. Operational Alert. b. Air temperature below 20''F (-7'C). c. Blowing dust or sand. d. Rain, sleet, or snow. e. Fording. f. Emergency operation with broken controls or indicators. ; 2-14 OPERATIONAL ALERf~ NOTE The M43A1 Detector will sound the alarm when heavy concentrations of rocket propeilant smoke, screening smoke, signaling smoke, or engine exhaust ire present or when a nuclear explosion occurs. a. When the alarm system signals that chemical agents are present, perform steps (b) through (k) below. b. Immediately take the protective measures described In FM 3-100. c. Give local alert according to local Standard Operating Procedures (SOP). 2-109 138 I M o-oooa-d «• i£«r •16 OPERATION IN BLOWING SAND l/f-16 OPERATION lfWM43Alilst tactor is to Im us sand or dust the air filter must be replaced at mori frequent intervals than normal. Refer to table 2-2. Table 2-2. Air HIter Replacement Interval Sand or Dust Concentration Typical Conditions Air Filter Replacemint Interval (hrs| Minimum Light or medium vehicle traffic on paved surface. Planes taking off from clean runway. Infantry movement on grassy or paved surface. 24 Moderate Light or medium truck traffic on sandy surface. Heavy tank traffic on paved surface. Heavy infantry movement on sandy or dusty surface. 12 High Light truck traffic on dusty surface on windy day. Medium or heavy truck traffic on dusty surface. Light lank traffic on dusty surface on calm day. 6 Extreme Heavy truck traffic on dusty surface on windy day. Light tank traffic on dusty surface on windy day. 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V V V v» V V V V V V) V V V V a ^ ^ ^ a ♦ , * ^ S -J « « e^ 3 lA e Ifl 'y hJ 3 « « *A ^ O art Al I * 'n c£ »*i « f«h -« « 1 * Z b- 1 t 1 1 1 3 Z *M « «J 5* n e r a Z 3 o ■A ^ o ^ m m -^ -* a O o o o a 1 1 1 1 o 1 O 1 o o o o O ^ 1 o o o -1 3 o o o o 1 I -^ j_ •M 1 1 1 1 1 t^ 5 1 -•% •* 1 o o 1 u^ 1 1 -O ac 5 ■A ■M 3 1 3 3 A 0 o •A C 3 o 196 .. I .;-f M-vy. ,,/•.,. i..-v, <■ ^-.. i-ir v.rffl?..;^^- l". |>;,J7'."'-: i^r^7i^y. ■! II .ij ^^^^^^^»*^^^^i^ ■» ■■ ii I ■■■I ,^D]r.c:yi^ ■'■■.y ■ ■;:•■??;,-'.: ^>- ,■-, :-:^-t^5A^Mm^ MM ^.MM:- ■•V W^"*- •" ••" 197 MEDICAL CUSTOMER SHOPPING GUIDE (ALL SUPPLY CLASSES) AND THEATER ARMY MEDICAL MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM (TAMMIS) INSTRUCTIONS FOR SAUDI ARABIA 1. In order to ensure more responsive medical supply support for units participating in Desert Shield, the Army Surgeon General's Office and the U.S. Army Medical Materiel Agency (USAMMA) have developed a Customer Shopping Guide for medical supplies. The shopping guide informs customers where current stocks are located and the levels of stockage. With this data, customers will be able to determine where they can obtain supplies in the time frames they need the supplies. 2. The TAMMIS Customer Guide (TAB A). a. This document is a guide to customers to understand TAMMIS and products that TAMMIS provides to customers. b. The TAMMIS Customer Reorder List (Page A-3 of the Customer Guide) is the key document for customers to manually communicate their recjuest to the U.S. Army Medical Materiel Center Saudi Arabia (USAMMCSA) or to their supporting Medical Supply, Optical and Maintenance Unit (MEDSOM). For items on the reorder list, the customer only needs to write in the quantity needed for an item. The USAMMCSA currently has four Customer Reorder Lists available that can be used by any customer. (1) Army sick call list (2) Army trauma treatment list (3) All stocked drugs (6505) (4) All stocked bandages and surgical supplies (6510-6515) These lists are available in either stock number or nomenclature sequence. c. Customers can receive a tailored Customer Reorder List for items they use. d. Customers will automatically have items added to their reorder list each month as they order items that were not on their original list. 3. For your convenience the Customer Shopping Guide-Saudi Arabia Is published in two sequences: a. Nomenclature/alphabetical (TAB B) . b. National Stock number (TAB C) . 198 4. How to read the Customer Shopping Guide: a. If an item has a quantity in the USAMMCSA column, it is stocked at the USAMMCSA and the delivery time should be seven days or less. b. If an item has a quantity in the U.S. Army Medical Materiel Center, Europe (USAMMCE) column, it is available in Europe and will have a routine delivery time of 14 to 24 days. All items stocked at USAMMCE are medical items frequently used by medical activities In Europe. c. All items with a quantity in the Defense Personnel Support Center/USAMKA column will have a routine delivery time of between 21 and 32 days for normal requests. 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